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Abstract 
This dissertation in four essays critically examines the emergence of 
international criminal courts: their international political underpinnings, 
context, and the impact of their political production in relation to liberal legalism, 
liberal political theory, and history. The essays conceive of international criminal 
legal bodies both as political projects at their inception and as institutions that 
deny their own political provenance. The work is primarily one of political theory 
at the intersection of history, international relations, international criminal law, 
and the politics of memory. The first essay questions Nuremberg’s legacy on the 
United States’ exceptionalist view of international law and its deviant practice, 
while the second essay explores the relationship between exploding inequality 
and the triumph of the human rights movement as well as the costs of 
international prosecutions to the detriment of transformative politics. The third 
essay explores the relationship between history and international criminal courts, 
as well as the limits of their engagement, while the fourth examines the idea of 
legalism—rule following as a moral ethos—in the context of real political trials.  
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Introduction 
“To persons of a more skeptical turn of mind, honest criticism is not a 
form of destructiveness. On the contrary, it is the natural form of intellectual 
discourse, seen as a shared enterprise of argument and counter-argument.”1 
 
The four essays that follow critically examine the emergence of 
international criminal courts: their international political underpinnings, 
context, and the impact of their political production in relation to liberal legalism, 
liberal political theory, and history. The essays conceive of international criminal 
legal bodies both as political projects at their inception (at least) and as 
institutions that deny their own political provenance. The work is one of political 
theory at the intersection of international relations, international criminal law, 
history, and the politics of memory that explores the political nature and effects 
of these prosecutions in their historical context.  
Political theory can, and perhaps indeed it should, provide unsettling 
insights into and mount uncomfortable challenges against conventional wisdom. 
These essays certainly reflect the disposition of a skeptic, and do not hesitate to 
critically examine entrenched ideas, ideologies, and in some cases, dogma 
contained in the academic—as well as judicial, middlebrow and activist— 
production in international criminal law and what I argue are its necessary 
corollaries, human rights, international relations and the new and perplexing 
conduct of war. These themes are obviously quite broad, but if any overarching 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Judith Shklar, Legalism : Law, Morals, and Political Trials, (Boston : Harvard University Press, 
1986), 222.	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strands can be found in these essays it is first a concern for epistemic integrity, as 
well as an examination across broader issues with the way the concept of justice 
is understood, deployed, argued, and the validity of those facts employed to 
support it. Justice is one of those capacious and bedeviling political concepts, 
debated from (at least as far as the Western World is concerned) classical 
antiquity to the current time, without any resolution of the main controversies 
anywhere in sight. These essays will not flatter themselves with any claim to 
originality where the definition of justice is concerned. Rather, they question 
what actually existing international justice is, what it does, and how it does it, and 
critically examine what is meant when the concept is used as part of a political 
claim. Is justice a procedural matter, like the establishment of Western-style 
legalist war crimes tribunals in the wake of Word War II; is it economic justice; is 
it the justice of the execution of a big name terrorist; and do judicial institutions, 
when trying international criminal cases enjoy a much wider jurisdiction than 
domestic courts, with the felt duty to write a definitive history of the nations and 
conflicts that generated the crimes for which individual defendants who stand 
before them are accused? Do these initiatives help or hinder economic justice and 
solidarity at home and abroad? 
The question of justice, in particular when viewed from the perspective of 
American foreign policy, or the Anglo-American legal model that roughly governs 
the new institutions of international criminal law, inevitably leads to an 
encounter with liberalism, a strain of political theory that has known, even in its 
narrower focus on the law, many variants since as early as the 17th century when 
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Hobbes and Locke presented it with such eloquence and urgency. The idea of 
law—the rules, the judge, the enforcement of legal sanctions—has been a central 
part of liberalism from the start. For liberals, political power, distrusted, and 
viewed as arbitrary, ought to be fenced in, and dissolved into legal relationships. 
In the political sphere, and perhaps even more so in the actual practice of law, 
this may constitute an ideology that prevents the search for the actual locus of 
political power—as it continues to exist, notwithstanding a constitution or a 
statute adopted by a Security Council resolution—thus rendering more secure its 
actual holders. Power, as Franz Neumann argues, “cannot be dissolved in law.”2 
In classical liberalism, law stands of course for life, for liberty, and for property 
(even in the French Revolution), but it also stands—though often quite 
hypocritically in practice—for equality. If power is not equally shared as a result 
of the establishment of law, what of the legitimate expectation of equality, both in 
the conduct of international relations through majoritarian institutions and in 
the trials of individuals deprived of hearings in their own sovereign states? 
Post-cold war liberalism emerged triumphant in the 1990s, offering the 
peace dividend, greater freedom and prosperity, as well as various sanguine 
conceptions of international law to be enjoyed in a world of liberal states. Among 
the most successful exponents of such ideas were scholars like Anne-Marie 
Slaughter who to her credit anticipated a critique of her distinction between 
liberal and illiberal states as reminiscent of 19th century distinctions between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Franz Neumann, The Democratic and Authoritarian State : Essays in Political and Legal Theory, 
Herbert Marcuse, ed., (Glencoe, IL : The Free Press, 1957), 7. 
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civilized and uncivilized nations.3 She admitted that time would tell whether the 
distinction might be abused. Ostensibly liberal institutions such as international 
criminal courts, or other kinds of human rights regimes and advocacy, in their 
single-minded prosecutorial determination to put an end to some other kind of 
injustice, failed to understand, or perhaps simply discarded “for the sake of 
cause,” basic liberal underpinnings of justice. Thus, they rode roughshod over 
those very cornerstone liberal principles flowing from the commitment to 
individual freedom: the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, the 
right to fair trials, or something like due process, such as the equality of arms, 
leading to a state of affairs where liberal intentions, backed by the power of 
liberal states, led to quite illiberal proceedings and illiberal results. 
Inspired by Robert Jackson’s opening statement at the Nuremberg trial, 
the first essay, “Reason’s Tribute to Power: International Criminal Law and 
International Relations” examines what is left, in the U.S. conduct of war, 
international relations and its conception of justice, of that magnificent oratory. 
Could power pay tribute to reason, by a nation stung with injury, in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001? The focus of the inquiry is the 
manner in which the killing of Osama bin Laden or drone strikes against 
American citizens are carried out: is the appropriate realm of justification 
morality or legality, and what kind of law for what kind of target? This new war—
and perhaps also the phenomenon of American exceptionalism—has blurred the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States” European Journal of 
International Law, 6(1995): 503-538, 506.	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distinction between criminal and enemy leading to an uncomfortable normative 
position that sits uneasily with liberal principles.  
The second essay, “The Costs of International Criminal Law” introduces 
the current gloomy state of scholarship on the phenomenon of international 
criminal law—a Götterdämmerung slash hangover after the jubilant years of ad 
hoc court establishment and the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The analysis of an exemplar of the current disaffected mood, Mark Osiel, 
known for his work on memory of atrocities, leads to a discussion of both the 
historical rise of the human rights movement, as well as the coincidence of the 
rise of inequality in the U.S. at the same time. The human rights movement has 
been unable or unwilling to tackle poverty and economic injustice and instead 
has devoted its energy to the pursuit of streamlined, minimal issues, primarily in 
the prevention and punishment of atrocities. While the human rights and 
international criminal law movements have had some modest successes in this 
fight against summum malum, they have failed in articulating and much less 
advocating wider collective projects of solidarity. Some prominent rights activists 
have argued that economic rights undermine more important rights, such as 
political, or negative, or “first-generation rights,” yet they have failed to defend 
those very rights in practice, and in particular in institutions of international 
criminal law.  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by the 
Security Council of the United Nations in 1993 and 1994, respectively, faced the 
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already daunting task of carrying out complex criminal prosecutions, with little 
jurisprudential guidance, in often extremely unfavorable conditions. Despite the 
innumerable practical, legal, financial and political challenges these institutions 
faced, they chose to take on an additional and unnecessary responsibility for 
which they were woefully ill-equipped: writing history. The third essay, “The 
World’s Court of Justice: A Historiography of War Crimes Prosecutions” explores 
the incompatibility between the craft of history and institutions of international 
criminal law, and argues that court written history degrades both. Moreover, 
contrary to the tribunals’ claims that their writing history in the context of the 
criminal prosecution of individuals serves to combat denial, the ICTY in 
particular contribute to precisely such historical distortions in the context of 
World War II atrocities. 
The fourth essay, “Shklar’s Legalism and the Liberal Paradox” examines 
Judith Shklar’s Legalism in light of the paradox that emerges clearly from a law-
based approach to international crises that ought to be evaluated on the basis of 
whether the judicial initiative—the cases examined are primarily drawn from ad 
hoc U.N. Security Council tribunals—promote, in Shklar’s words, “decent 
politics”. The question of whether this notion is exclusively related to liberalism, 
and whether it may run contrary to the role of defense counsel in such trials—
deeply anchored in the liberal tradition of the protection of individual liberty, and 
yet confronted to the politics of international criminal law and international 
relations, however theorized—is fundamental, as “decent politics” compete with 
the legalistic imperatives of the defense, and the liberal foundation of the legal 
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systems from which U.N. trials have emerged. Legalism provides a theoretical 
thread to examine the emergence of international criminal trials as well as the 
relation between the universality of law and history and the politics of memory, 
which figure prominently as political phenomena in these trials, but which may 
run contrary to the liberalism inherent in the legalist form. 
 
Poverty 
A note on the title of this dissertation in four essays On the Poverty, Rise 
and Demise of International Criminal Law is in order. “Poverty” is of course a 
nod to Karl Marx’s retort to anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s The System of 
Economic Contradictions: The Philosophy of Poverty, cleverly titled The Poverty 
of Philosophy. As Marx contests Proudhon’s abilities both in philosophy and in 
economics, so too I argue that the philosophical and economic bases of the 
broader human rights movement and institutions of international criminal law 
are less compelling, brilliant and hopeful than their proponents would have us 
believe. Proudhon’s anti-statism makes him a useful foil for my own Poverty, as 
the phenomena under study have challenged, and for a time, at least, prevailed 
over the idea of sovereignty (of some states) through the creation of international 
or hybrid institutions that prosecute individual citizens of sovereign states, 
humanitarian intervention, or even drone strikes. Marx’s original “mercilessly 
sarcastic”4 critique of Proudhon’s work was written in French to ensure the target 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Leszek Kolakowsi, Main Currents of Marxism, (New York: Norton, 2005), 172. 
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of his ire would readily comprehend his acid “observations.”5 At the risk of 
appearing to indulge in playful, almost post-modern etymological fancy, I point 
out that Marx’s French title is “Misère de la philosophie,” where “misery” (or 
“miserable” or “wretched”) was a synonym of “miser” until the 16th century, when 
the meaning shifted to account for the presumed unhappiness of those who hoard 
wealth. International criminal law has been miserly, delivering surprisingly little 
for any of its constituencies. Those of a pro-prosecution bent will bemoan the 
(low) single digit conviction rate before the International Criminal Court, others 
may be concerned by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia’s carving out exceptionally liberal standards of intent for a crime as 
stigmatizing as genocide, while still others may wonder, more broadly, whether 
the turn to international human rights and international criminal law has not 
adversely impacted previously held projects of transformative politics. 
The title also reflects three tenses of my own intellectual life. I began to 
think of these issues in the early 1990s while still in law school at the Université 
du Québec à Montréal. An ambitious new hire, who defended his Ph.D while I 
was his student, hired me as a research assistant. He was, at least for me, the 
future criminal defense lawyer, distressingly enthusiastic about something called 
“international human rights,” and tried to get me interested in the not-yet-
existing “field” of international criminal law. I resisted, not seeing anything that 
could usefully be written or argued about what seemed like a quasi-legal regime 
with apparently no enforceable rights for defendants. Then the ICTY was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 David McLellan, Karl Marx : Selected Writings, (Oxford: Oxford, 1977), 195-213. 
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established, and my well-connected professor, who had studied law after a career 
in journalism and political engagement, received some sort of contract to 
contribute to deliberations about the rules of evidence and procedure from the 
perspective of the defense. After carrying out research on the Nuremberg trial, I 
met with him to discuss my findings, as well as my concerns. The presumption of 
innocence would be difficult to ensure, I thought, and I expressed concern that 
rules of evidence ought not be relaxed for charges of sexual violence, in particular 
as the war had already generated incredible resentments, causing me to fear the 
potential of unreliable testimony in exactly those instances where rapes had been 
committed, to avenge the crimes of—not necessarily the accused—but any other 
soldier, militiaman, or guard of the same ethnic group as the rapist(s). The 
response I received was surprising: I was told by one who identified himself as 
being on the defense side of things, not to be imposing Western common law on 
an international proceeding, as if I had been promoting some Anglo-American 
legalistic imperialism against the wretched of the earth. His statement shocked 
me by the way it was framed and I realized that this portended quite poorly for 
the new tribunal, especially from the perspective of individual rights. I witnessed 
the poverty of international criminal law at the creation. 
 
Rise 
As for the rise of international criminal law, suffice it to say that I did go 
on to become a busy criminal defense lawyer in the trenches, writing articles for 
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my Bar colleagues when time permitted, while my professor, William Schabas, 
ascended the Olympus of human rights and genocide scholarship, as his 30 page 
curriculum vitae and half dozen honoris causae can attest. I was content in my 
practice, and planned not only to return to school to deepen my study of legal 
theory, but held the ambition of one day being named a judge. Circumstances, 
however, upended these plans as I was recruited to the defense team on one of 
the first ever cases prosecuting genocide as a result of my published work on the 
disclosure of evidence. Thus, I became in January 1997 co-counsel for Georges 
Rutaganda before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Arusha, 
Tanzania, and was appointed lead counsel in September of that year after his 
Belgian counsel essentially disappeared. This was the first year that individuals 
were charged with genocide; this was the rise of international criminal law. There 
is much that I could catalogue of my experience, from the humorous—being 
prevented from returning to the courtroom after a break by Hillary Clinton’s 
Secret Service detail and taking an unguarded back entrance instead—to the daily 
Kafkaesque violations of the rights of my client. I wish instead to relate the issue 
of how international criminal law, during its ascent, blocked the investigation of 
one of the most causally significant events in 1994 Rwanda. 
The consensus view is that the spark that set off the explosion in Rwanda 
in 1994 was the shooting down of the plane carrying presidents Habyarimana of 
Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, the Rwandan Army chief of staff, officials 
close to the presidents and the entire French crew. 
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More than twenty years after the catastrophic shoot-down of April 6th 
1994, there have been no criminal prosecution, no civil sanctions, and no 
diplomatic consequences to speak of in relation to this crime. It is as if the 
airplane had simply crashed by itself, while the killings then started. As cruel as 
this declaration may appear, it conforms exactly to the thesis adopted by the 
Prosecutor at the ICTR in the charges brought against Georges Rutaganda, my 
client:  
The 6th of April 1994, an airplane carrying President Juvenal 
Habyarimana of Rwanda, and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi 
crashed at the Kigali airport killing all aboard. Following the deaths of the 
two presidents, the generalized political and ethnic killings began in Kigali 
and then spread to other parts of Rwanda.6 
 
The vocabulary of the ICTR Prosecutor does not indicate a great desire to 
see things as they are: the plane “crashed”. Two presidents of two countries so 
torn by wars and coups d’états, likely to return to a bloody war, were “dead,” as 
simple as that. It is not inaccurate to assert that the plane crashed. It is, however, 
quite incredible that an institution described as judicial and established by the 
Security Council of the United Nations would neglect to mention that before the 
plane crashed, it was blown out of the sky by two SAM-16 missiles.  
The ICTR had all the judicial power and technical means required to 
initiate and carry out a thorough investigation of this terrorist act that triggered 
such nightmarish consequences. Yet its causes seem to be of astonishingly little 
interest to this organ of the UNSC, which was also responsible for the UNAMIR 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-I, Indictment. 
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force in Kigali at the time of the attack, present on the ground in Kigali at the 
time of the shoot-down. The importance of the shoot-down had not, however, 
escaped my attention. Already on the 7th of February 1997, I argued before 
Chamber I of the ICTR for the disclosure of all evidence obtained by Prosecution 
investigations into the shoot-down of the presidential plane or, alternatively, in 
the event that no such investigation had taken place, to order that the 
Prosecution proceed immediately to initiate such an investigation. The response 
by the Deputy Prosecutor was surprising:  
Our responsibility and mandate is not to investigate plane crashes. That’s 
not really our function. Therefore, I would categorically answer this 
question by saying that, first, we don’t have any such investigation. We 
have not made any such investigation and we don’t have any reports. And, 
secondly, it is not our function, it is not our mandate, to investigate plane 
crashes or presidents, vice-presidents, or whoever it is. And, therefore, this 
is really a matter not within our province.7  
 
That was in February 1997. On the 1st of March 2000, the Canadian daily, 
National Post, revealed that investigations into the shoot-down had been carried 
out by the Prosecution starting in 1996,8 that is, before the Prosecutor had denied 
it, categorically and on his oath of office, during the trial of Georges Rutaganda. 
The information obtained by The Post showed that investigations had in fact been 
fruitful: two witnesses from Kagame’s elite unit, “The Network,” had been located 
and they affirmed that the shoot-down was the work of the RPF, in collaboration 
with a foreign country. The journalist from The Post had acquired two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, translated from French language transcripts of 
February 7th, 1997, pp. 44-5. 
8 “Explosive Leak on Rwanda Genocide,” Steven Edwards, National Post, March 1st 2000, page 1. 
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documents: the so-called “Hourigan Report,” as well as an unsigned letter, 
detailing the testimonies of the members of “The Network”.  
The first confidential report was written for the Office of Internal 
Investigations of the United Nations by a former investigator for the Prosecutor’s 
Office9 expressing frustration with the fact that he was prohibited from 
continuing the investigation into the shoot-down, despite the fact that it was 
progressing well and following Prosecutor Arbour’s initial enthusiasm about the 
new developments. Suddenly, however, she brutally shut down the investigation. 
It had been closed just as it was gathering credible evidence about the 
perpetrators of the shoot-down.  
Thus, investigation was shut down, despite it having located new witnesses 
who were ready to talk. Their testimony would have completely overturned the 
conventional narrative regarding the shoot-down as an act perpetrated by 
“extremist Hutus” to liquidate a too-moderate Habyarimana whose plans were to 
establish the institutions set forth in the Arusha Accords. Instead, his 
assassination would trigger a pre-planned genocide against the Tutsi people of 
Rwanda.  
What if the investigation that was shut down had revealed that the RPF 
had brought down the presidential plane? What would have been the political 
consequences? In his testimony in the case Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Belgian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Michael Hourigan, Australian lawyer, employed by the Prosecution of the ICTR in the first years 
of operation of the Tribunal. Barrie Collins, Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide 
Conspiracy and its Consequences, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, 30-32. 
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Professor and Rwanda specialist Filip Reyntjens, called by the prosecution as an 
expert witness, conceded during the cross examination that:  
The Arusha Accords gave a great deal to the RPF. They could have clearly 
gained even more if they had carried on with the war to its end, which in 
the end they did, but which they certainly could not have done if they had 
no good pretext.  
Now, I am not at all suggesting that the RPF had been looking for this 
pretext, because this pretext would have meant shooting down of the 
presidential plane and we do not know, today, who carried out this shoot 
down.” (emphasis added)10  
 
We now know that at the time Professor Reyntjens was testifying, the Prosecutor 
was indeed in possession of evidence pointing to the RPF as the responsible party 
for the shoot-down. In light of Reyntjens’ reasoning, serious problems emerge. 
First, contrary to the assertion by the Deputy Prosecutor in February 1997, 
the identity of the perpetrators of the shoot-down was relevant. More 
significantly, the Prosecution’s fundamental thesis—that President Habyarimana, 
the MRND, the general staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces and other Hutu 
“extremists,” failed to negotiate for peace in good faith, because they did not want 
to share power with the RPF—collapses completely. In place of this entrenched 
conventional account, a competing theory emerges as plausible. The RPF may 
have shot down the plane in order to create a pretext for breaking the ceasefire, 
continuing armed hostilities, and take advantage of the predictable chaos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, French language transcripts of November 24th 1997, 
pages 19-20. 
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following the shock created by the President’s assassination to take over the 
entire country militarily.  
And so the massacres began. We know what then unfurled, and how these 
killings continued across a macabre path towards the Congo. Five million, six 
million human lives were lost since the invasion of Rwanda in 1990. Where is the 
Tribunal for the Congolese victims, for the Hutus slaughtered in the refugee 
camps in the ex-Zaire? What then would be the legal consequences to be drawn 
from the fact that the Prosecutor’s investigations revealed that the presidential 
plane was shot down by the RPF? Professor Reyntjens again gives us a line of 
thinking that is of essential importance for understanding not only the Rwandan 
catastrophe, but also the real reasons why an investigation that may have begun 
in good faith could end up so bungled:  
But there would also exists a legal interest. Those who brought down this 
plane knew very well what the consequences of this shoot-down would be 
and in this case they would bear a legal responsibility, and I’m not saying 
political, now, but legal, for the genocide. Because they, knowing full well 
what the consequences are, would have unleashed a genocide.11  
 
Despite this evidence presented at his trial, the judgment condemning 
Georges Rutaganda made note only of a “plane crash”. The shoot-down is 
invisible, its victims are demonized, and the fact of the shoot-down would only 
serve as a point of reference, in time, marking the beginning of the genocide.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, French language transcripts of the 24th of November 
1997, pp. 113-114. 
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Demise 
Thus, perhaps understandably, began my struggle with legalism 
confronted to the astonishing—and too often cynical, dishonest and unfair— 
realpolitik in and outside the courtroom. In 2004, the Security Council of the 
United Nations announced its completion strategy for the two ad hoc courts; the 
new International Criminal Court would now carry the weight of international 
prosecutions.  
The legacy of the ICTR, in particular, is marred by the shocking fact that 
eleven acquitted defendants remain in a safe house in Arusha, Tanzania, as the 
institution has proven itself unwilling or unable to secure the kind of 
arrangements with U.N. member states that it had succeeded in doing to house 
the convicted. It is impossible for these individuals to return to Rwanda without 
being prosecuted anew,12 and many states where their families reside legally have 
refused to grant visas for these people. One acquitted man has been living in the 
safe house since 2004. It is as if no thought was given to the eventuality of 
acquittals.13 
The ICTR heard its last appeal in December 2015. The electronic archives 
are scandalously incomplete, particularly in the case of my client. There is 
tremendous concern that the record of the proceedings of this now defunct body 
is not kept with anything resembling archival integrity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  James Karuhanga, “ICTR Can Return To Rwanda But May Still Be Charged:  RPF,” New Times, 
Kigali, January 18th, 2016.	  
13 Caroline Buisman and Kate Gibson, “Acquitted by Law, Prosecuted by Propaganda,” Justice in 
Conflict http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/03/31/acquitted-by-law-prosecuted-by-propaganda/. 
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In the wake of September 11th 2001, it was clear that a serious challenge to 
the ICC’s legitimacy had been presented by the “unsigning” of the Rome Statute 
by President George W. Bush. State members of the ICC could not agree on a 
definition of the crime of aggression—the supreme international crime, as per the 
Nuremberg tribunal—until 2010, but even then, with the influence of the U.S. 
“observer” delegation, it became possible for states to “opt out” of jurisdiction 
over the offence. The ICC appeared to have regained prestige and importance in 
2011 when it issued indictments against Muammar Gaddafi, but the fact and the 
manner of his subsequent murder, as well as the deterioration of the security 
situation and state apparatus in Libya left a bitter, decidedly non-Nuremberg-like 
taste. Grumbling about the ICC’s outcomes—and exclusive prosecution of 
Africans—has grown louder. In a late 2014 New York Times debate, Professor 
Daniel Abebe calculated that the ICC’s budget—$1 billion since 2002—could have 
fed 600 million people or vaccinated 1.7 billion. He makes the following 
politically decent point: 
Pouring more money into the I.C.C. or expanding its powers won’t 
overcome the constraints of international politics. Investing in education 
and health care in Africa is a better use of limited resources. In the end, if 
the supporters of the I.C.C. really think it is necessary, they have the 
burden of explaining why two convictions from a flawed court are worth $1 
billion.14 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Daniel Abebe, “I.C.C.’s Dismal Record Comes at Too High a Price,” The New York Times, 
December 11th, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/11/do-we-need-the-
international-criminal-court/iccs-dismal-record-comes-at-too-high-a-price 
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The false dichotomy between basic human needs and the quest for the 
prosecution of atrocity crimes and the most egregious human rights violators has 
hindered not only the proper conduct of criminal justice and achieved illiberal 
results, but has also degraded concrete solidarity projects at home and abroad. 
Perhaps then, as these essays explore, the prospect of international criminal law’s 
demise is not such a dire prospect, after all. 
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Essay 1: Reason’s Tribute to Power: International Criminal Law and 
International Relations 
 
“If you doubt America’s commitment—or mine—to see that justice is done, just 
ask Osama bin Laden. (Applause.)”15 
 
Flushed With Victory and Stung With Injury 
Four decades after their accomplishment, it seemed that the revolutionary 
prosecutions of individuals under international law at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
would, in the end, remain historical aberrations. Described variously as forms of 
victor’s justice,16 or sui generis political trials—for late political theorist Judith 
Shklar, writing about Nuremberg, they were acceptable to the extent that they 
might bring about “decent politics,”17 while for Tokyo Judge Rahabinod Pal, they 
were means to curtail and contain self-determination and decolonialization18 — 
over time, and with the cold war unable to produce anything like the precedent of 
Nuremberg, “growing” as Geoffrey Best put it, “ever fainter,”19 it appeared that 
the revolution of post World War II trials would remain childless. Ethiopia’s 1949 
attempt to extradite Italian marshals Pietro Badiglio and Rodolfo Graziani for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  “Remarks	  of	  President	  Barack	  Obama—State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address	  as	  Delivered,”	  January	  12th,	  2016,	  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2016/01/12/remarks-­‐president-­‐barack-­‐obama-­‐%E2%80%93-­‐prepared-­‐delivery-­‐state-­‐union-­‐address	  
16 Danilo Zolo, Victors’ Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad, (London: Verso, 2009) 27-29. 
17 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 145. 
18 Kirsten Sellars, “Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo,” EJIL (2010), Vol. 21 No. 4, 1085–
1102, 1096. 
19 Geoffrey Best, cited in Sellars, “Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo,” 1086. 
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war crimes before an international court governed by the Nuremberg principles20 
failed,21 while Hans Kelsen expressed the hope that Nuremberg would not create 
a precedent.22 Hedley Bull argued that the selectivity of the war crimes courts 
would cloud their symbolic value, and that it would be best to refrain from 
creating bodies that would “reflect the values of the presently prevailing great 
powers”23 without necessarily corresponding to a moral order yet to be built.24 
Once the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), shortly followed by the creation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), unthinkable during the cold 
war, but suddenly possible as a result of the radically different political 
conditions that emerged after its end, enthusiasm and support for international 
criminal tribunals and prosecutions of individuals under international law 
became ubiquitous in the scholarly literature. The disciplines from which this 
praise emanated were not limited to international law: historians, political 
scientists, political theorists, ethnographers, as well as large swaths of the 
humanities had something to contribute to the discourse of virtuous triumph. 
Finally civilization had reached, if not Fukuyama’s End of History, at least a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
UNTS 279. 
21 Zolo, Victors’ Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad, 27. 
22 Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in 
International Law?” International Law Quarterly 1 (2), 1947; Zolo, 18. 
23 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1977), 304; Justice in International Relations. 1983–84 Hagey 
Lectures, University of Waterloo (Waterloo, Australia: University of Waterloo Press); Jonathan 
Graubart (2010), “Rendering Global Criminal Law an Instrument of Power: Pragmatic Legalism 
and Global Tribunals” Journal of Human Rights, 9:4, 409-426, 411. 
24 Ibid. 
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promise of previously unattainable universal justice, and barring that, personal 
meaning for the romantics who’d finally found their academic Spanish Civil 
War.25 
Exceptionalism and its Discontents 
What is to be done with a project that seeks to engage with the politics of 
international criminal law and that does not assume that the normative 
enthusiasm, claims to institutional legitimacy, or policy positions expressed by 
much of the scholarly literature26 are unproblematic? A first question concerns 
the nature of what is being analyzed: international law, though a legal project, 
and accordingly susceptible to being studied strictly as such, is also undeniably 
the result of politics. Historically, the theoretical study of law has always been 
closely associated to philosophy and political theory, and from Plato’s Laws to 
contemporary critical legal theory, it has been clear, for the most part, that the 
study of the law has not been the study of just one thing, but is rather, as writes 
Ian Ward, “a critical and an interdisciplinary exercise.”27 Critical legal 
scholarship, according to Ward, disputes “the assertion that law can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
147-148. See, too, Carl Schmitt’s Political Romanticism, in particular as the idea is applied to 
contemporaries such as the late Christopher Hitchens by David Runciman, “It’s Been a Lot of 
Fun,” London Review of Books, 24 June 2010, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n12/david-
runciman/its-been-a-lot-of-fun>. 
26 See, inter alia: K. Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravscik A, et al. (2000) “The concept of 
legalization,” International Organization 54(3): 401–419; Yves Beigbeder, (2002) Judging 
Criminal Leaders: The Slow Erosion of Impunity. The Hague: Kluwer Law International; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, (1995) “International law in a world of liberal states,” European Journal of 
International Law 6(4): 503–538; (2003) A global community of courts. Harvard International 
Law Journal 44(1): 191–220; (2004) A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press; (2007) The Idea that is America: Keeping Faith with Our Values in a Dangerous World. 
New York: Basic Books. 
27 Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal Theory, (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1998), v. 
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understood, that it can be founded, in one particular theory or one particular 
discipline or methodology.”28 This view takes the position that law is not a 
science (or at least not just a science), a stance that critical approaches are hardly 
alone in defending. As a recent symposium on the methodology of international 
law, edited by Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter29 in the American 
Journal of International Law illustrates, “mainstream” legal scholarship has all 
but abandoned the exclusive theoretical commitment to a scientific study of law, 
opting instead for policy relevance,30 affecting the conduct of international 
decision makers,31 and studying the intersection of international relations and 
international law (or international law as a subset of international relations).32 
While “mainstream” approaches to international law have heeded Hans 
Morgenthau’s 1940 call for a closer connection between the “science” of 
international law and its subject matter,33 its approach to the examination and 
analysis of international criminal law is largely rooted in a faith that liberal 
judicial models produce justice.34 As questioning faith generated the ability to 
develop scientific enquiry in the Enlightenment, so, too, has the abandonment of 
the scientific approach to law apparently favored the conditions for a return to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid. 
29 Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Appraising the Methods of International Law: a 
Prospectus for Readers,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), 
pp. 291-302 
30 See the New Haven School, Ratner and Slaughter, “Appraising the Methods of International 
Law: a Prospectus for Readers,”293. 
31 Ibid., as in the International Legal Process School, 294. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law,” 34 AJIL 260, 261 
(1940). 
34 Graubart, “Rendering Global Criminal Law an Instrument of Power: Pragmatic Legalism and 
Global Tribunals,” 411. 
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faith, ideology, and the cloaking of power with the discourse and vocabulary of 
justice. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s A New World Order displays the kind of 
optimism towards post-cold war international law, and its potential to 
universalize American judicial values, that deserves further investigation.35 At the 
heart of her project, first introduced in “International Law in a World of Liberal 
States,” is the idea that American judicial governance—in the tradition of 
Marbury v. Madison—is not only desirable at an international level, but that it 
has already taken root as an international “community of courts” that act to limit 
centralized authority. It is as powerful a suggestion as it is provocative, and 
indeed curious: the legal (and symbolic) power of Marbury is predicated on a 
central, hierarchically superior legal text, the U.S. Constitution, yet no such 
document, or constitutional regime exists internationally.36 As Nikolas Rajkovic 
notes, the symbolic force of the American constitutional order is fully deployed 
within the “proliferation of powerful international courts,” while the “rule of no 
one,” the rule of higher law establishing a system of judicial review (and referring 
to the idea that no one is above the law, as well as to the concept of a government 
of laws, not men), is exposed,37 or to reformulate more strongly, empty.  
The strength of Marbury cannot be divorced from the culturally-specific 
and distinctly American attachment to the U.S. Constitution, one that, as Paul W. 
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Kahn has argued over the years, is spiritual in nature,38 and results from the 
constitution’s embodiment of the popular sovereign’s act of will.39 “Not 
coincidentally,” writes Kahn, it is precisely the belief that the constitution is a 
product of the sovereign will that “supports what is commonly called ‘American 
exceptionalism.’”40 Further, it is this very exceptionalism that justifies the U.S. 
reluctance to join international treaties, human rights conventions, to agree to 
the jurisdiction of international or translational courts, and to abide by their 
rulings.41 And yet, the Marbury ideal is the foundation upon which Slaughter’s 
New World Order is built, one in which American values radiate outward—such 
as with Gary Jonathan Bass’s peculiar suggestion that the American Declaration 
of Independence ought to apply to Bosnians42 —but are not, once they are 
projected back through any kind of remotely functional international legal 
structure, accepted or welcome. And this is possible because contrary to law’s 
rule in the United States, there is no international constitutional system in place 
internationally, and no enforcement beyond what states accept. That many of 
these treaties and international agreements are the results of successful U.S. 
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foreign policy, and that Americans do not disagree, according to Kahn, with the 
substance of international human rights law, appears less paradoxical when 
viewed in light of the American inability to see law outside the expression of the 
sovereign. Absent an international sovereign—or perhaps in the presence of 
another sovereign, a “them” to whom “we” are related only imperfectly—the 
American political imagination does not see law.43 Since the initial expression of 
popular sovereignty is a result of revolution, law is linked to exception.44 
American exceptionalism, for Kahn, is best understood as a variation on the 
theme of Carl Schmitt’s exception: “Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception.”45 
Slaughter’s optimism thus seems premature, or more precisely misplaced, 
if the exercise is meant to construct a system of international law that applies 
equally to all. And perhaps, in fairness, that was not what the project sought to 
accomplish. While the “new world order” was witness to the emergence of law-
like bodies (the expression is Judith Shklar’s)46 constraining the sovereignty of 
some states, the one state that predominantly decides whose sovereignty will be 
overridden is an exception to the universal regime as it is not held by it (though it 
is not, in this respect, alone). This one state, too, decides on the exception: those 
extreme cases of use of force and the establishment of judicial institutions 
governing exceptional cases arising from exceptional events. Because they are 
exceptional, international judicial bodies are not always created to deal with 	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exceptional events; they may or may not be, in accordance with the decision of 
the sovereign. Schmitt was not a liberal, of course, but assuming for the sake of 
argument that liberal states, as conceived of in Slaughter’s 1995 disclaimer 
regarding the manner in which her argument might be received, are in fact 
embodied by the U.S., it is instructive to take note of the potential for 
anachronistic adventurism that she makes explicit: 
 
The very idea of a division between liberal and non-liberal States may 
prove distasteful to many. It is likely to recall 19th century distinctions 
between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' States, rewrapped in the rhetoric of 
Western political values and institutions. Such distinctions summon 
images of an exclusive club created by the powerful to justify their 
dominion over the weak. Whether a liberal/non-liberal distinction is used 
or abused for similar purposes depends on the normative system 
developed to govern a world of liberal and non-liberal States.47 
 
And what normative system has been established that we might begin to 
evaluate whether distasteful 19th century distinctions between civilized and 
uncivilized states, “rewrapped in the rhetoric of Western political values” have 
emerged? The case of international criminal law is most instructive in this 
respect. 
Stay the Hand of Vengeance? 
Scholarship on international criminal courts described previously as 
belonging to the “mainstream,” and displaying unusual commitment and 	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optimism for a policy project (as opposed to, say, determination to understand or 
explain a given phenomenon) has been largely supportive of the drive toward 
international criminal law. Gary Jonathan Bass exemplifies this tendency in his 
book, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, published in 2000, in which he insists that 
only liberal nations adhering to due process establish war crimes trials, and 
insists, in particular, on American leadership—as well as, in an odd throwback to 
cold-war rivalry—Soviet bad faith, if not perfidy. Bass is explicit in identifying his 
theoretical opponents, the realists, who “argue that international relations differ 
from domestic politics in the lack of ruler among self-interested states.”48 Realists 
are in turn “mystified” by international moralizing and “contemptuous” of 
“utopianism.”49 Bass acknowledges the many historical failures of Western states 
to achieve war crimes trials—this is the term he uses, though his descriptions of 
offences lean towards extreme acts closer in nature to crimes against humanity 
and genocide—on the basis of state interests, but posits that there is something 
distinctly legalistic about these trials, something that realism cannot grasp or 
account for. They are not mere purges, he states, they do not aim to dispose of 
enemies but to try criminals “deserving of just punishment,” something realists, 
he writes, would be baffled by or deplore.50  
For all his sense of justice, however, Bass repeatedly indulges in 
formulations that support the justness of killing without recourse to trial, whose 
great virtue is in not some abstract due process, and much less a vague liberal 	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morality, but rather in performing the epistemic exercise that consists in 
evaluating actual evidence instead of determining that some individuals’ lives can 
be expended extra-judicially: “Today, who could really say that it would be totally 
unjust to shoot thugs like Théoneste Bagosora or Ratko Mladic?,”51 “[Milosevic] 
“could have wound up like Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu,”52 “These 
leaders …are lucky to be alive.”53  
Bass may be reasoning counterfactually in reference to Robert Jackson’s 
opening statement at Nuremberg, and referring to the stirring oratory that 
unforgettably intoned: 
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the 
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power ever 
has paid to Reason.54  
 
Bass makes a compelling case that the views of Western leaders, in particular 
those of Churchill and Roosevelt, were, at least initially, strongly in favor of 
executing the Nazi leadership. But this is not the same as saying that Power’s only 
means (and here, one would be well advised to read “realism”) are vengeance and 
killing, nor that realism, or power, or even liberalism, or reason, ever considered 
it “just” to kill extrajudicially. That type of political theory can be found in the 
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Medieval just war theory, or its successor versions in those thinkers Kant called 
“miserable comforters” in Perpetual Peace, or finally in its contemporary 
exponents such as Michael Walzer. Power does not cloak its killings under the 
mantle of justice, as Thucydides—upon whom Bass does not hesitate to rely to 
show the historical reality of reprisal killings and the exterminations that the 
Greek wars of antiquity visited upon defeated enemies55—but on the assertion of 
raw power. The Melian dialogue, the most oft-cited of Thucydides’ moralistic 
passages, shows that Athens did not consider that it possessed any claim or right 
or just cause over the lives of the citizens of Melos in the event of their defeat: 
only that they would, in the event of war, be powerless to resist mass murder and 
enslavement, and thus would be well advised to respond positively to Athens’ 
request that they no longer declare neutrality, and instead join them in the Delian 
League. This was by all means a threat, but what it certainly was not was a realist 
claim that killing was right. Not right, only possible (and indeed likely), and 
therefore expedient. What we remember from the Melian dialogues is that the 
Melians made a moral—and consequentialist—case for decency in war. Today, we 
would describe the Melian argument as consistent with the rules of jus in bello, 
but at that time, and as told by Thucydides, the Melians were arguing that 
perhaps Athens would not forever be as powerful as it was then, and that decency 
in combat might eventually appear to be a custom they would be grateful to see 
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observed by all56.  
Flushed With Victory 
The discursive origins of international criminal law were auspicious 
enough. Robert Jackson’s opening statement at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major 
War Criminals, artfully balanced in perfect proportion the rhetorical ingredients 
of logos, pathos, and ethos, and memorably cast the undertaking as exceptional. 
It bears repeating: “That four nations, flushed with victory and stung with 
injury,” Jackson said, “stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their 
captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes 
that Power ever has paid to Reason.” And to an important extent, it was. The 
allies could have followed historical precedent and inflicted a wide array of extra-
judicial punishment on the vanquished. Yet for the first time, as Justice Jackson 
framed it, power paid tribute to reason. “Tribute,” of course, in its original Latin 
form incarnation designated a tax, then a form of subjugation. Roman and Greek 
tributes were habitually paid by defeated or vassal nations to the victors or the 
imperial capital.57 Power, which in the case of Justice Jackson’s Nuremberg 
oratory, represented military victory over the Axis states in World War II, would 
pay tribute, or choose to subordinate itself, to reason, represented by the model 
of a courtroom. The opposition of the courtroom to the idea of vengeance is not 
new, as Justice Stephen Breyer, in a keynote address to mark Yom Hashoah at 
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the Capitol Rotunda in 1996, evoked Aeschylus’ The Eumenides,58—in which the 
vengeance of the furies is thwarted by Athena’s decision to hold Athens’ first 
mythical trial for murder—as a precedent to Nuremberg’s pioneering judgment of 
crimes against humanity. Breyer sees in Nuremberg an ending of the “Holocaust 
story with a fair trial, an emblem of that justice” that echoes Aeschylus: a perfect 
justice that is the best in the land, a “bulwark of salvation” across the empire, the 
mightiest in the habitable world.59 The reference hardly seems accidental. In The 
Eumenides, it is not, however, justice, but the goddess Athena who creates a 
criminal court, and it is in fact her power and authority that allows reason to 
displace vengeance as a preferred social solution for Athens, perhaps much as it 
was the power of Allied occupation, in Nuremberg, that allowed the allies to 
decide that reason, rather than vengeance, was the preferred international 
solution, in what had already become a significantly altered state of relations 
between major powers. 
The Eumenides has also, however, been interpreted as reflecting a “dark 
side” of Athens, in particular in its imperial designs and practices.60 Justice 
Breyer, in introducing the link between Jackson’s contribution to Nuremberg and 
Aeschylus’ justice (or Athena’s, in fact), does not hesitate to include her claim 
that the seat of justice “shall be a wall, a bulwark of salvation, wide as your land, 
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as your imperial state; none mightier in the habitable world.”61 Here, in Breyer’s 
oratory, Jackson represents American aspirations for international criminal law, 
and The Eumenides provides support for the notion that it is desirable to spread 
the democratic brand of justice (whether Athenian or American) abroad, as these 
values are inherently universal, radiating outward, as with Slaughter and Bass. 
That the U.S., like Athens, might be an empire, and how this relates to justice 
when carried out internationally, is worth examining.  
Rebecca Futo Kennedy, in her study of several Greek tragedies, traces the 
changes in the portrayal of Athena’s position on justice over a fairly short period 
of history (roughly of the existence of the Delian League, in the 5th century BCE), 
and in relation to Athens’ relations with its allies.62 She first notes the peculiar 
fact that The Eumenides describes the trial of Orestes, who is a summachos, 
translated as a non-Athenian military ally.63 At the time the play was first 
presented to Athenians, the only murder trials held in the Areopagus—where The 
Eumenides takes place—were of Athenians, and this is significant for Kennedy as 
the portrayal of the trial of a non-Athenian ally represents Athenian judicial 
hegemony in the Empire.64 Alliances in Athens required having the same friends 
and enemies; here Carl Schmitt looms large again.65 From The Eumenides’ 
portrayal of the Athenian justice of 460-450 BCE, Kennedy shifts her attention to 
the portrayal of justice and its relation to the increasing toll that war has taken on 	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Athens, her allies, as well as her enemies, as portrayed in Sophocles’ Ajax,66 set in 
the period of the Peloponnesian wars, and in the context of increasingly 
oppressive domestic rule in the years 429-412 BCE, some two decades later. 
Kennedy compares Thucydides’ Melian dialogue—written a decade later—to the 
type of discourse Athena now holds in Ajax: no longer eschewing violence and 
vengeance, but instead demanding them, yet directing Athenians, as citizens, to 
show “moderation.”  
Accounting for the change in the Athena of The Eumenides to the Athena 
who drives her former ally and Greek hero, Ajax, to madness, then suicide, 
Kennedy points to the toll that war and imperialism have taken on Athenian 
democracy,67 where power, realpolitik, expediency and brutality—as seen clearly 
in Athens’ attitude toward the Melians—have replaced the calls for justice 
popular only decades earlier. Ajax may have been represented in Athenian art as 
having fought side by side with Athena, but in the 420s, Kennedy writes, he 
represented “the Athens the Athenians pointed to in order to justify their power, 
but he was part of an Athens they could no longer claim to be,” thus illustrating 
the discrepancy between ideology and reality.68 Kennedy points to the refusal of 
Athens to pay tribute to Persia, and associates Ajax, not only with this heroic 
past, but with the Melian attitude towards Athens in Thucydides’ account, 
concluding that: “what was an absolutely unacceptable position to the Athenians 
in the 480s,” here one should think of accepting to be subjected to an Empire, or 	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abandoning Athenian pride, “had become their policy towards others a 
generation later.”69 (emphasis mine) Demands of “moderation,” made both by 
Athena to the people of Athens, and by the Athenians to the leaders of Melos, 
involve reverence and fear of a superior force, for the sake of the safety of those 
citizens of Melos and Athens.70 
However powerful it may be to invoke The Eumenides in relation to the 
Nuremberg trial, it is striking to think how quickly—a matter of decades—the 
“bulwark of salvation across the empire” gave way, at least in the case of Athens, 
to the extermination of the men of Melos, and the enslavement of their women 
and children. It should give pause, too, to note the change in attitude towards the 
citizens of Athens themselves, once called to brave resistance, then after decades 
of hegemonic wars, cowed and invited to practice a “moderation” of fear.71 As the 
Athena of The Eumenides can be said to appear anachronistically, like a Kant or 
Jackson figure, the Athena of Ajax seems ripped from the pages of Orwell. A 
relation may well exist between the exportation of democratic legal principles by 
a powerful state to other, less powerful allies, and the eventual distortion of that 
justice, both abroad and at home. Do the means of defense against foreign 
danger, to paraphrase James Madison, indeed “become the instruments of 
tyranny at home?” 
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Stung With Injury 
To “stay the hand of vengeance,” as stated by the American prosecutor in 
Nuremberg, meant something like displacing those most likely justified urges, to 
as Aeschylus’ furies had done, exact vengeance against the defeated Nazi 
leadership, and instead pay tribute to reason. This may have not been the 
simplest thing to achieve, and this is why Jackson suggests that it was 
praiseworthy to attempt justice through Western-style criminal trials, rather than 
by the extrajudicial assassinations (understandably) sought—at some point—by 
most of the allies. It is significant that American leadership sought and ultimately 
obtained these trials—which were revolutionary in that never before had 
individuals been subjects of international law—and that they were agreed to by 
nations having been much more than the U.S. “stung with injury.” Injury is for 
instance what the American people experienced on September 11th, 2001, and it 
was then clear that recourse to courts was easier said than done. Could the hand 
of vengeance be stayed with respect to Osama Ben Laden, or, as we now know to 
be the case, were the furies of vengeance unleashed? Distinctions between the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of defeated adversaries in what is called a 
conventional war (though certainly at the time, and for many conducting Shoah 
scholarship today, the actions of the Nazis were unprecedented, and thus hardly 
“conventional”) can be offered in support of the different posture toward justice 
now demonstrated by the United States. The war against terrorism is a long-term 
proposition, and has not been definitively ended by a surrender of the type 
offered by the German leadership at the end of World War II. Justice, it is also 
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argued, though appropriate for the murderers of millions in the judicial form, 
cannot conceivably be obtained in the case of Bin Laden. It is never offered that 
the crimes of the Nazis pale in comparison to the collective trauma provoked by 
the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, but it is, in 
contrast, assumed that security concerns and the very nature of the war against 
Al Qaeda (or ISIS today) precludes the possibility of anything vaguely resembling 
civilian justice. With Bin Laden’s killing in May 2011, it seemed that the varied 
lessons that Judith Shklar’s posthumously renovated concept of legalism, used as 
either a broad category designed to include approaches to international criminal 
law that favor judicial institutions72 (sometimes opposed to ad hoc courts),73 a 
commitment to due process inherent in liberal states (and to be contrasted with 
the approach of international relations realism),74 or a mistaken view that 
international collective action problems can be solved through recourse to 
institutions that are unrealistic, ineffective, and ignore interests as well as their 
potential for rational attainment,75 no longer could hold sway. Other arguments 
in Shklar’s Legalism, that have been construed to stand for the proposition that 
political trials are valuable to establish a historical record and prevent revisionist 
accounts, or the claim that to focus on due process and individual culpability is 
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“too narrow” in the context of international criminal law,76 as well as those that 
have purported to continue and expand on her work, offering a full-throated 
defense of liberal show trials,77 seem, despite their post-cold war ubiquity, 
strangely silent for the purposes of judicial policy regarding the fate of one Osama 
Bin Laden, who was to be captured, as President George W. Bush put it, “dead or 
alive.” It was President Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, who 
announced that bin Laden was dead, and that justice had thus been done, but did 
this justice resemble more that of the reviled nineteenth century lynch mobs than 
Robert Jackson’s great mid-twentieth century oratory in favor of principles 
inherited from the eighteenth century enlightenment? 
 
So Americans understand the costs of war.  Yet as a country, we will never 
tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people 
have been killed.  We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our 
friends and allies.  We will be true to the values that make us who we are. 
And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost 
loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror:  Justice has been done.78 
 
What are, precisely, “the values who make us who we are,” and are they 
contingent upon events, and therefore depend on whether the nation has been 
flushed with victory, or stung with injury, or does it depend on degrees of victory 
and injury, and, if so, in what proportion? It is perhaps instructive to 	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disambiguate practice and policy from principles when examining historical U.S. 
responses to security threats, as set out above, by President Obama. 
Extraterritorial application of American policing or military actions to capture 
those who would violate the security, life, liberty, and property of U.S. citizens did 
not begin with the capture and killing of Bin Laden, nor did U.S. refusal to have 
its citizens subjected to “barbaric” foreign law wait for the American 
Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA).79 Extraterritorial actions in the name of 
security, in instances that could be described as having properties of “exception” 
were features of the nineteenth century American legal landscape. The Ord 
Order, authorizing U.S. troops to enter Mexican territory as they saw fit to pursue 
“Indian raiders,” was issued in 1877,80 nine years before the capture, in Mexico, 
of the Apache Geronimo—whose name was attributed to Bin Laden in the very 
operation that resulted in his death—stands as a precedent for extraterritorial 
actions, deemed necessary in the name of either exceptionalism or exceptional 
national security claims of the United States, or both.81  
Though the precedent for the kind of cross-border operation that resulted 
in the killing of Osama Bin Laden is more historically robust than the relatively 
recent U.S. commitment to favoring justice and the institution of a dispassionate 	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trial to vengeance, the commitment to justice seems intimately connected to 
American self-perception as not only a law-abiding nation, but one whose values 
and practices regarding the respect for human rights radiate outward. Thus, the 
Bin Laden killing is not generally described as a deviation from a consistent U.S. 
commitment to justice, nor is it seen as an exceptional case of vengeance. 
Instead, discussions emphasize the justification for the killing, whether that 
justification is legal—as in the position defended, inter alia, by Harold Koh, 
former legal advisor to the State Department, that this killing was of a “high level 
belligerent” in the course of an armed conflict and was thus lawful pursuant to 
the laws of war—or justified morally, as with claims based on assumptions of just 
war theory, in the fashion of Michael Walzer.82 The first type of argument 
involves the determination of the type of law that applies to a given factual 
situation. If the laws of war, and not criminal law, apply to a specific individual 
(say Osama Ben Laden, but one might also say Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen 
whose killing was authorized by President Obama83), then the interpretation of 
the situation regarding that individual militates against conducting a trial, but 
instead, and increasingly, as memos interpreting the law of war reportedly argue 
(though these interpretations have not been made fully public) authorize killing 
the individual. 
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Just war theorists demand greater flexibility still: Walzer suggested, in his 
discussion of Ben Laden’s killing84 that though the positions taken on the 
question of whether the acts of September 11th were to be viewed as a crime (and 
to be treated as such) or an act of war (and to be prosecuted accordingly) were 
normally considered mutually exclusive, “the truth is that each one is right, some 
of the time, in some places.” Since Ben Laden was not captured in Paris, but 
rather in Abbottabad, where Walzer posits that conditions of peace do not exist, it 
is therefore justified to undertake an act of war, rather than the kind of trial that 
would be possible in a Western European capital.85 “Killing Osama” writes 
Walzer, “did him no injustice,” rather, the question is whether violence has been 
done to American principles by not trying him in a court of law. Walzer responds 
in the negative, arguing that it is neither just nor moral to require of commandos 
that they act like police officers when they are not in what he describes as a “zone 
of peace.” Here, the just war position seems steeped in a military pragmatism 
that may well explain its contemporary cachet. Further, Walzer’s 
recommendation that we might or ought to experience “gratitude that it was our 
Obama who did in Osama” sits quite uncomfortably with the passing concern 
that this action might have come into contradiction with a professed American 
preference—and for some, it is much more than a preference, and is in fact seen 
to be a quintessential feature of American political theory—for due process, and 
trials. Here, war, which Walzer has elsewhere claimed should be entered upon 
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only with the greatest reluctance and trepidation, appears instead to be what 
Corey Robin has called “the great romance of the age, the proving ground of self 
and nation.”86 Moreover, the account of Ben Laden’s killing as having been 
necessary in the face of armed resistance has been forcefully challenged by 
Seymour Hersh in a essay published in the London Review of Books.87 Although 
it generated substantial controversy at the time of its publication, the account 
offered by Hersh has at least tentatively been recently supported in the New York 
Times.88 
While the extrajudicial killing of Ben Laden by a nation stung with injury 
(“our Obama”) was widely deemed justified, some were still unsettled by the total 
absence of legal—or rather judicial—participation in what they nonetheless 
consider to be a morally correct act. Roger Berkowitz confronts with apparent 
discomfort objections formulated by Kenneth Roth (executive director of Human 
Rights Watch) and Geoffrey Robertson that Ben Laden was killed rather than 
tried. Calling these types of objections “controversial,” Berkowitz nonetheless 
gives consideration to Robertson’s complaint that Ben Laden was not tried in The 
Hague by Muslim judges, and confronted to his crimes, resulting in not only a 
fair trial but a reduction of his stature, from a soulful figure on the mountain, to a 
shrill, screaming old man. For Berkowitz, the advantages set out by Robertson 
are mostly utilitarian, and pragmatic; what would stand for justice is a legal 	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judgment, “that Osama bin Laden was evil, a criminal, and that he deserved to be 
put to death.”89 This is far from seeming like the kind of thing that trials ever 
actually do, or ought to: basic premises of justice such as the presumption of 
innocence preclude a kind of spectacle meant to establish, in advance, that an 
individual is evil and that she (before a decision being made regarding her 
responsibility for the commission of an offence, and a determination of the 
appropriate legal punishment) deserved to be put to death. This is because 
Berkowitz is actually less interested in a trial of Ben Laden (whether in The 
Hague, in Guantanamo, or on an aircraft carrier, where Muslim judges, he offers 
with rather startling naiveté, would await him along with a crew of ready and 
competent defense lawyers prepared to try the case which could conclude in a 
matter of hours, and the proceedings be videotaped then released unedited) than 
he is in another kind of trial altogether. 
Berkowitz proposes that the Navy SEALS who conducted Ben Laden’s 
execution voluntarily put themselves on trial before an American jury to 
determine whether they acted justly. The jury would have to be American, as the 
SEALS would be entitled to the right to a fair trial—unavailable, Berkowitz 
presumes, in Pakistan—and the right to assert challenges to the jury, which 
presumably are unnecessary for Ben Laden, or indeed anyone brought before the 
International Criminal Court, or any ad hoc international tribunal where jury 
trials are unavailable. “The point is,” writes Berkowitz, “only a jury – charged 
with the right to do justice – can offer the promise of a trial that might recognize 	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and thus give legal cognizance to the justice of what the SEALS did.” It is unclear 
whether Berkowitz grasps that jury trials are available for all persons accused of 
most classes of offenses in the United States, and not only those assumed 
innocent of murder because they killed an evil person.  
The historical precedent for this kind of killing followed by legal 
imprimatur was first offered by Hannah Arendt, writing about the Eichmann 
trial, and later echoed by Samantha Power’s opening paragraph in A Problem 
from Hell: America in an Age of Genocide. Sholom Schwartzbard and Soghomon 
Tehlirian were both tried for killing, respectively, Simon Petlura, the former 
Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian army during the pogroms in 1926 on the 
streets of Paris, and Talaat Bay in Berlin, in 1921. Both invoked at their trials that 
they killed great murderers, and both were acquitted (albeit for different reasons: 
Tehlirian was acquitted by reason of temporary insanity, not quite a ringing 
endorsement, at least from a legal standpoint, of the justness of his act). 
Berkowitz asserts, that “the point is that revenge, while itself an act outside of the 
realm of law and justice, can serve the interests of justice and promote justice 
when the avenger seeks and receives a judicial blessing for the act after the 
fact.”90 This means that justice ought to in fact be employed to prosecute only 
nominally those who kill, and in reality, used a mechanism for vengeance—
setting the entire justification for Nuremberg, or even Athens’ storied first 
criminal trial on its head—as the trial becomes a means of assessing the character 
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of the assassin’s victim, as Walzer argued91 rather than the crimes of the assassin 
herself. Walzer does not claim that the legal order, or the venue of the trial 
assesses the character of an assassin’s victim. Rather, he claims that our common 
moral judgments might favorably view the assassination of a Hitler-like person. 
Walzer correctly, here, distinguishes between the legal and moral orders. 
The trial venue as espoused by Berkowitz offers the possibility of some 
kind of spectacle where it is the victim who is judged—very much in absentia—
rather than the killer. Here the trappings of justice are on display, satisfying a 
sort of desire for a judicial form, but only for the process to deprive that real 
accused—the person deemed worthy of killing—of the rights that make trials 
something we can legitimately describe as representing a tribute that power 
would pay to reason. 
If the ex-post facto legal approach seems familiar, it is because it has also 
been defended in the context of torture, by those who like Jean Bethke Elshtain, 
Henry Shue, Sanford Levinson, (as well as Alan Dershowitz and Michael Walzer, 
albeit in different ways)92 would not like torture to be subject to legal 
prohibitions, but for the practitioner of torture to be given an opportunity to 
establish a judicial justification for her action. This line of argument borrows 
from the theory of civil disobedience, where one submits to justice acknowledging 
that one has broken the law, but has done so for a higher good or in order to 
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publicize a neglected political demand. That torture is the object of an absolute, 
unqualified prohibition in international law has not tempered the ardor of those 
who argue those restrictions ought to be relaxed in the current circumstances of 
insecurity and to prevent terrorist attacks.93 Critiques of such “legalization” 
arguments, going beyond the simple restatement that torture is quite obviously 
illegal, have revolved around four main objections: that torture is not effective, 
that torture is cruel (not seeking out information, but silencing the subject), that 
the “ticking time-bomb” scenario though perhaps on occasion justified, can 
quickly slip into routinized torture, and finally, that even if torture is committed, 
it must remain illegal, and the torturer must know that the act is not only wrong, 
but violates the law.94 This deviation from international law is a more general 
phenomenon, and may paradoxically constitute an inherent characteristic of 
states’ attempts to govern the international order through legal norms. 
 
Power and Law: Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will 
At the heart of international law lies a fundamental duality regarding 
authority: there are texts, “positive law”—treaties, General Assembly resolutions, 
as well as judicial opinions; then, there is state practice. “International law,” 
writes Paul W. Kahn, “advances—or retreats—along both dimensions at once.95” 	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In short, “deviant practice”—that is the exercise of among other things, but most 
importantly, power—has the potential to create law. Power, then, for better or 
worse, because it is permitted, by legal definition, to shape law, is, though 
distinguishable from it, inextricably bound up within it. This internally 
contradictory incorporation of power into international law has historically been 
a source of confusion, frustration and distress, and has thus too frequently been 
shielded from view. 
It is perhaps a fool’s errand to attempt an original definition of power. 
Even Hans J. Morgenthau’s great Scientific Man and Power Politics only 
introduces the term that figures prominently in the book’s title at page 195 (out of 
223 pages).96 It is nonetheless essential to offer a sense of what could be meant by 
it in assessing power’s relation to the law. In Morgenthau’s later and vastly 
influential Politics Among Nations, he devoted an early chapter to the concept, 
setting out clearly what he meant by power and its centrality in both domestic 
and international politics.97 Power, for Morgenthau, is first man’s control over 
the actions and minds of other men, while political power refers to a relation 
between holders of public authority, as well as between the latter and the people 
at large.98 Strongly influenced by Max Weber,99 Morgenthau’s conception of 
power is first an influence over minds—thus acknowledging the autonomy of the 	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person in relation to whom it is exercised—deriving from three sources: “the 
expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men or 
institutions.”100 Michael Williams has aptly observed, arguing against the well-
worn claim the Morgenthau’s conception of power is too simplistic to be of any 
use in today’s international relations scholarship, that Morgenthau deploys the 
sophisticated strategy of indeterminacy in presenting power as an open 
sociological concept.101 Power’s “content and the matter of its use are determined 
by the political and cultural environment,” writes Morgenthau, and “may 
comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.” 
Power, for Morgenthau, is not only sensitive to cultural and political context, but 
covers all social relationships from physical violence to psychological control; it 
can be moral, when controlled by constitutional safeguards, or be a “barbaric 
force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification 
in its aggrandizement.”102 Further distinctions are offered between influence and 
power (persuasion as opposed to compulsion); power and force (the use of force 
as an abdication of political power); usable and unusable force (that is the threat 
as opposed to the use of nuclear weapons); and finally the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate power (a morally or legally legitimate power, as 
opposed to naked power).103 
Morgenthau’s conception of power is both sufficiently indeterminate and 
precise to explore it in relation to law, and more specifically international law. In 	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theory—recent Supreme Court judgments notwithstanding—the transition from 
politics to law can be understood as a shift from power (a potentially 
asymmetrical relation) to equality. Domestically, law supposes equality between 
individual citizens and internationally, between sovereign states.104 Once rules 
are set, in this conception, outcomes of a dispute should not depend on the 
relative power of the parties, but on the qualification of facts and the 
interpretation of rules. This explains, writes Kahn in an article published after the 
end of the cold war but before the events of September 11th, 2001, why weaker 
nations have had recourse to international majoritarian institutions not 
controlled by great powers—like the International Court of Justice—and 
conversely why most great powers prefer to avoid those same institutions, citing 
that among the five veto holding members of the United Nations Security Council 
only Great Britain recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.105 Since the 
ratification of the International Criminal Court, of the same veto holding 
members of the Security Council, only France and Great Britain have become 
member states of the ICC. Moreover, the international order provides a 
diminished range of adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms in comparison to 
domestic institutional arrangements, and thus internationally, power, 
understood here as the possibility of advancing state interests independently of 
norms and procedures, weighs significantly more than law.106  
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It is on the question of the influence of the practice of sovereign states on 
the evolution of international law that the disproportionate weight of power and 
the weakness of law’s normative sway is the most evident. The history of the use 
of force in international conflicts provides the sharpest examples of a deviant 
evolution of international law, through the use of power, which when employed 
as force, as defined by Morgenthau above, has abdicated the practice of politics. 
In addressing the issue of judicial settlement of disputes, Morgenthau 
astutely diagnosed the central problem at the intersection of international 
adjudication and war: casus belli were never, he claimed, a question of 
interpretation of the law as it stood, but rather political demands to modify the 
legal status quo. Everyone knew the legal status of Czechoslovakia in 1938, 
observed Morgenthau, and thus the issue was not then—nor in other 
controversies since—about the interpretation of existing law, but rather a 
challenge to its legitimacy and a demand to change it.107 He then distinguished 
“status quo nations,” in whose interest it was to have recourse to courts, whose 
authority, as Judith Shklar also notes, rests on that very status quo,108 and 
“imperialistic nations” who are “inevitably opposed to the existing status quo and 
its legal order.”109 For a more recent example of this insight we might observe 
how the defense of humanity, rather than stated imperialist aims, was the 
justification for the demand to change international norms in NATO’s decision to 
bomb Yugoslavia in 1999, described by the Chinese ambassador as a severe 	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violation of international law.110 Shklar, too, paid attention to the question of the 
status quo, but highlighted the other side of the coin: she argued that one of the 
weaknesses of the Tokyo trials was that it provided an opportunity to Indian 
judge Radhabinod Pal to expose American designs in Asia. The crime of 
aggressive war, construed by the Americans to mean a challenge to the status 
quo, “could and did appear as nothing but an ideological defense of 
colonialism.”111 For Shklar, the challenge of the status quo was made unavailable 
not for the imperialists, but for those peoples suffering colonial rule, the very 
victims of the imperialism Morgenthau, once in the U.S., saw as the main and 
inevitable challenger to the status quo. But Morgenthau, as William Scheuerman 
explains, had already in 1929 when still in Germany and working with leftist 
labor lawyer Hugo Sinzheimer formulated an argument strikingly similar to 
Shklar’s and to Pal’s: that the static nature of international law did not take into 
account political and social change, putting weaker states in the position of 
having “to abide for all eternity to norms privileging the great powers.”112 
War, or the use of power through force, can change the law. So, too, can 
ex-post facto legal institutions attempt to assess whether such recourse was 
lawful. The first historical precedent was the Nuremberg Trial of the German 
Major War Criminals in 1945 to 1946, about which Prosecutor Robert Jackson, in 
his opening statement, said that it was part of an effort “to make the peace more 
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secure.”113 Nuremberg could only claim to determine the legality of Nazi actions 
because the trial was established by the victors of the war; moreover, its 
significance was in trying individuals as defendants pursuant to criminal law. At 
issue was the status under international law of state violence, and Kahn 
formulates the intriguing claim that “if state violence were not justiciable, then 
neither would individual responsibility for that violence be justiciable.114 
Justiciability, then, of violence (the more naked type of power) was to be viewed 
as analogous to self-defense in domestic law: a justification of the use of violence 
that could only be confirmed or dismissed institutionally after a criminal trial. 
Some defense lawyers, in particular General Alfred Jödl’s counsel, scholar and 
lawyer Hermann Jahrreis, saw matters differently, and argued that in light of the 
numerous reservations contained in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the treaty upon 
which the prosecution primarily relied for the crimes against the peace counts, 
“Only on one thing did complete agreement exist: War of self-defense is 
permitted as an inalienable right of all States; without this right, sovereignty does 
not exist; and every state is judge of whether in a given case it is waging war of 
self-defense.”115 Jahrreis’ argument was ultimately unsuccessful; the tribunal held 
that the right of states to self-defense did not preclude the court’s ability to 
judicially determine whether illegitimate actions such as aggression had taken 
place.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the major war criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946. (Nuremberg, Germany: [s.n.], 
1947), 85. 
114 Paul Kahn, “From Nuremberg to The Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. 
United States and the Development of International Law,” Faculty Scholarship Series, January 1, 
1987, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/339, 6. 
115 Ibid., 11. 
	   52	  
Kahn’s account of the Nuremberg episode is designed to shed light on 
another, more recent, legal argument formulated by the United States before the 
ICJ in The Hague in the suit brought against it by Nicaragua for military and 
paramilitary activities on its territory. The U.S. opposed the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ arguing that it was acting in self-defense (of its Salvadoran ally), but more 
crucially that the ICJ is not competent to make determinations regarding the 
legality of the use of force, a jurisdiction reserved exclusively to the United 
Nations Security Council.116 The U.S. position amounted to the failed Nuremberg 
argument that stood for the proposition that the determination of self-defense is 
non-judiciable, that, in other words, (Security Council) power trumps law. This 
has also been the U.S. position regarding the hypothetical crime of aggression 
finally defined by the state parties of the ICC.117 It now seems that perhaps 
Nuremberg did not stand for the rule, but rather for the exception, at least where 
the five veto-holding members of the Security Council are concerned. 
The phenomenon of human rights, streamlined to stand for those most 
extreme violations by the state against its citizens, or simply put, atrocities,118 
emerged with force at the end of the cold war. The idea of human rights—though 
the argument had been used before, and including as a subsidiary claim by the 
US in the Nicaragua case119—is one of the crucial ways in which international law 
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sought to reinvent itself after the end of the cold war.120 Kahn saw early on that 
the rise of human rights in the context of American hegemony, especially in light 
of its sovereign self-understanding as a nation of law and rights from within, not 
to be subjected to law and rights from without—might appear to others in the 
world as a Western project, a kind of cultural imperialism.121 After a few years, 
years that have seen wars and failure of post-cold war’s promises to deliver the 
dividends of prosperity and peace, Kahn’s concern is reflected in a growing 
critique of the idea of human rights as a via media between power and law. At 
times, they have stood for both. The all-powerful human rights discourse has left 
unresolved conflicts aside and tolerated that victims of less-extreme injustice 
forego demands for more tangible kinds of reparations and the redistribution of 
wealth.122 The discourse has shifted from a revolutionary, vulnerable call for law’s 
equality to an established mode of governance and an exercise of power.123 The 
project of rights-based international law, such as the one articulated by Anne-
Marie Slaughter,124 “mandating” distinctions between different types of states, is 
familiar to historians of nineteenth century international law and its insistence 
on the difference between civilized and non-civilized states.125 To Slaughter’s 
credit, she predicted that very response and identification, but concluded that 	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“whether a liberal/non-liberal distinction is used or abused for similar purposes 
depends on the normative system developed to govern a world of liberal and non-
liberal States.”126 Two decades have passed and it is fair to state that the nascent 
critique of international human rights law is precisely based on the failure of the 
“normative system developed to govern the world” to deliver both the goods and 
the good.  
Slaughter-type endeavors are critiqued as not only necessarily advancing 
an imperial agenda—not as a result of bad faith or conspiracy, as Koskenniemi 
puts it—but because the logic of the argument points to morality rather than to 
law, or rather hopes to salvage the law by making it an instrument of the values of 
the powerful.127 Moreover, the focus on instrumentalism “silently assumes that 
the political question—what the objectives are—has already been resolved.”128 So, 
too, has the human rights discourse, in its successful attempt to transcend 
politics ended up with a very minimal content, and has been “bound up in the 
power of the powerful.”129 
A related problem concerns the morality of jurisdiction. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda were established by the Security Council of the UN; 
subsequent bodies were created by hybrid means; finally, the International 
Criminal Court is a treaty-based body. These differences in organization are fairly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States,” 506. 
127 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 484. 
128 Ibid., 485. 
129 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 227. 
	   55	  
uncontroversial, as is the notion that once a legal (or law-like) body is created, it 
will neutrally adjudicate claims pursuant to its jurisdiction. This view is 
challenged by Kenneth Anderson who has made the striking claim that the 
conventional legal view is morally wrong, and that instead, “the right to judge is 
the rights one earns.130 The right is earned, offers Anderson, by a willingness to 
intervene—and therein lies the connection to the current human rights 
discourse—rather than to adopt what he calls “a stance of passive, perhaps 
handwringing neutrality.” Conceding that justice is universal, he opposes justice 
(and it is unclear whether the notion relates to power or to law) to the right to 
administer it, the latter belonging to “the just party or the party of the just 
party.”131 This is the same just war theory relied upon by President Obama in his 
speech about the use of drones,132 a practice that as far as is known has killed 
3000, including 800 civilians and at least four American citizens133  and for at 
least those reasons, and probably others, it deserves close scrutiny. 
Judith Shklar described her friend Michael Walzer’s just war theory as one 
that places war on one end of a continuum that has “the harmonious consensual 
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community” on the other.134 War for just war theorists, is, as the name implies, 
not outside the rules of law and morality, in contrast to the Kantian view that war 
is beyond the rules of good and evil, an absolutely prohibited practice, never 
justified, falling only into the realm of necessity and self-preservation.135 The 
Kantian view, in Shklar’s assessment, is to hold that just war theorists encourage 
people to recklessly enter into wars “and then baptizing his own side with the 
holy water of justice.” “Every enemy,” she writes, “can be made to look the 
aggressor.”136 Anderson’s “earned right to judge” by having intervened as the just 
party poses a greater problem still: in addition to it being possible to “baptize 
one’s own side,” it is possible to think of very few states who would, in addition to 
being convinced that they are just—which is sadly not a difficult thing at all—
possess the military and political power required to earn the “right” to judge, ex 
post facto, with the determination of justice already pronounced. 
Are drones to be best understood by a theory of just war? Looking at the 
targets, Paul W. Kahn has recently published a chilling argument: they are not 
criminals to be tried with the protections of law, nor innocent military personnel 
engaged in warfare.137 It is, he argues, the status of the target that illuminates the 
nature of the enterprise. It is neither war nor is it the application of the law; the 
classical distinction between criminal and enemy has dissolved. Drone strikes, 
instead, diagnoses Kahn, are statecraft as the administration of death; a high-	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tech form of a regime of disappearance. For Kahn, the use of drones in the war on 
terror cannot be understood by reading Clausewitz or Kant, but by following 
Machiavelli.138 French philosopher Grégoire Chamayou, who like Kahn shares the 
concern that the use of drones to kill lies uncomfortably somewhere between 
warfare and policing, theorizes the drone’s function as that of nothing short of a 
manhunt,139 or more starkly, as Philip Alston has put it, “a license to kill.”140 
Proponents of drone strikes such as Kenneth Anderson have expressed concern 
that the lack of firm legal guidance for the use of these unmanned aerial vehicles 
might compromise their future use, and thus Anderson proposes a new regime of 
ad hoc law he would call “naked self-defense.”141 This is understood by Chamayou 
to mean that it would automatically invoke self-defense without respecting the 
legal restrictions that generally confine the justification. We have seen the 
troubled precedents for the invocation of self-defense absent a judicial 
determination—both in Nuremberg and before the ICJ in the Nicaragua case—
but Anderson’s drone exception goes further still: “self defense gives the 
discretionary ability to attack anywhere in the world where a target is located, 
without having to make claims about a state of armed conflict everywhere and 
always across the world.”142 How would such a rationale square with Kant’s 
prohibition of assassins and assassinations in Article 6 of the Preliminary Articles 	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for Perpetual Peace Among States? 
Beyond a theoretical exploration of continued state practice deviating from 
black letter international (and perhaps domestic) law, it is worth stopping briefly 
to assess the efforts of American drone victims’ families to quite legalistically 
seize the institutions of American courts to either prevent strikes (in favor of a 
traditional criminal resolution) or to receive clarity about the death of an 
innocent 16 year-old. Such were the efforts of Nasser Al Awlaki, who after earning 
his Ph.D. in the United States as a Fulbright Scholar, went on to become Yemen’s 
Minister of Agriculture and President of Sana’a University. His son, Anwar, and 
grandson, 16 year-old Abdulrahman, were both born in the United States, were 
U.S. citizens, and were killed by U.S. drone strikes two weeks apart. Dr. Al-Awlaki 
joined the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights in a lawsuit 
questioning the propriety of his son Anwar’s inclusion on a “kill list,” arguing 
inter alia that the imminent harm justification for targeted killing is not met 
when names remain on that list for months at a time, and that the U.S. 
Constitution requires a transparent account of the legal criteria upon which 
inclusion of the kill list is determined for any specific individual.143 A federal 
court dismissed the case on December 7th, 2010.144 President Obama announced 
that Anwar Al-Awlaki had been killed by a drone strike on September 30th, 
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2011.145 The following year, the ACLU and CCR filed a new lawsuit arguing that 
Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki, son and grandson of Anwar and Nasser Al-Awlaki had 
been killed without due process. The case was dismissed on national security 
grounds.146 Dr. Al-Awlaki, who had fervent faith in the ability of the U.S. courts to 
deliver justice for his grandson, decided not to appeal the ruling. “I have no faith 
left in a judiciary that refuses even to hear whether Abdulrahman, an American 
child, was wrongfully killed by his own government,” he stated, adding “although 
the court failed to fulfill its role in this case, my family and I continue to hope that 
answers to our questions about why our son and grandson were killed will 
someday see the light of day, and that there may someday be accountability for 
the government's actions.”147 
Abdulrahman’s death certificate was accompanied by a standard State 
Department form entitled “Death of an American Citizen Abroad”; it falsely 
recorded his cause of death as “unknown.”148 Subsequently, an unnamed U.S. 
official told the Washington Post that the teenager had been “in the wrong place 
at the wrong time” when he, along with another U.S. citizen, were killed by a 
Predator drone in Yemen.149 In 2012, the New York Times took pains to show the 
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difficult process of decision-making as it relates to the “kill list,” portraying 
President Obama as carefully and thoughtfully weighing national security 
imperatives against the respect for the Constitution, and indeed morality.150 He is 
described as a student of Aquinas and St. Augustine151—perhaps he even consults 
Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. Obama has not spoken about the killing 
of Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki, but his 2012 campaign spokesperson, Robert Gibbs, 
when pressed on the question of lack of due process, the absence of trial, and the 
fact that Al-Awlaki was a minor when he was killed by the U.S., said “I guess I 
would suggest that you should have a far more responsible father if they are truly 
concerned about the well-being of their children.”152 It is not difficult to 
understand how Dr. Al-Awlaki lost faith in American legal institutions, but one 
could be forgiven, too, for understanding it if he lost his faith in U.S. politics. 
International law is deeply, perhaps irremediably—short of Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace in a federation of free states153—steeped in power. Between the 
two, and even within the waning empire of human rights,154 lies not a new utopia, 
but perhaps the old, plain business of an unself-conscious politics of contestation 
and of aspiration. This brings us to American liberalism. 
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We, the People and the World: American Liberalism’s Troubled Relationship 
with International Law 
One is hard pressed to find an account of liberalism—be it by its 
proponents or by its critics—that does not feature the rule of law as one of its 
main tenets, if not as its central normative feature.155 And whether this rule of law 
emerges as a moral duty to pull unfortunate members of a territorially-defined 
group out of a state of nature and into a civil society on the basis of autonomy and 
freedom, as in the Kantian account defended by Anna Stilz; as an administrative 
process yet to be tamed by reasoned democratic deliberative reasoning, as with 
Henry S. Richardson; as the fetichized locus of a political-theological project, as 
presented in the manner of a foundational myth by Paul Kahn; or alternately, as a 
symptom of political sovereignty’s shift from boundedness to aggrandizement 
through will, as is Jean Bethke Elstain’s contention; to finally, a necessary evil, to 
be viewed with some democratic wariness and a good dose of pluralist 
skepticism, as with Michael Walzer, the law is, however variable, nonetheless 
always important. In fact, it is critical. 
As difficult as it is to secure agreement as to the ontological nature and 
epistemic requirements of law on a liberal view, the challenges that confront the 
liberal idea of law increase exponentially when considered as an international 
phenomenon. It is not a coincidence that Judith Shklar chose to write her 1964 
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Legalism about the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. It is when justice is conceived of 
beyond the territorial borders of the modern sovereign state that problems 
emerge with the greatest acuity for liberals. This is because—as Anna Stilz would 
know, though it is not something that she clearly lets on—Kant’s assessment, in 
Perpetual Peace, of international relations existing as a state of nature has yet to 
change, all moral claims of rights to humanitarian intervention156 to the contrary 
notwithstanding.157 Kant is still not far from wrong today when he wrote that 
states have “no external tribunal to put their claims to trial,”158 as indeed courts, 
which by nature must possess the capacity to enforce their own decisions, do not 
currently exist—with such an enforcement power— between states at the 
international level.159 Judicial bodies have, however, been created by the United 
Nations Security Council as well as by the Rome Treaty, and these courts—or 
“law-like political institutions,” and Judith Shklar would put it,160 have 
jurisdiction over individuals. The difficulty is that they have (absolute) 
jurisdiction only over individuals of those nations who are not permanent 
members of the Security Council, and who cannot themselves create ad hoc 
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bodies, or who do not—more importantly—have the power to refuse to submit to 
the jurisdiction of a tribunal such as the International Criminal Court, by for 
instance, deciding to exercise their power of veto to prevent the referral of an 
investigation of their own nationals. 
Several issues are thus apparent, and require some explanation and 
justification by liberals. International justice—or perhaps more accurately, 
international law—when set out in such a stark manner, may appear illiberal in 
many ways. First, inconsistent application of the law can appear to do violence to 
principles of equality and fairness. The lack of universality in the application of 
the repressive mechanisms of international criminal law suggests that the process 
may be arbitrary, depending, for its implementation, on inconsistent 
circumstances, and more troublingly, is sensitive to power (to an unacceptable 
degree) and thus violates deeply held liberal commitments to the principle of 
equality. Secondly, the extent to which politics (in this instance, international 
politics) play a role in the determination of situations that require adjudication 
(or intervention) seem removed from the type of rationally-based procedural 
mechanisms liberals are committed to when issues are determined in a legal or 
judicial manner. 
Finally, power wields a far greater influence in the determination of what 
(or who) will or will not be scrutinized by international “law-like political 
institutions” than what liberals are generally comfortable with. This last point 
coexists with liberalism’s occasionally uneasy view of sovereignty, as this idea is 
what, at least for some powers internationally, permits and justifies immunity 
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from prosecution; it is also the same concept that is (often by the same states who 
invoke it for the protection of their own interests) viewed as a platitudinous 
orthodoxy of a bygone era—or at least as something that in extreme cases, plays a 
counterproductive, if not frankly dangerous role in the international post-cold 
war environment. 
A corollary to these questions has to do with the kinds of wrongs that 
justify international legal action, and specifically whether there exists any 
(liberal) basis to state that individuals can claim a right to be protected against 
such wrongs, or, of greater relevance here, of a right (or perhaps duty) for states 
or other arrangements to intervene on behalf of such individuals when they are 
citizens of foreign states, on foreign soil, and thus subject to the law of another 
jurisdiction.161 Then, brutally put, are we prepared to kill to fulfill this purpose, 
and to sacrifice our own lives?162 
Liberals will also take an interest in the manner in which international 
rights, duties, procedures and institutions come into existence; liberal 
commitments afford some importance to the nature of agreements that generate 
obligations, create law (whether it is genuinely enforceable or not), and in 
extreme cases, the ability to deprive individuals of liberty—such as in the context 
of an ad hoc or permanent criminal or war crimes prosecution—or to engage in 
war, which frequently extinguishes the lives of individuals, whether they be 
compatriots or people living in other states. 	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Sovereignty 
It is perhaps tempting to make sovereignty out as the villain in this state of 
affairs, that which prevents claims of right from fully and fairly being adjudicated 
equally, against all, or even as the very cause of intemperate war and massive 
crimes committed by states. Before examining what sovereignty is responsible 
for, however, it is worth attempting to explore what it is (and in relation to what). 
This is of course a very difficult question, and efforts to define sovereignty may 
vary in clarity and quality across theorists and depend on their own ontological 
and political commitments. Paul Kahn defends what he presents as a distinctly 
American view,163 of a popular sovereignty from which law derives legitimacy 
(and not the other way around, as is the case for others, where law precedes and 
limits sovereignty.164) This is “we, the people,” and for Kahn, this refers not to 
mere majority rule; instead, popular sovereignty is a transhistorical project of a 
people creating and maintaining itself.165 This is obviously not the type of claim 
that a state could, on a legal view, invoke to object to foreign attack or intrusion. 
Claims of what we could call cultural sovereignty bear an uncomfortably close 
resemblance to claims of exceptionalism,166 and Kahn has not shied from the 
implication that exceptionalism of the American kind is perceived abroad (and 
with particular relevance for the interest of this essay, regarding the United 
States’ unwillingness to be subject to the International Criminal Court, 
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specifically167) as an expression of naked interest by a sole super-power. The idea 
of American exceptionalism, however, predates its superpower status by two 
hundred years, and thus a justification for the exceptionalist view must be found 
elsewhere. Clearly, for Kahn, it is not a crude matter of power. Nor is 
exceptionalism grounded in considerations of justice, as the view that commands 
international law apply to all other states and not to the U.S. was—quite 
obviously—not determined behind a veil of ignorance.168 Instead, exceptionalism 
is more plausibly justified by the fact that America’s popular sovereign and acts 
and speaks exclusively through the law.169 “At that point,” writes Kahn, “the 
exception becomes the exceptional, as in American exceptionalism.”170 The 
reference to “the exception” here is made explicitly (and somewhat 
disconcertingly) to Carl Schmitt, a theorist with whom Kahn has engaged in 
greater depth in his recent Political Theology.171 Though Kahn has made plain 
that he wishes to bring “liberalism in contact with Schmitt,” and not adopt his 
illiberal views—in particular those that base sovereignty on a prepolitical 
conception of a “people’s substantive homogeneity,”172 Kahn nonetheless adopts a 
Schmittian theoretical structure to discuss what he maintains is a view of 
American political faith in popular sovereignty, which in the discrete case of 
American society, runs precisely contrary to a homogenous view, demanding 
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instead that popular sovereignty accommodate a diversity of immigrant groups 
and faiths.  
This view of exceptionalism, while it accounts for a secular devotion to 
U.S. sovereignty, as a reflection of American identity and a justification for 
sacrifice, does not begin to engage with, much less justify an American (or liberal) 
position towards the sovereignty of other states. Is the mere fact of 
exceptionalism sufficient to justify that a state would hold others to norms while 
simultaneously shielding itself from the institutionalized enforcement of those 
very same rules? 
Humanitarian Intervention 
Here, Michael Walzer can offer an account, though it may perhaps, when 
employed in this way, seem to focus too strongly on power. On the issue of 
humanitarian intervention, Walzer has argued that in the face of the commission 
of atrocities, those who can, should, intervene—and by intervention, what is 
meant here is military action. To rebut the implication that this moral claim 
anoints the powerful and the enlightened (who may well be the “we” to whom he 
refers affectionately, and which is described by Judith Shklar as “we,’ his favorite 
characters”173) to act as Wild West vigilantes, Walzer instead relies on the 
examples of three let us call them “Third World” humanitarian interventions to 
demonstrate that proximity is sometimes the kind of “can” that leads to a 
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“should,”174 that is an ability that generates an obligation to act. The problem with 
the cases that he cites—and this exemplifies a wider problem with doing justice 
through the infliction of military sentences without the benefit of a judicial 
institution to weigh evidence and sort out facts from rhetoric, however well-
intentioned—is that all three “humanitarian interventions” could be reasonably 
justified as responses to aggression. Tanzania repelled Ugandan troops that were 
unlawfully on (and claiming) its territory; Vietnam responded to repeated 
aggressions on its territory by an increasingly bellicose Cambodia; and India 
(ultimately) responded to an aerial bombing of its territory by Pakistan. This is 
not to say that none of these military actions were undertaken with humanitarian 
justifications, or that their consequences were not to improve the lives of at least 
some civilians in the targeted states; the claim is that all three actions were 
justified under existing rules of international law and did not require additional 
humanitarian rhetorical support or deviation from (or for some, improvement of) 
the law as it stands. The concern here is to employ these cases to stand for the 
proposition that since civilians were exposed to a range of inhumane acts in 
Uganda, Cambodia, and East Pakistan, that these military responses were 
justified as cases of humanitarian intervention; blithely ignoring the fact that they 
were in all three cases justified responses to aggression is tantamount not only to 
rewriting the facts, but to creating rights of military actions on the basis of 
precedents that do not quite justify them. In other words, and this is in any event 
the prevalent legal and moral argument today, states are justified in attacking, 
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bombing, and invading others on the basis of humanitarian claims. Because 
Walzer does not think much of the United Nations’ ability to provide “rescue and 
relief,”175 it is up to those who can, to do. Where does this leave the state? One 
could suppose that it depends on the state: some states have obligations to 
protect individuals abroad, while other states are argued out of existence, 
replaced instead by suffering individuals bearing rights to be rescued.176 Some 
states provide enforcement of rights for individuals on their territory— in fact, 
according to Walzer, what is unique to the state is “the description of rights 
enforcement as its central purpose”177—but in some cases, states, when they 
determine (on some good basis, but it is not quite certain what that would be, and 
how it is possible to always know for sure) that citizens of a foreign state are 
being massacred, have obligations to protect them, because no other entity can. 
Analogies with domestic cases such as police are troublesome here because 
they fail to render the reality of international relations, or at best warp a proper 
analogy which would consider, for example, discretionary decisions of the police 
when to stop or not a speeding motorist178 as a decision made by some sort of 
police-like international entity, rather than by some state (presumably a powerful 
enough one). It makes a difference, when viewed domestically, whether one is 
stopped by the police—in which case one ought to accept the ticket or fight it in 
court—or by a burly motorist with a very powerful vehicle. In the latter case, not 	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only is the legitimacy of the intervention highly questionable, but what will come 
of it is unpredictable. In a civil society, it may be an unlawful act; in a Hobbesian 
state of nature, it looks like par for the course. 
The difference, internationally—and the locus of the debate, really—is 
whether there exists anything tantamount to a police force, or a court, or some 
kind of locus of adjudication or of reasonable deliberation.  
Kahn, too, has addressed the question and while less sanguine than Walzer 
about humanitarian intervention, he cannot articulate a reason why law—or 
antiquated arrangements at the UN level (antiquated presumably since they 
correspond to a cold-war logic)—ought to prevent states from ameliorating the lot 
of others.179 The problem is not, in Kahn’s view, a surfeit of questionable 
interventions, but rather the failure to carry out humanitarian intervention 
consistently around the world.180  
Moreover, it is difficult for Americans to adopt or ratify foreign or 
international human rights norms, as is evidenced by the exasperatingly slow 
pace of adoption of the Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Rome Treaty on the International 
Criminal Court. This is largely because, Kahn argues: 
The United States was the first modern state, forming itself under a 
constitutional ideal of democracy and law. It is the country most deeply 	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committed to an idea of itself as a sovereign entity under law. And it is the 
most spectacularly successful state in all of modern history. Only in the 
United States is the view deeply held that we have no need of the new 
global order of law: we have no such need because our nationalism has 
been a nationalism of rights under law for 200 years.181 
 
The expression of popular sovereignty accommodated itself well with the 
cold war arrangement, as it protected America’s territory and political conception 
of the law.182 It is the emerging project of global human rights that seems to 
disorient, though Kahn does not account for the fact that first, the human rights 
project—whether it be embodied by the United Nations, the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, or the Convention the Rights of the Child 
(to name only those)—is hardly an “emerging” cold war development. As for the 
post cold-war human rights agenda, observers of international law can be 
forgiven for thinking that the vast majority of the initiatives to change the 
international landscape were American. The first Gulf War, the establishment of 
two ad hoc criminal courts in 1993 and 1994 (as well as hybrid courts 
subsequently), the NATO campaign against rump Yugoslavia in 1999, and the 
unilateral war against Iraq in 2003 did more to vary the shape and content of the 
manner in which the international human rights project is advancing than any 
other initiatives since the cold war’s end. 
Humanitarian intervention, too, is not something that was forced upon the 
United States; and it is not the invention of developing nations in the seventies. It 
represents something worth sacrificing life for, in Walzer’s view, since it is an act 	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of collective agency by the state, and though lives may be lost, the life of the state 
intervening is not at stake, it will live on.183 This argument appears to be meant to 
solve the “Good Samaritan” problem, that is the duty to help those who lives are 
in danger, but not at the peril of one’s own life. Walzer shifts the question by 
envisaging the action as not risking the intervening state’s sovereignty or 
territorial integrity.184 This move, while reassuring states that understandably 
seek to preserve the lives of their own citizens—seeking, as Walzer puts it, zero 
casualties of their own,185 opens the question of what happens to the target state. 
Is its territorial integrity and sovereignty not in immediate peril? If such 
infringement of sovereignty is to be properly compared to the lives of individuals 
tasked to carry out humanitarian operations, then it may be worth wondering 
about the whether any kind of fair procedural arrangement, or prior deliberation 
is not required before matters of such gravity are undertaken. 
The sacrifice of individual lives, then, does not imperil the life of the state. 
The sacrifice is worthwhile as it is carried out on moral grounds, by this 
character, “we,” to help “them.” There is something disconcertingly similar in this 
assumption of sacrifice for the state (that will continue to live) to Kahn’s more 
theological project, and his notion of sacrifice for the popular sovereign. There is 
something exceptional (or exceptionalist) in the view that “we,” having 
determined that international regimes are ineffectual, or that human rights 
instruments cannot possibly apply to us (after all, didn’t we write them in the first 	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place?) ought nonetheless take justice into our own hands. What warrants this 
arrogance, this epistemic certainty?186 
The Problem of Legalism 
The (usually, but not always) liberal commitment to legal principles has been 
described by political theorist Judith Shklar as “legalism,”187 that is “the ethical 
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following and moral 
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”188 Legalism is a 
feature of most democratic societies, but can in addition constitute an ideology 
that denies “both the political provenance and the [political] import of judicial 
decisions.”189 Legalism illustrates the sort of formality that is required if judicial 
bodies established internationally (in the absence of supranational enforcement) 
are to be considered legitimate. It is worth noting, however, that legalism is both 
a tool of critical political analysis (as intended by Shklar) and a concept that has 
been reinterpreted by subsequent scholars and publicists as representing 
formalism as well as a (distinctively) liberal virtue.190 
If international law is indeed moving from, as Kahn puts it, “a doctrine of 
state relations to a regime of individual rights,”191 this will likely lead to a highly 
individualized self-conception where rights—even internationally—precede other 
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political commitments.192 Yet political commitments range more widely than to 
mere rights: families, community, the popular sovereign, and institutions of non-
domination or of deliberation. Even if commitments do not—or ought not—
extend that far, if they are political by nature, they cannot be reduced to a narrow 
individual conception of rights without changing something fundamental in the 
nature of the liberal view. However important the law, procedure, and rights are 
to liberalism, on any account, they are important within institutions of the state. 
That is where these commitments emerge as politics, and it is in state institutions 
(whether those of deliberation or those of justice) that these liberal commitments 
thrive. In the continued absence of a truly genuine (that is universal) 
international enforcement of justice, the idea of a regime of individual rights 
replacing a doctrine of state relations is not only implausible, but seems, as it 
would reintroduce a kind of prepolitical anarchy, simply illiberal. Surely this is 
not the polis that liberal opponents of sovereignty would wish upon themselves. 
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Essay 2: The Costs of International Criminal Law 
 
“They were careless people, Tom and Daisy - they smashed up things and 
creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness, or 
whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess 
they had made.”193 
 
International criminal law experienced an irresistible ascent after the 
United Nations Security Council, in 1993, unanimously interpreted the UN 
Charter to stand for the proposition that it had the power to establish criminal 
courts with the jurisdiction to prosecute and sentence individuals to 
incarceration for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.194 This was 
a remarkable development, and it is seldom sufficiently noted that it represented 
a marked departure from the content and architecture of the U.N. Charter, which 
set out as its subjects member states, and whose sovereignty the document 
explicitly guaranteed. Never was U.N. power over individuals even considered 
before then. Yet as the post-Cold War “peace dividend” bore witness to the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and war in Europe, an unexpected opportunistic 
steeplechase to be the first state to offer an international legal remedy to a 
complex military and political problem unfolded in a matter of mere months; 
though the sudden reframing of armed hostilities as crimes had not previously 
been considered as something to be prosecuted before a new Nuremberg-style 
body, at least not by the Security Council before then.  
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The Secretary General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, hastened to 
offer a legal justification for the establishment of the ICTY, acknowledging that 
the Security Council’s creation of a criminal tribunal might appear to be at odds 
with the contemporary understanding of how such a structure might formally be 
established. It bears noting here that generations of U.N. legal commissions had 
been vainly struggling to establish a permanent international court since its 
creation, and thus, at least within the U.N., a sudden international consensus (of 
at least the five permanent members of the Security Council) could surprise and 
warrant explanation. And so, Boutros-Ghali canvassed the “normal” approaches 
to the establishment of a court, namely through treaty (which has since come to 
fruition with the creation of the International Criminal Court, in force since 
2002), or more controversially, through the vote of the General Assembly, 
deemed important, according to the Secretary-General, to point to states’ 
“prestige” or perhaps to acknowledge some democratic, and more representative 
element in decision-making that was lacking in the Security Council’s decision. 
The reason this type of process would be circumvented, according to Boutros-
Ghali, was urgency. There was simply no time to wait for states to ratify a treaty 
or for the General Assembly to agree to create an international criminal court. 
And over twenty years on, with ICTY prosecutions still taking place (and eleven 
years after the Security Council’s decision that the ad hoc bodies wrap up their 
operations, in accordance with their completion strategy) it is possible to 
question whether urgency could ever apply to international criminal law (or any 
type of judicial litigation at all). 
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International criminal law progressed rapidly; the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda was established in 1994, with its first trial beginning in 
1997, as the movement to ratify the Rome Statute, which would create the long 
awaited International Criminal Court, gathered steam and gained plaudits from 
well-meaning scholars and activists (as well as some political entities, such as the 
European Union) who drove the process. 
A number of other courts, whether international (that is Security Council 
created) or hybrid (that is established and run by a state alongside the United 
Nations) also emerged in the heady late nineties and first decade of the 21st 
century: the Sierra Leone Special Tribunal, the Cambodia Special Chambers, the 
East Timor Court International Court of Justice, as well as the Lebanese Special 
Court, which is devoted to a single event, the assassination of Rafik Hariri. On 
December 30th, 2006, Saddam Hussein was hanged after a rather egregious show 
trial, which by the admission of some of international criminal law’s leading 
scholars was organized by United States,195 and which featured the little-known 
murders of three defense counsel by gunmen.196 The Iraqi special court is now—
as are uncomfortably large swaths of the country—currently defunct, but the 
other courts slouch and lumber on, despite their increasing lack of credibility or 
geopolitical relevance, and in some cases, struggling with funding. 
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Towards Demise 
Two recent ICC cases illustrate a shift in ICL’s legitimacy; both concern 
Africans and both demonstrate how ICL coincided fully with instances of regime 
change as well as the destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa. In 2011, 
Western media and politicians began to describe events unfolding in the area as 
the “Arab Spring.” Very quickly, faced with reports of atrocities committed (or 
about to be committed) by Libyan political and military officials to quash 
demonstrations demanding greater democracy, the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970, which, inter alia, referred the 
matter to the ICC, leading to the eventual indictment of Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi, as well as to air strikes, regime change, and finally to Gaddafi’s lynching 
and death, filmed and posted online. Other senior officials of the Jamahiriya 
remain indicted, but Libya has challenged the ICC on the basis of the Rome 
Statute’s complementarity provision: lawyers representing Libya argued that it 
was willing and able to carry out the prosecution, which would supersede the 
ICC’s referral jurisdiction.  
As it stands, Saif al-Islam, Gaddafi’s son, has had his ICC indictment 
confirmed by the Appeals Chamber, yet he is being held in the town of Zintan by 
a non-state armed group, and had appeared for a court date via 
videoconference.197 He had been denied access to defense counsel, according to 
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Amnesty International.198 He was sentenced to death by firing squad by a 
tribunal constituted by a non-internationally recognized Libyan faction in Tripoli, 
that does not have actual access to al-Islam. Abdullah Senussi’s trial, the ICC 
Appeals Chamber held, could take place in Libya, where he was sentenced to 
death in the same trial. It is difficult at the time of this writing to imagine stable 
conditions under which something like a criminal trial of this significance could 
be carried out fairly and transparently, if at all, and in fact the trial has been 
denounced as a travesty of justice, without defense lawyers, cross-examination, 
or even evidence.199 The sentence is currently being reviewed by the Libyan 
Supreme Court.200 
Another case bears mentioning here, as I attempt to brush, perhaps with 
broad strokes, a picture of the current political state of ICL. In 2011, as well, Ivory 
Coast president Laurent Gbagbo was arrested by a combination of U.N., French 
troops and militias loyal to his opponent in highly contested Presidential 
elections followed by political and ethnic violence, then sent to the International 
Criminal Court. Gbagbo’s opponent, Alessane Ouatarra, a former IMF economist, 
claimed he had won the elections and the dispute was subsequently heard by the 
Constitutional Court, which found in favor of Gbagbo. Violence and opposition to 
the decision continued, but Gbagbo was inaugurated, with charges being 	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exchanged on both sides that orders had been formulated to kill, beat, and rape 
protestors. Gbagbo’s trial illustrates both progress and perversion in ICL: on the 
one hand, he was only officially indicted three years after his arrest while 
remaining in custody in The Hague, partially as a result of the court having given 
the Prosecutor an additional year to come up with evidence to support, not a 
finding of guilt, but the confirmation of the charges against him. On the other 
hand, the indictment decision features a spirited dissent that laments that the 
new evidence tendered by the Prosecutor relies primarily on “anonymous 
hearsay,” and moreover, fails to make a compelling case that Gbagbo ordered, or 
even knew that violence would be carried out against civilians.201 The latter 
development is certainly positive, and stands in stark contrast to the practice 
back in the 1990s, when ad hoc courts, would, like New York Grand Juries, to 
quote Sol Wachtler’s infamous phrase, “indict a ham sandwich.”202 
I cite these last two cases to introduce a current picture that is much 
bleaker than the narrative of progress that sustained the forward march of ever-
expanding international criminal law in the past two decades. Intervention in 
Libya has proven less than optimal, to put it mildly, and the trials envisaged by 
the Security Council in 2011 seem not only dysfunctional, but derisory. The 
benefit of a criminal prosecution (or “accountability,” in Security Council 
language, or indeed some conception of “justice”) seems out of proportion with 
the costs of geopolitical instability. 	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And so today, some of the most sanguine voices in favor of international 
trials are now beginning to doubt that the project can survive in its current form. 
Mark Osiel, who once passionately called for “atrocity trials” to create collective 
memory through the judiciary’s spinning of “vivid yarns,”203 penned a detailed 
and pessimistic account of international law, titled “The Demise of Criminal 
Law.”204 He canvasses a number of disappointments with the institution of 
international criminal law (at times conflating it with human rights law) and 
deserves great credit, as an ardent proponent of international trials, for setting 
some terms of discussion and argument, and for a candidly expressing his dour 
scholarly mood.  Osiel’s list of grievances also provides the opportunity to 
illustrate what is lacking in his critique (that I want to address as a type rather 
than a token approach to ICL) and how it fails to address not only the specific 
historical and political conditions that led to the institutions’ emergence, but the 
fact that these historical conditions are in part responsible for the tribunals’ 
downfall.  
 I certainly share Osiel’s disappointment with international criminal law, 
but some of the reasons for that disillusion differ; moreover, mine is of a far more 
long standing nature. He argues that the future of ICL depends on the survival of 
the International Criminal Court, specifically, and questions whether it has 
achieved the abysmally low standard of “better than nothing.” I shall return to the 
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question of alternatives to international criminal trials, namely economic and 
social justice as well as the question of economic inequality, but Osiel points to 
something quite different: he concludes that the ICC, for its “constituency,” has 
fallen short, in ways that may prove fatal, to offer more than nothing. He first 
laments that among the respectable number of states that have ratified the Rome 
Statute, too many have done so cynically, in order to secure foreign direct 
investment, rather than with the intent of credibly committing to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. The implication, of course, is that states seeking foreign 
investment—developing nations—are the least credible. Criticism is also leveled 
against the foreign donors, who Osiel contends have insufficiently tied aid to the 
domestic prosecution of international crimes. The European Union is also at fault 
for not having insisted on trials of Communist-era crimes, and having instead 
accepted that post-Soviet states undertake more modest commemorative 
approaches to their past. It is unclear what type of international crimes Osiel 
believes went unpunished in the non-examples he provides, or how retroactive 
domestic (or international) legislation could plausibly serve to prosecute them. 
Considering collective memory to be shabby in comparison to trials, he reveals 
that his own commitment to judge-sanctioned collective memory was never 
meant as a grass-roots process of local reconciliation, but rather a top-down 
pedagogical initiative in which foreigners teach natives the benefits of liberalism. 
Osiel has in fact argued in favor of liberal show trials, “monumental spectacles,” 
he writes, with no apparent sign of irony; “yarns,” “narratives,” and “stories” that 
would require prosecutors to familiarize themselves with the local conventions of 
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narrative genres.205  
Osiel continues his foray into the current state of international criminal 
law by addressing the growing interest scholars have shown for domestic 
prosecutions of international crimes. This would put the ICC in a kind of 
supervisory role, exercising soft power by pressuring states to carry out their own 
prosecutions, failing which The Hague would step in. Not only does Osiel express 
discomfort with this self-effacement tantamount to “self-erasement” of the ICC as 
an institution, he does not think history has demonstrated that states tend to 
adequately prosecute their own crimes. This is not meant in the ordinarily 
understood sense that leaders tend not to arrest and prosecute themselves for 
war crimes or genocide; instead, Osiel points to the record in Latin America, 
deploring the fact that post-dictatorship states have preferred “populist” trials 
prosecuting the financial offenses committed by previous regimes, believing that 
to be more acceptable to the people than prosecution of atrocities in which large 
swaths of the population may have been complicit.  
This barely concealed contempt for financial prosecutions points to a key 
phenomenon: the power to frame what counts as a crime—the non-prosecution of 
which fosters what human rights and international criminal law activists and 
scholars of the nineties called “the culture of impunity”—deserves scrutiny, 
particularly in light of the correlation between the increase in interest in 
prosecuting atrocities (abroad) and the actual decrease in the prosecution of 
high-level financial crimes in the United States. “Too big to fail” was 	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accompanied by “too big to jail,”206 as in 1999, Federal guidelines were 
introduced, inviting US prosecutors to take into account the interests of 
shareholders in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.207 A single banker has 
faced criminal charges since the 2008 financial crisis, a situation that stands in 
stark contrast to the vigorous prosecutions for fraud and other offenses after the 
1980s Savings and Loans scandal. The question that emerges from this empirical 
observation—and which is evident from Osiel’s complaint, is whether there is a 
kind of trade-off between economic criminal justice (prosecutions for private-
sector fraud or public corruption) and the prosecution of atrocities, whether 
within a given state—these are the examples Osiel has in mind—or the preference 
for spectacular prosecutions abroad to the detriment of domestic economic 
crimes. In other words, is it possible to detect a link between the two phenomena, 
in particular in terms of political choices about justice, and indeed, about the idea 
of equality?  
Osiel’s position should be familiar to students of the field of “transitional 
justice,” an array of causal and normative theories that would govern 
accountability once autocratic states experience a shift to at times fragile 
democracy. Typically, the field of transitional justice favors legal and institutional 
responses to past crimes, such as the torture of political opponents of former 
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“third wave”208 regimes (Argentina being the prime example as well as the case 
study that led to a formal articulation of transitional justice under the auspices of 
the Aspen Institute, funded by the Ford Foundation in 1988),209 over other 
(politically plausible) justice claims addressing inequality or the redistribution of 
wealth. Transitional justice, as Paige Arthur, in a commanding study of the 
emergence of the field puts it, in particular in those cases where prosecutions of 
former political and military leaders were held, then suspended, as a result of 
political backlash, as in Argentina, the questions at stake went beyond simple 
accountability: “How to balance competing moral imperatives, reconcile 
legitimate claims for justice with equally legitimate claims for stability and social 
peace, and foster the relationship between justice for crimes of the past and a 
more just political order in the present.”210 
Osiel’s unwillingness to broach the record of domestic prosecution of 
atrocities with the nuance that Arthur demonstrates does a great disservice to 
those the whole enterprise purports to serve: the people, or more accurately, the 
citizens and legal residents of a given state. He claims, without providing 
evidence, that public opinion supports prosecutions for corruption and the kinds 
of government fraud that anger populations harmed by economic scarcity due to 
inequality, a view that canny prosecutors will seize, in his contention, to choose to 
prosecute those types of crimes to the detriment of more serious international 
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offences, such as torture. Even were the claim to be empirically true, and 
acknowledging that it is problematic to refrain from the prosecution of serious 
offenses against the person (though there may be, as in the case of Argentina, 
important political reasons to suspend these cases, such as the choice of avoiding 
a coup to protect the new democratic government), another question emerges: so 
what if the collective good, honest officials, and fair distribution of wealth matter 
to people?  
 
The Politics of Human Rights 
The period in history when transitional justice emerges as a discipline—
arguably the bridge between the explosion of human rights and the later 
surprising establishment of international legal bodies—predates the end of the 
cold war. A brief history of the emergence of human rights is required here, and 
some remarkable revisionist accounts have challenged the idea that human 
rights, viewed as a supra-national endeavor, have been with humanity, or the 
West, depending on the account, since time immemorial. Samuel Moyn patiently 
demonstrates that human rights, as understood today, emerged only in the mid-
nineteen-seventies, having been, despite claims to the contrary, fairly marginal 
before then, at least as an international norm to be applied or enforced abroad. 
Indeed, after discarding the “uncritical wonderment” of the historiography of 
human rights, so frequently immersed in a teleological “church history”211 	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searching for past evidence upon which to identify the long roots of the 
irresistible ascent of human rights, he identifies the first genuine expressions of 
the phenomenon, more properly then understood as “the rights of man and the 
citizen” in Enlightenment revolutions.  
While acknowledging that some ancient Greek thinkers (the Stoics), some 
aspects of Judaism, medieval Christianity, early-modern philosophy, abolitionists 
and antiracists certainly incorporated elements of morality—this is hardly a 
revelation—enforceable rights emerge only as does the secular state, and these 
rights are owed by the state to its citizens; it was inconceivable then, however 
internationalist was the French or the aftermath of the American revolutions that 
these rights were meant to apply to the peoples of other states.212 Enlightenment 
human rights are rights of citizens (and in the case of France, citizenship is 
extended quite generously during portions of the Revolution) and it is indulging 
in anachronism to entertain the idea that anyone conceiving of these lofty ideals 
at the time thought that they looked anything like they do now, something that 
would seek to transcend the authority of the state rather than rely upon it entirely 
for its fulfillment. The Rights of Man movement, posits Moyn, predates the 
human rights movement, “and it was called nationalism.”213 Moyn’s argument is 
based not only on the genuine lack of historical enthusiasm for these kinds of 
international rights over most of history—including, quite significantly, at the 
time of the adoption of the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, when they were not only marginal, but crucially addressed states—he 	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instead contends that human rights should be seen as a utopia that only emerged 
when various conditions interacted unexpectedly.  
Moreover, human rights could only emerge as an ideal after other 
universalist utopias had lost steam and were on the brink of collapse. For Moyn, 
in parallel with the ascent of increasingly mainstream human rights NGOs such 
as Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch (today’s Human Rights Watch)—
and they became mainstream only when they began pointing to abuses 
committed in Warsaw Pact countries in addition to their more traditional focus 
on Latin America—came a certain disillusionment with the promise of 
decolonialization and self-determination.214 Indeed, Moyn demonstrates 
persuasively that what occupied the decades of idealism after World War II was 
not the idea of individual rights, (and much less as a reaction to the Holocaust215) 
but rather the struggle by formerly colonized states to achieve independence and 
self-rule. But by the early 1970s, anti-colonialism, writes Moyn, was believed to 
be “shipwrecked as a moral and political project.”216 The bloom had faded from 
Western enthusiasm for the swashbuckling third world revolutions of Che 
Guevara and his comrades-in-arms,217 as many newly independent states 
eventually settled into plutocracy and client-based politics that had failed to 
deliver the egalitarian promises post-colonialism had within its reach but failed 
to fully grasp and realize.  
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Those very emerging third world plutocracies are today associated with 
what Nils Gilman calls “deviant globalists,” criminals who entertain a symbiotic 
relationship with a decaying state—and the phenomenon is not limited to the 
developing world.218 First World plutocrats erode Western democracy through 
lobbying and corporate personhood, while still parasitically enjoying its “legacy 
goods of social welfare,”219 then sending their profits and earnings to tax havens 
abroad, while global criminals—not those who interest the world of international 
criminal law and its tight focus on atrocities, but rather, drug and human 
traffickers, rare wood and earth dealers, illegal coltan miners, among others, who 
carve out bedeviling microsovereignties in post-colonial states.220 This “Twin 
Insurgency” emerges precisely at the same time as the idea of human rights. In 
Gilman’s historical sketch, the post-World War II developed world promoted a 
largely social welfarist model, with states favoring the expansion of a middle class 
that could expect both increasing economic improvement as well as the state’s 
provision of public goods through non-punitive progressive taxation.  
The existence of the more radical egalitarian alternative of the Soviet 
Union, Gilman contends, provided a cold war incentive for social justice in 
Western nations. In these circumstances, inequality decreased within states in 
most of the developed world, and a middle class (or the industrial labor force in 
the communist space) could also consume goods produced within the state. It is 
uncontroversial to situate the beginning of the major political and economic shift 	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from this broadly Keynesian (in the West) approach in the 1970s, which is also 
when labor unionism began its US decline and the share of income going to the 
top 10%, which had fallen sharply in the late 1930s, started to increase gradually, 
reaching 50%—last seen in the 1920s—by 2008. 
Figure 1 
An understanding and analysis of this period—as well the social trade-offs 
associated with it—are essential to understand the origins (and the eventual 
costs) of what seemed like a sudden shift towards international criminal 
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prosecution of atrocities right after the end of the cold war. I will argue that it is 
not entirely unrelated to the inequality we have rediscovered in the Western 
world with Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century221 or Gilman’s 
deviant globalization. 
Barbara Keys has added a remarkable study to the history of human rights 
scholarship, pin-pointing (as did Moyn before her) 1977 as the year the human 
rights ethos emerged in earnest. She shows, however, that this was a deliberate 
(though at first inchoate) political decision made by the Carter administration, to 
overcome collective guilt and shame in the wake of the Vietnam War. Human 
rights, as envisaged by the Carter administration, were no longer those “civil 
rights”—a painful reminder of social strife that shook the 50s and 60s in the U.S. 
and deploring injustices within the country—but rather wrongs committed 
abroad by others, to be identified and remedied by the US, serving as what Moyn 
describes as “a tonic for the nation’s self-confidence.”222 Though unsure, at first, 
of what these human rights would consist of, the Carter administration, 
influenced by New Left Democrats (the conservative democrats would lose the 
early definitional struggles but would reemerge under the Reagan, and crucially 
under the G.W. Bush administration223) promoted an idea of international 
human rights, with little cost to the U.S., and deployed this idea in opposition to 
the 1960s Left opposition against “searing inequality and injustice,” and rather to 
campaign against “individual evil perpetrated by small numbers of wrongdoers” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, First Edition (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2014). 
222 Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2014).  
223 Ibid., 4. 
	   92	  
abroad.224 Keys’ critical insight is that the foreign policy decision to adopt human 
rights was one of sentiment, to avoid the shame and guilt that resulted from the 
napalm, the strafing runs, My Lai, and the dishonor of Vietnam. The policy to 
defend human rights (abroad) would restore American virtue and a “proud, 
proselytizing moral role in the world.”225 
Against the backdrop of the emergence of human rights in the 1970s, the 
phenomenon of transitional justice, which can be seen as a hybrid of human 
rights and domestic criminal law, more clearly emerges as a political and 
philosophical predecessor of international criminal law. Paige Arthur provides 
four main reasons for transitional justice’s appeal in the 1980s: democracy was a 
desirable goal in many states undergoing political change from dictatorship; 
modernization theory had become discredited as an analytical and policy tool; 
states shifted from seeing transition as socioeconomic transformation and 
instead embraced legal-institutional reform; and finally, the “global decline of the 
radical left.”226 
The human rights “revolution” of the 1970s-1980s stands for the 
internationalization of a formerly national idea, enforced domestically, through 
domestic legal or administrative institutions, which in its new incarnation, came 
to enjoy bureaucratic support, as an “embedded missionary agency”227 in the 
State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Following 	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Ronald Reagan’s election to the United States presidency, the administration first 
stated that international terrorism would take the place of human rights in 
foreign policy, but this intention, articulated by Alexander Haig and echoed by 
failed nominee to the key human rights post at the State Department, Ernest 
Lefever (who was not hostile to some degree of torture),228 was abandoned in 
favor of a more neoconservative vision of human rights by Elliot Abrams, who 
engaging in a certain amount of historical revisionism, framed the idea in a 
manner consistent with American exceptionalism, as “central to what America is 
and stands for.”229 Human rights in U.S. foreign policy were thus redefined as 
democracy promotion, to be applied with some selectivity (that is not to allies), 
and as Keys puts it “emphatically did not include economic and social rights.”230  
Human rights were thus firmly established, defended by the National 
Endowment for Democracy as well as by Amnesty International. International 
criminal law, in contrast, was yet to enjoy institutional status: in order to emerge 
as a tangible corpus of law to be enforced before tribunals or in the words of 
Judith Shklar, “law-like political institutions,”231 two other developments had to 
take place: first, the end of the cold war, and second, the emergence around the 
same time as the internationalization of human rights, of Holocaust memory.  
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Holocaust Memory in America 
Institutional memory typically consists of those legal acts of public 
commemoration established by a given state, such as the creation by a public law 
in 1980 of the United States Holocaust Memorial and Museum in Washington 
DC.232 Peter Novick devoted a controversial study of the “current concerns” that 
at the time led to the late emergence of Holocaust memory and its eventual 
institutionalization in America.233 The debate continues as to whether, as Novick 
(and also Moyn in an essay on the intersection of the emergence of human rights 
and Holocaust memory234) demonstrates, “Holocaust consciousness” was 
marginal following the end of the Second World War (and as Moyn further 
contends, largely irrelevant to the human rights concerns expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights235) or whether significant evidence shows 
that Holocaust memory remained vivid in private memory and in Jewish 
subcultures. Little evidence exists of a salient Holocaust memory until the mid-
seventies, whether in the United States or in Europe.236 The remarkable historian 
of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg (a trained political scientist) observed in his 
memoirs—detailing with evident frustration the difficulties he had for decades 
publishing his formidable opus, The Destruction of the European Jews— that it 
was only at the time of the Vietnam War, when Americans were “searching for 
moral certainties” that the Holocaust could be a topic of interest, standing for 	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absolute evil, against which “all other transgressions in the conduct of nations 
could be measured and assessed.”237  
This statement by Hilberg, of course, bears striking similarity to the results 
of Barbara Keys’ study on the emergence of human rights. And tellingly, Jimmy 
Carter’s signing statement to public law 96-388, establishing the Holocaust 
Museum predictably said nothing about Vietnam, and much about the promotion 
of human rights.238 The temporal sequence that led to the proliferation of 
Holocaust memory (and its causes) is important as the USHMM was immediately 
the locus of two simultaneous things: the memory of Nuremberg (and the 
important role played by the United States in the prosecution of the Nazi war 
criminals) and calls for action to be taken by the United States in the former 
Yugoslavia, which were made at the opening ceremony, on April 22nd, 1993, by 
Elie Wiesel in the presence of President Bill Clinton.239 Hilberg had lamented that 
the Holocaust museum, for which he served as an advisor in the early stages of its 
planning and creation, had, contrary to his own scholarly emphasis, failed to 
insist on the perpetrators and their sources. (Focus on the perpetrators, as well as 
Hilberg’s insistence on the structural components of the Holocaust: the 
bureaucracy, the party, the military, and the industrialists, as well as the shift in 
decision-making, from public laws to something resembling anticipation or 
improvisation, was to some extent to blame for the hostile reception of his work 	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in the early years.) Hilberg had requested that a wall at the museum be covered 
with photos of perpetrators, known and unknown, representing these 
professional groups—Hilberg never failed to emphasize the key role of lawyers in 
facilitating the Holocaust, from the Nuremberg laws, to the niceties of 
expropriation and concentration—but instead, the wall ultimately displayed 
photos of the Nuremberg trials. “Some of the perpetrators,” wrote Hilberg, “are 
still there, but in the role of defendant.”240  
This is true, but it is useful to better understand what happened with these 
photos, to think not only about the perpetrators, but also about the experience of 
the visitor to the museum. For that, Novick’s work—and research question, “why 
here, why now?”—are most instructive. Novick describes some puzzlement (both 
as a Jew and a historian) in discovering a museum that features exhibits that 
remind him of stations of the cross, with relics that strike him as fetishized 
objects that employ, most significantly, he writes, in the climax of Elie Wiesel’s 
Night, crucifixion imagery, which resonate powerfully with major Christian 
themes while being only peripherally relevant in Judaism.241 This 
Christianization of the Holocaust is a phenomenon explored in Naomi Seidman’s 
“Elie Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage,” an examination of the shift 
between Wiesel’s first publication of his experience at Auschwitz (and later 
Buchenwald), and the novel Night, that with the assistance of French Catholic 
and Nobel prize laureate François Mauriac, underwent significant changes that 
would prove appealing to Western audiences by toning down Wiesel’s evident 	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anger in his first Yiddish version of the book (Un di Velt Hot Geshvign, “And the 
World Remained Silent,” published by a small press in Buenos Aires), and 
instead supplanting that rage with the portrayal of a soulful, wise survivor, that in 
addition narrated events that were familiar to Christians, such as crucifixion 
imagery, or references to the Trinity.242 Night also abandons the political 
implications of the Yiddish original, in particular the demands for an end to what 
Wiesel saw as post-war German impunity. As Hilberg writes, again attempting to 
explain the hostility to his monumental empirical documentation of the 
Holocaust, there was a time when survivors were told to forget, “and when the 
Nuremberg trials were conducted not so much to understand Germany’s history 
as to conclude unfinished business in order that Germany might be reconstituted 
with a clean slate in the North Atlantic community of nations confronted with the 
threat of communism.”243 
Another variant of Christianization has had distorting historical effects at 
the highest institutional levels. When President Jimmy Carter first set out to 
consider memorializing the destruction of the European Jews in the wake of an 
internationally successful NBC miniseries, Holocaust, he spoke of the six million 
victims of the Nazis,244 but was advised by domestic policy chief Stuart Eizenstadt 
to expand the number to eleven million, as the Simon Wiesenthal Center in 
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California had done.245 The eleven million figure had baffled many, including the 
Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer. Indeed, five million non-Jewish casualties of the 
Third Reich is far too low a number to ever be accurate; conversely, if it is a 
measure of non-Jewish groups targeted for murder, it is far too high. So how was 
the figure arrived upon? Bauer reports that he asked Wiesenthal the question 
directly, and was told that he had simply invented it,246 ostensibly to present a 
more “ecumenical” figure to include victims of other (primarily Christian) faiths. 
In April 1979, both President Carter and Vice-President Mondale referred to the 
victims of the Holocaust as eleven million killed, 6 million of them Jews.247 The 
inclusive (and historically puzzling number) did not fail do draw the ire of Elie 
Wiesel, who found the number offensive. As Chair of the newly appointed 
President’s Commission of the Holocaust, he insisted on, as Novick puts it, the 
“temporal as well as the conceptual priority of Jewish victimhood.”248 Concerns 
grew among White House staffers that Wiesel’s opposition to the eleven million 
language, to be included in the President’s executive order creating the Holocaust 
Memorial Council—the body that would go on to create the Holocaust Museum 
and Memorial in Washington, D.C.—might lead to his resignation, which would 
cause the administration to lose “the symbol of the Holocaust.”249 In the end, 
Carter’s executive order did refer to the eleven million victims of the Holocaust, 
and Wiesel did not resign. What is left, however, is an institutional trace of an 
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inaccurate casualty figure invented by Wiesenthal that became the first U.S. 
government-sanctioned definition of the Holocaust. 
In addition to the Christianization of the Holocaust, which has served to 
give the event and its significance—arguably altered in the process—wider 
resonance, another phenomenon emerges with the Americanization of the 
Holocaust, made most evident by the Holocaust Memorial and Museum’s 
placement adjacent to the National Mall in Washington, D.C. Optimism, argues 
Alvin Rosenfeld, was integrated into the American memory of the Holocaust, be it 
in the memory of Anne Frank (“In spite of everything I still believe that people 
are really good at heart” quoted by President Reagan during his trip to the 
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in 1985), films like Sophie’s Choice or 
Schindler’s List, and finally, the Holocaust museum itself.250 A passage from a 
letter soliciting the support of new members sets out the “story” that visitors will 
experience: the extermination of the Jews, other groups, “and even innocent 
children.” What follows is significant: 
Then, finally, when breaking hearts can bear it no longer, visitors will 
emerge into the light—into a celebration of resistance, rebirth and renewal 
for the survivors—whether they remained in Europe, or as many did, went 
to Israel or America to rebuild their lives. And having witnessed the 
nightmare of evil, the great American monuments that surround each 
departing visitor will take on new meaning, as will the ideals for which 
they stand.251 
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Here, the museum states that it not only commemorates (an event that 
took place in Europe), but perhaps even more importantly, celebrates the 
monuments that represent great American ideals, “fair play, decency, and justice 
for all.”252 As Omer Bartov253 and Charles Maier wondered, why not build a 
museum to commemorate the American institution of slavery,254 Novick provides 
an uncomfortable answer: a reflection on enslavement and wrongs committed 
against African-Americans would imply reflections on redress, while the triumph 
of the Washington Mall over evil is “virtually cost-free: a few cheap tears.”255 
Bartov further emphasizes that the Holocaust itself was committed by a 
highly efficient, modern state, a state much like ours, and whose features, he 
writes, we “would like to see exported to other parts of the world,”256 in particular 
those economically inefficient places suffering from “epidemics, famine, and a 
general condition of brutality and savagery.”257 Bartov then argues that if any 
lesson is to be drawn from the Holocaust, it is precisely that a society like ours—
our political and economic institutions, our mass psychology—could commit 
another such Holocaust, but that implication is far too subversive to be drawn 
from a publicly funded federal institution situated in its capital,258 among the 
great monuments to its national credo. Hilberg’s observation about the 
photographs of the perpetrators becomes significant in the context of Bartov’s 	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argument: instead of depictions of individuals who as lawyers, bureaucrats, 
servicemembers, industrialists, and party members, were the cogs of the 
machinery of destruction, and without whose work (familiar to us in a modern 
state) the Holocaust would not have happened as it did, we see some perpetrators 
on trial. It is worth recalling who tried them. Thus, we do not only see the 
perpetrators “in the role” as Hilberg puts it, of defendant; just as we see the 
monuments celebrating America’s system of justice (for all) upon emerging “into 
the light,” we see the American contribution to the prosecution of the Nazi 
leadership at Nuremberg. The Holocaust museum opened two months to the day 
after the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Neoliberalism, Human Rights, and International Criminal Law 
In a previous section, I have introduced a coincidence in the rise of human 
rights discourse, Holocaust memory, inequality, and the wider though unstated 
rubric of neoliberalism. Recent scholarship on the emergence of human rights 
from relative political or ethical marginalia to a forceful and effective mobilizing 
movement, in particular the groundbreaking work of Samuel Moyn, has first 
argued that human rights emerged as a utopia when other utopias ran out of 
steam; he also shows, however, that for the human rights movement to genuinely 
achieve purchase, it had to stake a non-political, minimalist and at times anti-
statist ground. This meant abandoning socioeconomic rights talk and focusing on 
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individual rights, most often, as with the most powerful rights NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, of citizens outside the 
developed West. Furthermore, the U.S. adopted Human Rights as foreign policy, 
as shown by Barbara Keys, first fitfully, under the Carter administration, then 
more forcefully under President Reagan and since. The U.S. did not, quite 
obviously, have as a goal to defend redistributive rights abroad and much less at 
home.  
In fact, in 1975, Daniel Patrick Moynihan published a rebuke to Third 
World demands for a new international economic order in Commentary, “in 
essence,” writes Keys, responding “to the developing world’s clamorous calls for a 
redistribution of wealth by saying: no, have human rights instead.”259 Moyn’s 
leading historiography of human rights posits that the most interesting and 
useful unanswered question in scholarship consists in “grasping the eerie and 
disturbing conjuncture in which strong and costly solidarity at home collapsed in 
tandem with the popularity of weak and cheap solidarity abroad.”260 This 
emerges precisely when the U.S. adopts, even inchoately, human rights as policy, 
but also soon after Gunnar Myrdal and Frederick Hayek were jointly awarded the 
Nobel prize in economics, with their respective fortunes, in a rough symmetry 
with Moyn’s “eerie and disturbing conjuncture,” moving towards descent for 
Myrdal, and ascent for Hayek. Moyn points out that Hayek’s policies saw their 
practical implementation in Great Britain, and the U.S. in the 1970s, a 	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phenomenon that applied with less democracy and more violence in the Southern 
cone of South America.261 
In parallel, as Moyn puts it, emerges the very strong idea—arguably 
stronger even in the institutions of international criminal law that followed—was 
that: 
there was no summum bonum as the plausible object of striving, not even 
the capitalist welfare state once widely stigmatized for its lack of ambition 
and materialist soullessness. Instead, the summum malum of spectacular 
atrocity as the organizational fulcrum for moral consciousness and 
international conscience was put in its place.”262 
 
Moyn has taken up a recent critique formulated in an important essay by British 
Marxist legal scholar Susan Marks that he, contrary to the engaged writer Naomi 
Klein, has failed to appreciate the influence of neoliberalism in the emergence of 
the 1970s human rights phenomenon in both a scholarly text as well as a more 
widely accessible internet publication.263  
Before wading into the merits of the respective sides of the debate, in 
which I will introduce a via media—that is human rights neither as a “helpless 
bystander”264 nor as a “powerless companion”265 of neoliberalim as with Moyn, 
and not as caused by neoliberalism, as with Marks, but rather as a reckless 	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opportunist—I shall first turn to a brief intellectual history of economic and 
political thinking focusing mainly on the 1970s, but certainly not constrained to 
that decade in regards, broadly, to the perception of equality, rights, and more 
broadly, democracy at the same time. 
(A) Economics and Inequality in American Intellectual History 
The year 1977 is now considered the signal year for the earnest emergence 
of human rights in most serious scholarship, but it is also the year that Charles 
Lindblom’s controversial Politics and Markets was published. It received several 
scathing reviews across the scholarly and political spectrum (and from friend and 
foe alike),266 but also attention and acclaim by the New York Review of Books.267 
The degree of interest in Lindblom’s book was in part due to his unflattering 
observations—from a democratic standpoint—about the power of corporations in 
America, but perhaps even more so to the fact that Lindblom, Yale professor and 
with Robert Dahl, prominent proponent of pluralism theory, described somewhat 
harshly by Daniel Fusfeld as “this stalwart of the conventional wisdom, this 
academic pillar of the status quo,”268 appeared to have undergone an “intellectual 
and ideological transformation.”269 Others, less charitable still, particularly in 
light of their admitted friendship, likened Limblom’s efforts to that of a Rip Van 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Daniel Fusfeld,  (1979) Three Reviews of Charles E. Lindblom: "Politics and Markets: The 
World's Political Economic Systems" Journal of Economic Affairs 13(1) 207-217; Charles W. 
Anderson, C. (1978) The Political Economy of Charles E. Lindblom.  The American Political 
Science Review, 72 (3), 1012-1016; James Buchanan, (1979). Three Reviews of Charles E. 
Lindblom: "Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems" Journal of Economic 
Issues 13(1), 207-217; Robert Solo,  (1979).  Three Reviews of Charles E. Lindblom: "Politics and 
Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems" Journal of Economic Issues 13(1), 207-217. 
267 Fusfeld, 209. 
268 Ibid, 214. 
269 Ibid, 215. 
	   105	  
Winkle, who had seemed to have slept through the 1960s.270 And perhaps not 
only the 1960s, as he seemed to have missed the storied debates and critiques 
that marked the decade so strongly,271 most notable of which was the 1960 
publication of The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America,272 in which E.E. Schattschneider famously quipped that “the flaw in the 
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus signs with a strong upper-class 
accent.”273 
Lindblom’s general argument was that the idea of pluralism—developed, 
argues Ido Oren, as a research agenda to counter what the discipline considered 
to be the inherent totalitarianism of the Soviet Union at the height of the cold 
war274—had failed to take into account the disproportionate influence of business 
and corporate interests on political power, and that this phenomenon had 
disenfranchised the people—at least with respect to their control of government 
authority—and they had come, in addition, to accept that state of affairs 
uncritically.275 
Lindblom’s concern resides in the fact that private enterprise, quite 
outside formal collaboration with governing institutions, makes decisions (as is 
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its nature in a capitalist economic system) relevant to a huge swath of economic 
organization, and that influence the lives of millions of people.276 Putting it 
bluntly, Lindblom revealed the tension between the idea of the great American 
democracy, and an institutional and economic reality that does not appear to 
fulfill the promise of pluralist theory. Of this theory, Fusfeld writes that it is:  
[T]he socio-political theory of the 1950s that explained why the United 
States—whose economy is dominated by a few hundred giant corporations, 
whose politics is run by special interests and their allied bureaucrats, 
where at least 60 percent of the productive wealth is controlled by less 
than 2 percent of the families—why this society was the most truly 
democratic and beneficent that mankind had ever seen.277  
 
The attitude revealed by Fusfeld, above, recalls Samuel L. Huntington’s insight 
that Americans suffer from “cognitive dissonance,” a condition caused by the gap 
between ideals—and in this case it would be pluralist theory—and the existing 
political institutions’ inability to measure up to the standards of democracy. In 
Huntington’s argument it is Gunnar Myrdal’s “American Creed,” embodying the 
ideals of liberty, equality, individualism, and democracy278 that has fallen short. 
Huntington emphasizes the ideal of equality as that which U.S. institutions has 
most disappointed—conceding the point regarding the distribution of wealth and 
in limited respects regarding the distribution of political power—citing de 
Tocqueville’s “half right and half wrong” assessment of equality being the 
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defining characteristic of American society.279 Half-right, empirically, at the time, 
argues Huntington, but not correct regarding a gradual evolution towards 
equality, at least not, as Lindblom discovered, where economic distribution of 
wealth is concerned.  
It is worth noting that Huntington approached the problem of “his” 
cognitive dissonance by first characterizing the people’s reactions as a mixture of 
moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy280 —in a manner not dissimilar 
to Lindblom’s conclusion that in fact the people had lost the ability to take better 
into account business interests in their daily lives and by becoming slothful and 
acquisitive281—then, by engaging upon a comparative analysis of other polities 
which were, he argues, all institutionally improved by American foreign 
intervention.282 Thus he can claim that the gap between American ideals and 
American institutions vanishes when applied to the American impact on other 
societies. The similarity with the new human rights of the 1970s as radiating 
outwards to wrongdoers abroad, rather than to inequality at home is striking.  
The corporate sector is already a leviathan of an interest group, quite 
unlike the associations conceived of by de Tocqueville, Robert Putnam or even 
Michael Walzer, a fact rarely conceded by the pluralist theorists of Lindblom’s 
generation.283 They arguably benefit from at least four important advantages over 	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other groups, that is, resources in money, organization, access, and 
indoctrination.284 Furthermore, corporations have won a First Amendment 
challenge in Citizens United v. FEC, and may now devote unlimited financial 
resources to federal electioneering communications, and thus directly attempt to 
influence the electorate to (further) adopt corporate preferences in the public 
sphere. Since then, the Supreme Court in its 2014 McCutcheon v. FEC ruling took 
Citizens United further, “celebrating,” as campaign finance scholar Richard 
Hasen writes, “the idea of politicians responding to the wishes of big donors and 
spenders.”285 And in a dramatic finding reported well outside the confines of 
political science,286 Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page found that time and again, 
across policy areas, the interests of the wealthy are preferred over those of the 
general public as measured by policy outcome. In fact, average citizens were 
found to have little to no influence.287 
As even eminent pluralists, in the 197os, began to doubt the promise of 
economic equality, and indeed of democracy, just as human rights were invoked 
by the United States government against violators of individual rights abroad, it 
is easy to grasp why human rights talk would want to minimize demands in order 
to succeed as a movement. The idea of equality was already running dry as alarm 
bells rang against the expansion of corporate power, as the credo of equality was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Anderson, 1016. 
285 Richard Hasen, Plutocrats United : Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distorsion 
of American Elections, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 2016), 5. 
286 What in the world? Pieces of global opinion, “Study: US Is an Oligarchy, Not a Democracy,” 
BBC News, accessed February 14, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-
27074746. 
287 Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens,” 12 Perspectives on Politics 564 (2014); see discussion in Hasen, 
Plutocrats United, 53-54. 
	   109	  
even explicitly discredited as a petulant populist demand by thinkers as 
influential as Huntington. The time was evidently ripe for human rights, then 
eventually international criminal law, as well as Holocaust memory in between. 
(B) Powerless Companions and Neoliberal Stooges 
Samuel Moyn has taken on, as we have seen, the charge that he has 
inadequately, as opposed to Naomi Klein, appreciated the contribution of market 
fundamentalism as a driver of the human rights movement as we know it, a 
minimalist enterprise.288 Susan Marks first deftly summarizes Moyn’s 
conclusions in his important 2010 The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History in 
a succinct paragraph:  
In his words, human rights ‘became powerful and prominent because 
other visions imploded’; they ‘are best understood as survivors: the god 
that did not fail while other political ideologies did’. The ‘god that failed’ 
was, of course, communism, as seen by ex-communists who had 
repudiated it. But while Moyn highlights the ‘anti-totalitarianism’ of this 
period, he also stresses the ‘anti-politics’. If human rights avoided failure, 
he explains that this was ‘most of all because they were widely understood 
as a moral alternative to bankrupt political utopias’. Their success 
‘depended on leaving behind political utopias and turning to smaller, more 
manageable moral acts’. Human rights thus involved the ‘substitution of 
moral for political utopianism’. They were a ‘minimalist, hardy utopia that 
could survive in the harsh climate’ of the post-oil shock era, with its 
straitened economic circumstances and ‘mistrust of more maximal plans 
for transformation – especially revolutions but also programmatic 
endeavours of any kind’289 
 
But Marks quickly shifts to a virtual retort she would have Naomi Klein make 
against Moyn’s careful research into the conditions that allowed the frank 	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emergence of a movement that had previously labored in the shadows. For Moyn, 
this is the displacement of discredited political utopias in favor of minimal ones 
focusing less on summum bonum than on summum malum. Klein, according to 
Marks, also considered that human rights were truly born in the 1970s, however, 
states Marks, Klein points out what Moyn failed to mention: that human rights 
rise in the “period of the neo-liberal version of ‘private’ capitalism, with its now 
familiar policy prescription of privatisation, deregulation and state retreat from 
social provision”.290 Marks adds that for Klein, “part of the context for the 
consolidation of neo-liberalism itself was the emergence of the human rights 
movement (…)”291 Unfortunately, that is not quite what Klein argues in the 
thirteen-odd pages she devotes to human rights in The Shock Doctrine,292 a book 
that though receiving plaudits on its book jacket (and beyond) did not fail to draw 
harsh criticism from both the left (how is this new?293) and from the right 
(selection bias, faulty causal reasoning, vulgar demonization of Milton 
Freidman294). In discussing the shift from a utopian left politics in the Southern 
cone to a more legalistic, human rights discourse, she tells the story about how 
groups were forced, because of the violence of state repression, to shift their 
strategies, and instead focus on appeals about disappearances, extra-judicial 
detention, and torture. The strategy of minimizing demands she recounts does 
not seem to substantially differ from Moyn’s, and the idea that neo-liberalism 	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could consolidate as a result of this adaptation—in a geographically limited case 
study—is suggested rather than affirmed, and then if only because these 
authoritarian neoliberal states’ use of violence precluded other means of 
opposition. So, too, do the demands of students, leftists, trade unionists, and 
their clergy comrades, must, in the face of an army ready to shoot, and a police 
ready to imprison, be reduced from calls for redistribution to cries for help. Klein 
shows that human rights emerge as a strategy in these cases because of violence 
(and is that violence inherently neoliberal, or is it more accurately authoritarian?) 
but not that the shift to human rights did anything to enable, enforce, or 
consolidate neoliberalism.295 It is best described by Klein as its symptom, not its 
cause. 
Marks also uncharitably, and it seems inaccurately, faults Moyn for 
desiring, if not prescribing, a minimal human rights devoted to “catastrophe 
prevention,” and not grasping that anti-politics is a politics.296 Though Moyn has 
never taken the position the human rights have a causal link to inequality, he has 
consistently demonstrated that he is concerned with the problem of their 
coincidence, and has shown, if gingerly, dissatisfaction with the current minimal 
state of human rights affairs, contrary to Marks’ contention. In response to these 
charges, Moyn has recently written that: 
Unlike some Marxists,297 I think it is foolish to blame human rights for the 
explosion of inequality in our time, even though the former became 	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globally prestigious just when the latter began. In a vulgar formula, 
neoliberalism, not human rights, is to blame for neoliberalism. The real 
trouble is that those systems of law and programs of action that have so far 
been established around socioeconomic rights have made of them neither 
an enabling tool, nor a threatening enemy, but a helpless bystander of 
market fundamentalism.298  
 
(C) Crafting a Via Media: Reckless Opportunists 
It is not certain that anyone—including “some Marxists”—have been 
sloppy (or foolish) enough to “blame human rights” for inequality. Moyn himself 
has pointed to the importance of the coincidence in the rise of both phenomena 
as an important and useful question in the historiography of human rights.299 He 
points out that not only Marxists see a link between the two, but proponents of 
economic freedom have argued300 that open markets promote human rights, 
citing Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s301 unbridled free market optimism, as well as 
Philip Alston’s unambiguously clever response: “Petersmann’s goal was “to 
hijack, or more appropriately to Hayek, international human rights.”302  
Surely Moyn is not as blind to the consequences of neoliberalism on the 
human rights movement of the 1970s and beyond as Marks would have him, but 
in the end, following his own reasoning, he contends that a system that conceives 	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of rights as a floor, with no interest in limiting or attaining (an economic) ceiling 
is simply too weak to affect rising inequality.303 He concludes by assessing the 
limited goals of the current rights movement, and stating that only something 
much different, and more threatening could have the power to affect market 
fundamentalism: 
To bring the limited aims and often glancing successes of human rights 
movements into focus is simply to demand another politics to supplement 
goals that are inadequate in the first place and strategies that rarely work, 
especially in the socioeconomic domain. A threatening enemy, rather than 
a powerless companion, is what market fundamentalism demands.304   
 
To be sure, rights that primarily, if not exclusively, seek to ensure the protection 
of fundamental freedoms (from catastrophe or atrocity) will not have the power 
to—nor the objective of—taming economic inequality. But to say that this 
conception is but a “helpless bystander” is mistaking the rights per se with the 
human rights movement as a sociological group, one with agency and the ability 
to make choices for the survival, and indeed the ultimate triumph of its 
aspirations. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have employed the tools of structural 
sociology, developed by Pierre Bourdieu, to explore the dynamics of the field of 
human rights.305 “To understand the logic of the field, we examine how it was 
built and what ingredients became a part of it,” they write.  “This sociological and 
historical approach,” they continue, “reveals power relationships that are 
obscured in words like “the international community,” “norms,” and the “law.” 	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They conclude: “The “rules of the game” of the field determine the kinds of 
arguments, ideas, and actors that will be capable of transforming the field, or 
particular aspects of it. U.S. influence, […], created a transnational field that not 
only privileges legalization, but also places U.S. campuses, the U.S. media, and 
the U.S. power centers of New York and Washington, DC, at the top of the 
hierarchy of actors and organizations.”306 
If Moyn is correct in his assessment that the human rights movement rose 
to prominence as a result of the discredit of a former, be it redistributive, 
reformist, or plainly socialist utopia—and he has made a terribly good case that 
he is—it is worth examining whether or not the human rights movement made 
conscious choices to tailor rights as minimally as they did. Only then will it be 
possible to judge whether they are, with respect to inequality and to economic 
injustice “helpless bystanders,” or as I prefer to put it, reckless opportunists. 
By all accounts, human rights organizations made the conscious choice to 
scuttle socio-economic rights in order to streamline and mainstream their 
message; in today’s cynical marketing parlance, we would speak of clarifying their 
brand. This certainly contradicts the idea that these movements stood like deer in 
the headlights before an unexpected neoliberal ten-ton truck: they had already 
known it best to dash away to the safe-haven of the atrocity and the war crime. 
Thus, no frontal impact did, during the most important period, occur. It is 
instructive to examine the views held by the former head of the ACLU and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Aryeh Neier, towards socio-economic rights, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Ibid, 231. 
	   115	  
these, at least as he has stated them, go well beyond a strategic decision to leave 
them aside for the sake of more important so-called first generation rights (also 
known as political rights, or as he put them, “negative rights,” following Isaiah 
Berlin),307 but demonstrate evident political hostility to the very idea of economic 
rights. He “strenuously opposed,” he writes, both at the ACLU and HRW, “efforts 
to deal with economic issues as rights.”308  
Neier thus challenges the idea that what he calls economic issues can or 
ought to be construed as rights,309 despite the inclusion of eight such articles in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.310 Neier considers the concept of 
economic and social rights “profoundly antidemocratic,” and adds that 
“authoritarian power is probably a prerequisite for giving (them) meaning.” In 
light of the lack of evidence he presents, one can only conclude that this is an 
ideological preference, premised perhaps on his stated reliance on Aristotle’s 
conception of distributive justice, opposed as is it to equals receiving unequal 
shares and unequals receiving equal shares in a given distribution.311 Neier claims 
to oppose the idea of economic rights because they somehow “diminish the 
protection of political rights,” as he contends that economic issues concern 
expenditures by governments that may have different conceptions of, for 
instance, an adequate standard of living that may vary from place to place and 
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from time to time. Thus, for Neier, “the language of universal rights should be 
reserved for matters where it is possible to insist on adherence to these same 
criteria everywhere.”312  
The problem in Neier’s reasoning is that he appears to assume that to view 
those UDHR economic rights as rights, necessarily undermines freedom of 
expression and association. He perhaps has some examples in mind where this 
may have been the case, but counterexamples abound showing that ensuring 
something like a non-discriminatory wage, or compulsory elementary education 
are not inconsistent with the exercise of democracy. Democracy is undermined, 
he argues, because economic rights claims do not trust “institutions and 
processes” that normally make decisions regarding the allocation of resources. 
That is not necessarily the case: democratic decisions can be made to promote 
more redistributive policies that coincide with the economic and social rights 
promulgated in the UDHR; so too can democratic decisions be made to restrict 
freedom of expression and assembly, as France has done in the wake of terrorist 
attacks in Paris of November 13, 2015. The compulsion to separate the two types 
of rights overlooks a legalist reality: the Declaration is a hortatory document, it is 
aspirational, and it did not spring fully formed like Athena from the head of Zeus, 
but was rather the result of compromise between cold war actors.313 Contrary to 
what Neier suggests, there are no enforceable political rights from which 
antidemocratic economic issues must be extracted to preserve the universalism of 
the former. Moreover, even the assumption some may hold that liberal states 	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might have been forced to accept social and economic rights is not historically 
correct: Moyn provides the obvious reminder that social rights were not 
controversial at the time, they had been present in the French Revolution, and 
more recently in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s proposal of a “Second Bill 
of Rights,” as well as the interwar policies designed to tame the excesses of 
capitalism.314  
Of course this will change during the Reagan era, when the 
administration’s anti-big government measures drew curiously little resistance 
from human rights leaders, as James Peck details, citing Neier’s claim that 
economic rights are undemocratic as well as the wider observation that the 
Reagan administration had no difficulty capitalizing on many human rights 
groups’ anti-statism.315 Journalist Mark Ames points out the resemblance 
between Neier’s view that economic rights impede the protection of negative 
rights (or more broadly “freedom”) not only with Friedrich Hayek, but also with 
Social Darwinist William Graham Sumner:  
As with Neier, William Graham Sumner argued that liberty has an inverse 
relationship to economic equality; according to Sumner, the more 
economic equality, the less liberty; whereas the greater the inequality in a 
society, the more liberty its individuals enjoy. It’s the fundamental 
equation underlying all libertarian ideology and politics—a robber baron’s 
ideology at heart.316 
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Not only Sumner, but also Milton Friedman makes the same point in Capitalism 
and Freedom.317 Ames details previous initiatives taken by Neier—while head of 
the ACLU—against organized labor, as well as in favor of campaign financing as 
freedom of expression. In the first instance, Ames refers to William F. Buckley 
Jr.’s—a onetime board member of Amnesty International U.S.A.318—account of a 
conversation with Neier in which he expressed the intention of convincing others 
in the ACLU that the union shop violates civil liberties.319 The ACLU’s support of 
Buckley’s brother in Buckley vs. Valeo (and their subsequent amicus brief in 
support of Citizens United) is also cited by Ames, who makes a broader case that 
many human rights groups have been accomplices to the reduction of labor rights 
in the U.S. 
Neier, an important figure at the ACLU, HRW, and subsequently at George 
Soros’ Open Society Foundation thus appears to have a clearly well thought-out 
position against economic rights, as well as an antiquated conception of equality, 
all of which are consistent with economic inequality and injustice. Here “human 
rights,” in the sociological sense, are hardly “helpless bystanders.” As represented 
by Neier, the human rights movement has agency, but it also has power. Neier 
had described himself as the Secretary of State of the only private citizen in the 
world with his own foreign policy, George Soros.320 That is no “powerless 
companion.” And yet, human rights, as conceived of by the field cannot offer any 
defense, not only to a society, but to individuals, against the anti-democratic 	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consequences of a decision like Citizens United. The human rights movement was 
free to set economic and social rights aside for ideological or methodological 
reasons, as defended by the current HRW head, Kenneth Roth,321 but it could not 
have failed to foresee that ignoring economic injustice, or worse still, attempting 
to scrub economic and social rights from the Universal Declaration, would leave 
those individuals whose rights it purports to defend, defenseless. As Neier claims 
that economic “issues” undermine political rights, so too does defending political 
rights to the detriment of economic rights cause them to be seen as issues of 
distributive justice to be gently adjudicated through elections with nearly 
unlimited campaign spending where the most vulnerable do not stand a chance 
to have their economic aspirations—if they even dare hold them—heard. The 
human rights movement was reckless, if not more, but it was also opportunistic, 
taking full advantage of the U.S. turn to human rights with the aim of “reclaiming 
American virtue.”322 It should be obvious that raising economic injustice at home 
as a human rights issue would not serve as the moral tonic that the Carter and 
Reagan administrations had in mind. 
(D) Schindler’s Social Darwinism 
The rise of human rights as a triumphant project thanks to its streamlined 
focus on summum malum is intertwined with both the Holocaust memory boom 
that occurred at roughly the same period, as well as the creation of institutions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Kenneth Roth, “Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), 
pp. 63-73.  
322 See Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s 
	   120	  
international criminal law. As we have seen, inequality, neoliberalism, and 
economic injustice begin to hold sway at approximately the same time. The year 
1993 is when the Holocaust Museum is inaugurated, with Elie Wiesel’s dedication 
beseeching that something be done about Yugoslavia; just two months before, the 
first international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg and Tokyo is established by 
the United Nations Security Council. Returning briefly to Aryeh Neier, it is 
instructive to note that he claims to have initiated the call for criminal 
prosecutions in relation to “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, in July 1992. The ethnic 
character of the crimes being committed, according to Neier, were reminiscent of 
Nazi methods, thereby justifying the proposal of a Nuremberg type body.323  
James Peck mentions that broad interest in Bosnia at about the same time 
“coincided with a blossoming of popular films, books, and academic programs 
and the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington.”324 The 
culmination, writes Peter Novick, of the process of affixing the Holocaust to 
American culture was the 1993 release of Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List.325 
The film was not only a box office success, it received moral plaudits from Oprah 
Winfrey who announced “I’m a better person as a result of seeing Schindler’s 
List,”326 and from President Clinton, who “implored” Americans to see the film.327  
It also seemed to resonate politically, as special screenings of the film were 
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organized for the leaders of France, Germany, Israel, Austria, and Poland.328 
According to Spielberg’s biographer, Schindler’s List provided much the same 
emotional experience as the newly opened Holocaust Memorial and Museum.329 
The experience of seeing the film is described by Novick as overwhelming, a 
confrontation with horror and grief that moved many—including himself—to 
tears. He adds, however, that “this leaves unresolved the question of why the 
eliciting of these responses from Americans is seen as so urgently an important 
task.”330 
The film was not without its detractors, many finding the redemptive “feel 
good” plot unspeakably inappropriate,331 or others, such as Nobel Prize winner 
and Holocaust survivor Imre Kertész, denouncing the very idea of portraying 
human beings emerging from the camps healthy and unharmed as kitsch. Kitsch, 
too, for Kertész, is the representation of the Holocaust as a phenomenon that 
would be foreign to human nature.332 Alvin Rosenfeld registers some surprise 
that Schindler’s List entirely reverses the empirical reality of the destruction of 
the European Jews, as developed by Raul Hilberg,333 from perpetrators, victims, 
then later in his research, bystanders, to the tragically statistical outliers of 
survivors and rescuers.334 Given, as Rosenfeld observes, that the virtue of 	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Schindler’s List is that it may well be the introduction, or perhaps the sum total in 
some cases, of exposure to knowledge about the Holocaust, it is unfortunate that 
it distorts the truth about the general thrust of the killings during that period of 
history. Survivors were rare, and rarer still were the rescuers. It may be, however, 
that some degree of tolerance ought to be afforded to Hollywood treatments of 
historical events, and in any event, as Hilberg lamented, kitsch, distortion, 
manipulation, and even plagiarism are not unheard of in Holocaust 
scholarship.335 
As Kirby Farrell notes with respect to Schindler’s List—as does Novick 
more generally in his attempt to grasp how and why the Holocaust rose to 
prominence when and where it did336—the film “recreates the past through 
present concerns.”337 Farrell then asks, point blank: “Given all the stories which 
could have been told about the Holocaust, why are we moved at this historical 
moment by an account of a factory boss saving people from death by making 
them slave laborers?”338 He details—and the characters have aged prematurely—
the handsome bonuses received by “heroic chairman Lee Iacocca,” who days later 
announced the transfer of K-car production to Mexico; similarly Farrell recalls 
another film, Michael Moore’s Roger & Me and the destruction of Flint, 
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Michigan,339 without knowing then that the true dystopia of the automobile 
industry, or the calamitous state of Flint—declared a state of emergency in 
December 2015 due to important quantities of lead in the water340—actually lay 
ahead. While allowing, as surely he must, that the Nazi slave economy was more 
horrific than America in the 1990s, he notes a number of distressing social 
developments affecting the working class in “postindustrial America”: falling 
wages, dissolving job security, erosion of retirement, and increased earnings 
inequality between CEOs and workers. He observes that anxiety about economic 
injustice has begun, just as Schindler’s List is released, to bubble to the surface, 
citing articles published at the time.341  
Farrell makes parallels between the insane productivity of Nazi slave-labor 
factories—as then “superfluous labor” meant death and incentives to produce 
were accordingly and barbarically high—and the emerging business models of the 
1990s, from total quality management (with its interchangeable workers), 
downsizing, management slogans such as “lean and mean,” layoffs of older and 
less healthy workers to avoid paying benefits, and the export of jobs with the type 
of industrial production Spielberg depicts. Bartov and Kertesz have both, albeit 
the former calling it “subversive” and the latter calling it “kitsch,” cautioned 
against the failure to see the Holocaust as something not foreign to us—“us” 
being the developed, industrialized world—as it is precisely a society like ours 	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that committed and can commit such a genocide.342 It is therefore not surprising 
that Farrell can detail these economic similarities (of degree), and the reader is 
left to determine how persuasive is the subtle suggestion that Hollywood wishes 
American workers or the unemployed to favorably compare their plight to 
doomed Jews facing certain death if not for the intercession of the Nazi party 
member and cheerful opportunist turned benevolent lifesaving entrepreneur. 
Such is the gratitude of the slave labor to Schindler for saving their lives—
contrast here with the famous March 27th, 1941 demonstration in Belgrade, 
opposing the authorities’ alliance with the Nazis, where the slogan was “Bolje 
grob nego rob!,” “Better grave than slave!”343—that their last industrial act in 
Schindler’s factory is to manufacture a gold ring from their fillings to give to their 
benefactor.  
There would probably be no possible restrained Marxist reading of that 
scene (or of that historical event), and none shall be attempted here. Another 
gesture the Shindlerjüden extend to the man who upon Nazi surrender may face 
capture for the war crime of exploiting slave labor, is a note describing his good 
works, and his successful deployment of many talents to save 1100 people, so that 
he might escape an eventual war crimes prosecution. One practicing law as a 
defense attorney at the time, when talk of prosecuting the Serbs dominated the 
news, could not help but notice that for all the Holocaust analogies driving the 
establishment of the newly-minted international criminal tribunal, the box office 	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hit and Oscar victor of the day told a story not just about rescue (in fairness, of 
course it did), but also about slavery, and paradoxically, impunity. 
Farrell also successfully discusses the influence of Social Darwinism both 
in Nazi industrial production—and the effect, literally, of “survival of the fittest” 
on the lives of slave labor on an assembly line—as well as the broader embrace of 
eugenics in Nazi ideology.344  The discussion may well succeed because of its 
familiarity: certainly it is well grounded in the American history of economic 
ideas as a defense of capitalism as “natural law.”345 John Kenneth Galbraith’s 
study of American attitudes “rooted in the poverty, inequality and economic peril 
of the past,”346 devotes what could seem a surprising amount of attention to 
Social Darwinism. He believes that it was in practice dealt crippling blows first by 
democracy, citing Barry Goldwater’s 1964 rout, and by the modern corporation—
which by virtue of its “immortality,” he mentions General Motors and General 
Electric—no longer engages in the kind of struggle Herbert Spencer and Sumner 
had in mind between, say, individual entrepreneurs.347  Corporate “immortality” 
is of course one of the most compelling objections to the Citizens United decision 
regarding corporate personhood; but there are instances when the faith in 
everlasting corporate life is challenged. Thus, Vice-President Biden, on a Labor 
Day stump speech in Detroit during the 2012 election campaign summed up the 
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success of the Obama administration: “Osama bin Laden is dead and General 
Motors is alive.”348 
Galbraith sees Social Darwinism’s improbable survival in two areas, the 
first being in the realm “of attitudes which American brought into the age of 
affluence,”349 and the second being an attribution of “a special mystique to the 
market.”350  Where general attitudes are concerned, Americans could think that 
here, more than anywhere, the ordinary person had equal chances of success. Yet, 
they also had to face the fact that economic life was a mortal struggle, that a 
chance of winning also meant a chance of losing, that the consequences of loss— 
hunger, privation and death—must be accepted. He adds:  
Poverty and insecurity became inherent in the economic life of even the 
most favored country. So, of course, did inequality, and this was firmly 
sanctified by the fact that those who enjoyed it were better.351 
 
Where the market is concerned, Galbraith contends that its idealization 
broadened its own claims to the detriment of “social measures designed to rescue 
the individual from the privation or to protect him from the hazards of economic 
life.”352  This resembles the attitude towards economic and social rights held by 
Aryeh Neier, as well as the current state of enforceable protection of such rights 
today. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Rodney Hawkins CBS News September 3, 2012,  “Biden: We Are Better Off, ‘Bin Laden Is Dead 
and General Motors Is Alive,’” accessed December 21, 2015, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-we-are-better-off-bin-laden-is-dead-and-general-motors-
is-alive/. 
349 Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 52. 
350 Ibid, 53. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
	   127	  
For the sake of argument, let us assume that Neier is correct and that 
economic rights diminish the protection of political rights.353 It should follow 
then that the neglect of economic rights would have served to strengthen those 
most important civil and political rights, such as the core, crucial rights to 
freedom of expression, the presumption of innocence, or the right to an 
independent, impartial trial. 
Defendants at the ICTY and ICTR have not made broad demands for 
anything like economic redress, much less a socialist utopia. They have merely 
asserted their most liberal “bourgeois” fair trial rights, and sadly have had to 
denounce the violation of what Neier would argue are cornerstone human rights. 
Yet he himself when discussing Milosevic’s court case takes the tone and tenor of 
the prosecutor, having perhaps forgotten along the way his four decade long 
career devoted to protecting the human rights of individuals.354 As I have detailed 
elsewhere,355 in the context of highly politicized trials, those basic fair trial rights 
defended by the human rights field (be it NGOs, academics, or governments) to 
the detriment of economic rights, have not fared as well as what the new 
institutions of international criminal law have claimed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Neier, Taking Liberties, xxx. 
354 Ibid, 349. 355	  See Tiphaine Dickson and Aleksandar Jokic, Targets of International Justice: Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda First in Focus (forthcoming); Tiphaine Dickson and Aleksandar Jokic, “Hear No Evil, 
See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Unsightly Milosevic Case,” International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law 19 (4) (2006): 355–387; Tiphaine Dickson, “De l’invisible attentat aux faux 
experts: le combat des avocats de la defense au Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda,” in 
Charles Onana (ed), Silence sur un attentat: le scandale du genocide rwandais, (Paris: Editions 
Duboiris, 2005), 83-100.	  
	   128	  
Defendants’ freedom of expression, their right to a public, independent 
and impartial trial, due process, as well as the presumption of innocence have all 
been violated by these bodies since their inception in the 1990s. Thus scuttling 
economic rights may have been beneficial for the human rights organizations 
themselves, but setting them aside did not make fair trial rights hardier in 
exchange. Indeed, not only did the most influential human rights NGOs 
demonstrate hostility towards the economic rights that might have, if only 
discursively or perhaps culturally, opposed the rising tide-turned-tsunami of 
neoliberal inequality—already apparent in 1977 for Lindblom just as rights 
became the Western buzzword—but those same organizations abruptly turned 
prosecutorial when ad hoc courts were created, thereby undercutting those few 
remaining rights of relevance to accused persons before international courts. 
Blind faith in the markets and the uncritical idealism of human rights were 
reckless and opportunistic where the basic economic well-being and decent 
conditions of life of people was concerned. Not only have they ignored, and 
contributed to rendering illusory or dangerously populist those very economic 
safeguards agreed upon in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, but in their desire for proximity to power, have ultimately cost defendants 
those very rights they claimed they were most keen to preserve. 
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Essay 3: “The World’s Court of Justice”: A Historiography of War 
Crimes Prosecutions 
 
“Presque toute l’histoire n’est donc qu’une longue suite d’atrocités inutiles”356 
“The History of the world is the world’s court of justice.”357 
“History is a pack of tricks we play on the dead.”358 
 
The Gavel of History 
To say that the influence of history on war crimes trials and international 
criminal law is significant would be an understatement. The discipline of history 
participates in the establishment of a narrative that international courts (and 
their political proponents) consider as being true; this truth in turn becomes, in 
the highly charged context of, for example, a genocide trial, the historical account 
that must be proven as a matter of law. The idea of (writing) history becomes one 
of the objectives of the court, and some judges, not content to note the historical 
nature of their functions adopt, in addition, the mantle of historians.359 But 
contrary to those they emulate, they seek an account not subject to appeal. 
Historical events and historic legal precedents from the mid-twentieth century 
lend solemnity and purpose by analogy. After all, the judges who preceded them 	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Judge and the Historian,” in Questions of Evidence: Proof Practice and Persuation Across the 
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of Chicago Press, 1994), 291. 
358 Words of Voltaire cited in Judith Shklar, “Learning Without Knowing,” Political Thought and 
Political Thinkers, Stanley Hoffmann, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 117. 
359 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s website, in its “About Us” 
section, makes this plain: “The Tribunal has contributed to an indisputable historical record, 
combating denial and helping communities come to terms with their recent history.” 
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at Nuremberg, at least in France, have their words enshrined in legislation that 
prohibits contesting (“contester”) the existence of crimes against humanity as 
defined by the Nuremberg Charter committed by organizations deemed criminal 
or by individuals found guilty by French or international tribunals.360 Members 
of the French Commission on Constitutional Law, the commission being a 
legislative committee, have argued that this provision of criminal law can be 
extended to questioning (or “contesting”) the existence of crimes against 
humanity as held by judges of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.361 It 
should not come as a surprise that a number of reputable historians362 have 
publicly objected to this law, and asked for its repeal, among them the tireless 
opponent of Holocaust denial and son of two parents killed in Auschwitz, Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet. “History is not a legal object,” Vidal-Naquet wrote in an op-ed 
published in Libération. “In a free state, it is not the province of Parliament or 
the courts to define historical truth. State policy, even when animated with the 
best intentions, is not the policy of history.”363   
And so a historian protests the enactment of a criminal law that protects the 
history written by judges in international criminal cases—at times with the help 	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proposition de loi (n° 3030) de m. Didier Migaud et plusieurs de ses collègues, complétant la Loi 
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Christophe Masse, Député,” May 15th, 2006, 15. 
362 See René Rémond, “L’histoire et la loi,” Études, June 2006. 
363 My translation. “L’histoire n’est pas un objet juridique. Dans un État libre, il n’appartient ni au 
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of expert historians—from the scrutiny of historians. This essay examines how we 
got there. 
 
Law in History 
Law and history have long been interrelated. Historians have employed 
law’s artifacts—judgments, transcripts, letters exchanged in the margins of 
trials,364 accounts of trials—to tell stories about politics, society, institutions, and 
philosophy. From the numerous conflicting accounts of the trial of Socrates to 
historical scholarship on the witchcraft trials of the Inquisition, law’s 
manifestation through sources offers useful evidence for the work of the 
historian. Legal proceedings leave precious archival records for historians to 
mine.365 But this observation is trivial if the purpose for which historians employ 
archival evidence generated by law is ignored. The Annales school366—named 
after the 1929 French journal, Annales d’histoire économique et sociale—
introduced a new approach to social history, borrowing from Emile Durkheim’s 
contribution to the sociological theory of collective unconscious, as well as from 
the structuralist theories developed in anthropology.367 It is with these methods 	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and approaches that historians of this school studied social units such as women, 
the poor, marginal elements of society as well as the ideas creating the 
boundaries and values of these elements in their historical context.368  
Inquisition records provided evidentiary foundation for the exploration of 
themes well beyond the narrow scope of the trials themselves; Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie reconstituted the complex social relations of a 14th century French town 
on the basis of Jacques Fournier’s Inquisition records of the investigation of 94 
people accused of heresy in Montaillou, setting the records against the broader 
economic, social and political context of the time.369 Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese 
and the Worms,370 as well as The Night Battles, examine society, beliefs, and 
cosmology by exploring the gaps created by misunderstandings and distortions 
contained in Italian Inquisition records.371 This work disproved the pessimism of 
many historians regarding the possibility of reconstructing the lives of average 
individuals, and even more so, the underprivileged of the distant past, as 
evidence did not exist in a sufficient amount to document their daily habits and 
social relations.372 The law proved critical in permitting this approach to emerge, 
as Ginzburg puts it, since “the richest (not to say the only available) evidence for 
these entries has been provided, either directly or indirectly, by court records 
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from distance places and times: fourteenth- or sixteenth-century France, 
seventeenth-century Italy or China.”373 
But more crucially than the issue of availability, as important as it is, the 
fact is that history and law share some core methodological affinities. History, 
originally conceived as a practice on the intersection of medicine and rhetoric,374 
reflects not only tools of legal reasoning and argument, but also the evaluation 
and careful weighing of evidence375. History is, however, the self-conscious 
reconstitution of that evidence into a coherent, honest, yet nonetheless subjective 
narrative.376 Peter Brooks writes, regarding histories of law, that: “How stories 
are told, listened to, received, interpreted—how they are made operative, 
enacted—these are issues by no means marginal to the law nor exclusive to 
theory; rather they are part of law’s daily living reality.”377 What this means with 
respect to history is that good history is a story well told, conveying an illusion of 
reality378 but it is not—and surely cannot be tolerated as—a merely fictional 
exercise. Evidence matters. But what can be reconstructed is a story—
scrupulously respecting the integrity and authenticity of evidence—that borrows 
from the literary genre, allowing the historian to consider matters that had been 
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considered irrelevant (such as peasants and “witches”) or for which the evidence 
was scarce.379 
Thus law and history overlap, but they are not interchangeable. Earlier 
historiography emphasized persuasion, at the expense of the production of 
evidence, the latter being reserved to antiquarians.380 In the eighteenth century, 
the practice of the historian considering evidence and “testimony” emerged; and 
so, too, did the practice of the historian assuming the role of a judge.381 Ginzburg 
shows how profoundly the influence of the judicial temper and function affected 
historiography at this time: first, Hegel’s grand pronouncements, in his 
philosophy of history, of the “Weltgericht,” “verdict of the world”—which also 
means “Last Judgment,”—against which Nietzsche railed furiously in his Uses 
and Abuses of History382—then Lord Acton’s characterization of history as a 
legitimate tribunal dispensing universal truth.383 But this approach oriented 
historiography to the examination of great events, leaving aside the type of social 
relations later captured by the Annales school—paradoxically, perhaps, thanks to 
the assistance of sources generated by the legal process. It is thus that social 
historians chose to understand rather than to judge.384  
The judicial process and the law, writes Ginzburg, travel along the same 
road in the initial stages of their respective purposes, both, in particular, paying 	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careful attention to facts and evidence; but they must necessarily diverge at one 
point. Both justice and history suffer from conflation of purposes, and indeed, in 
Ginzburg’s apt formulation, “whoever attempts to reduce the historian to a judge 
simplifies and impoverishes historiographical consciousness; but whoever 
attempts to reduce the judge to historian irredeemably pollutes the exercise of 
justice.385”  
 
History in Law 
“The remote past,” wrote Judith Shklar, regarding the charge of waging 
aggressive war in Nuremberg, “cannot be legally tried, and the remote future 
cannot be controlled.”386 In Legalism, Shklar sharply distinguished the legal and 
historical approaches to events on the basis of different methodological 
commitments to causality387. Where historians and jurists could agree, she 
argued, was on simple matters of causality such as John Wilkes Booth being the 
cause of Abraham Lincoln’s death. But historians, though their discipline 
provides them with professionally understood and accepted cut-off points in 
time, nonetheless explore vast swaths of social and economic interrelations over 
time and space. This, she argues, makes history uniquely ill-suited to examining 
charges, brought in the judicial sphere, such as that of waging aggressive war, 	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since the prosecution of such an offence (and inevitably its defense) would 
introduce a discussion of the causes of the war. This exploration can be taken up 
by the historian, but it embraces far more than what a trial requires and indeed 
allows.388 Much of the contemporary scholarship on the role of history in the 
legal process, however, has not been as skeptical as Shklar’s.  
In the heady post-cold war years Shklar’s work—Legalism and “The 
Liberalism of Fear,” an essay—were in fact posthumously employed to variously 
promote the idea that war crimes trials had always been established by liberal 
democracies,389 or to restore, urgently, faith in liberalism—paradoxically lost 
after it had ostensibly triumphed against the ideas of Marx—by highlighting 
terror and fear abroad, thus creating vocations of heroism for American rebels 
without a cause.390 Standard accounts now repeat that the nineteen-nineties were 
years where atrocities were unleashed while the West stood by;391 in this 
narrative, those who did act (usually with the pen, or more frequently the laptop 
of the foreign correspondent) were fighting the tide of stubborn inaction. The 
claim seems curious, as not one, but two, ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
were established by the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of 
1994.392 This is worthy of mention as the creation of these bodies is a legitimate 
object of study for history; but the type of history that has been produced to 	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account for it, bears striking resemblance to the biographies of great men—one 
can think here of Samantha Power’s lionization of Raphaël Lemkin and William 
Proxmire393—or to the early historiography advocating Christianity.394 The 
contemporary cause is the fight against atrocities and its urgent and graphic 
nature justify the adoption of a historiographical genre better suited to advocacy 
than to understanding.395 
A Brief History of the ICTY 
It is impossible to assess the quality of ad hoc tribunals writing of history 
without reference to these bodies’ origins and purposes, as well as to the specific 
historical conditions that colored the first post cold war decade.  
The ICTY was created by the Security Council of the United Nations in 
1993, after both decades of inaction following Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as 
decades spent fruitlessly laboring at drafting a code of offenses.396 The 
prosecution of crimes against the peace—described by the Nuremberg judgment 
as the “supreme international crime”—was relegated to a form of protest in the 
cold war years, as with Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre’s “popular” 
tribunals judging French and American actions in Vietnam.397 After the first Gulf 
War, both Margaret Thatcher and George H.W. Bush called for the creation of a 
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special UN court to try “Iraqi war criminals,”398 an initiative that was no more 
successful than the initiative of the (then twelve) European Community states to 
petition United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to “examine 
the personal responsibility” of Iraqi leaders for acts of genocide.399 Western 
support for Iraq against Iran, including arming in conventional as well as 
chemical weapons was a more recent memory then, leading some to speculate 
that such a trial might have proven too politically perilous to attempt.400  
In June 1991, Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia. The republics of Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit. Fighting erupted in the latter two 
territories, prompting a United Nations arms embargo,401 followed by the 
deployment of European peacekeepers, assistance in the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, as well as the imposition of economic sanctions.402 The media’s increased 
coverage of the war, and its framing of the conflict as a one-sided infliction of 
barbarity (by the Serbs) against defenseless civilians403 created the impression 
that not only solutions short of armed intervention could do nothing to alleviate 
the humanitarian situation, but that a judicial process ought to be established, as 	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a matter of urgency, to show international resolve.404  
Historical analysis suggests that the run-up to what can be called the 
judiciarization of the conflict was not solely driven by idealism, compassion, or 
pathos. The conflict, before it was framed as a narrative of atrocities, had been 
viewed by the Bush administration as a matter for Europeans to demonstrate 
their nascent strength and authority. “Yugoslavia,” wrote Secretary of State 
James Baker, “was as good a first test as any.”405 Moreover, the Bush 
administration had overcome its “Vietnam complex” in Iraq, and wished to focus 
on domestic and economic issues.406 Europeans viewed matters differently, 
emphasizing instead that the fact that they had—in contrast to the Americans—
peacekeeping troops on the ground, which justified preferring diplomatic 
attempts to broker peace. Thus European concern—while mischaracterized as 
simple weakness and ineffectuality407—focused on negotiated settlement for the 
safety of European troops and for an ultimate resolution of the conflict.408  
In August 1992, however, media reports of concentration camps and 
images suggesting conditions reminiscent of Nazi places of detention during the 
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Holocaust409 refocused the issue of the Yugoslav conflict significantly. Imagery 
and the emergence of a concentration camp narrative were central in what could 
be called (borrowing a chapter subheading from Samantha Power’s A Problem 
From Hell) a successful deployment of “advocacy and analogy.”410 Yugoslavia was 
no longer a civil war somewhere in “Eastern Europe” (as it was frequently 
misreported), but a repetition of unmentionable crimes in the midst of Europe in 
the waning days of the twentieth century.  
In the U.S., the shift coincided with a presidential election; then candidate 
William Jefferson Clinton attacked George H. W. Bush’s inaction, promising 
armed intervention against the Serbs who were committing, he contended, 
genocide, further calling for perpetrators to be brought to justice.411  Clinton’s 
eventual election to the presidency tempered his interventionist ardors, after 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher found little in the way of European 
enthusiasm to put peacekeepers at risk.412 The balance in favor of a judicial rather 
than a military or diplomatic approach was tipped heavily by an unexpected 
speech by Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in Geneva at an international 
conference to support the negotiation efforts led by Cyrus Vance and Sir David 
Owen (known as the Vance-Owen plan) in the waning days of the Bush 
administration. Eagleburger called for the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic and 
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others, much to the chagrin of the European and British delegates who saw the 
outburst as definitively scuttling peace prospects.413 French diplomats expressed 
their exasperation, claiming that they were being employed as troops at the 
bidding of the Germans and Austrians (whose early recognition of Croatia had 
contributed to fanning the flames of war, but whose World War II actions, to 
employ a euphemism, prevented them from intervening themselves), as the 
Americans staked “out the moral high ground to avoid getting wet while we take 
all the hits in Bosnia.”414 Eagleburger had forced the hand of his successor, 
perhaps conveniently, to commit to the establishment of a war crimes trial—in 
lieu, as some have argued415 of what at the time was the more complicated, risky, 
and internationally divisive policy of intervention. 
French foreign minister Roland Dumas had been one of the early 
proponents of a war crimes prosecution, though his advocacy had left French 
President François Mitterrand cool until the French learned that the Italians were 
preparing a proposal for a tribunal.416 In January 1993, President Mitterrand 
publicly expressed his support for a war crimes prosecution days before 
President-elect Clinton was to be sworn into office. The following weeks, the two 
states engaged in what Pierre Hazan has described as “an opportunistic 
steeplechase” to circulate the final draft for an ad hoc court at the United Nations 	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Security Council.417  
The ICTY was established by the Security Council without opposition, 
despite concerns expressed by China, Venezuela, and Brazil.418 China followed its 
interests, whether that was seeking most favored nation status with the US, or 
responding to French delegation entreaties that they ought not be seen to be 
siding with the “butchers” if they wanted to increase their international standing 
(accounts from the American perspective are similar).419 The cold war rival, 
Russia, was in the process of privatization and liberalization; moreover, President 
Yeltsin, embattled and struggling with internal problems, was seeking U.S. 
political and economic support.420 
Thus on February 22nd, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 808, 
creating a Tribunal for the “prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991.” 
This institution, a “law-like body”421 established on the legal basis of the 
Security Council’s power over international peace and security, and more 
specifically its ability to create “subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
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performance of its functions”422 is a creature of politics, specifically, as explained 
by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, as a remedy to a threat to international 
peace and security through the unprecedented use, by the United Nations, of a 
body to prosecute individuals (and not member states) for war crimes423 The 
tribunal’s title indicates that it prosecutes “persons responsible,” and the legal 
history of the ICTY’s approach to modes of responsibility certainly indicates that 
this infelicitous formulation was taken seriously.  
The brief historical sketch of the court’s emergence stresses the 
importance of power, and interests in its establishment. The idea of the virtuous 
liberal (read American) war crimes court, to be judged by history, and that would, 
if it failed to treat a defeated enemy fairly, put a poisoned chalice to its own 
lips,424 has by all accounts failed to materialize. An oddly disincarnated “justice 
cascade” has entrenched humanitarian norms in the UN system to be sure, but 
those continue to be unenforceable against the US (as well as China and 
Russia).425  
Trying History 
It may be that the role of history in war crimes prosecutions is situated 
somewhere between judging and understanding. Richard Wilson undertakes the 
rebuttal of a trio of objections against the use of history in war crimes 	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prosecutions: that it is harmful to due process, that it is inconsistent with the 
legal approach, and that it generates “boring” history.426 Wilson begins from the 
questionable premise that the “standard” view is that history ought not play a role 
in the law governing atrocities, which can hardly be said to reflect the 
conventional scholarly, social, or even institutional wisdom on this point.  
Starting with the public position of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, as set out by their outreach program (a responsibility of 
the Registrar, one of the three organs of the Tribunal), a radical embrace of 
history, as well as of a sense of historical mission and accomplishment is 
immediately apparent: 
The Tribunal has established beyond a reasonable doubt crucial facts 
related to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. In doing so, the 
Tribunal’s judges have carefully reviewed testimonies of eyewitnesses, 
survivors and perpetrators, forensic data and often previously unseen 
documentary and video evidence. The Tribunal’s judgements have 
contributed to creating a historical record, combatting denial and 
preventing attempts at revisionism and provided the basis for future 
transitional justice initiatives in the region.  
 
As the work of the ICTY progresses, important elements of a historical 
record of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s have emerged. 
The ICTY has established crucial facts about crimes, once subject to 
dispute, beyond a reasonable doubt.427 
 
The pronouncement, by a Security Council body tasked to hold trials against 
individuals, that certain historical matters are now no longer subject to dispute is 
perplexing. Wilson, however, expresses the view that international tribunals, and 	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in particular the ICTY, have overcome the main obstacles posed by previous 
courts, by virtue of their international nature. Part of the problem is that Wilson 
considers only objections to French proceedings against Paul Touvier, and 
Hannah Arendt’s critique of the Eichmann trial; but obviously international 
courts are not a single nation-state exploiting a criminal trial for the purposes of 
restoring moral credibility as in the case of France or building a national identity 
as in the case of Israel.428 It thus says very little to point to international courts as 
not tributary of the idiosyncratic goals of particular states if that is to mean that 
such international status can guarantee fair trial and due process rights, or 
indeed that history has not been abused or potentially distorted. It hardly makes 
a difference from the due process standpoint that the Security Council is 
employing an international tribunal to write history instead of a nation state: the 
problems inherent in court-written history remain just the same. “A trial at the 
ICTY” writes Patricia Wald, former judge at the ICTY and quoted by Wilson, “is 
usually more akin to documenting an episode or even an era of national or ethnic 
conflict rather than proving a single discrete incident.”429 Is Wald not describing 
a practice beyond that of the prosecution of individuals, more akin to Shklar’s 
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concerns regarding the historians’ broader views of causality, and can it be 
blithely assumed that this will have no impact on the due process rights of an 
individual charged with specific criminal offenses? 
In the end, Wilson does not meaningfully address the due process 
objections that emerge when war crimes prosecutions employ courts to write 
history; instead, he devotes considerable space to praise the quality of the history 
written by the ICTY, noting that the court’s first judgment, in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Tadic,430 restates the history of Yugoslavia (and its constituent 
parts, before the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) from 
the fourth century to the armed conflicts justifying the establishment of the 
tribunal in 1993, as it was presented by the Prosecution’s expert, military 
historian James Gow.431 Wilson then summarizes the sixty-nine pages that the 
Tadic judgment devotes to history even before addressing the indictment, and 
approvingly cites another prosecution expert witness, historian Robert Donia, 
who in his own published account of his role as a prosecution expert in another 
case,432 wrote that “[t]hese chambers have produced histories that are not only 
credible and readable, but indispensable to understand the origins and course of 
the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Prosecutor v. Tadic; (Case No. IT-94-1-T), Judgment of Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997 
431 Wilson, “Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia,” 927: “The history up to World War I is taken entirely from Gow’s testimony 
and significant elements of subsequent history as well, including the role of President Tito in 
suppressing nationalist tensions, the significance of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, and finally 
the organization and ethnic composition of the Yugoslav People’s Army in the 1980s and early 
1990s”, citing the Tadic Judgment at ¶¶ 56–79, 108–14. 
432 Robert Donia, “Encountering the Past: History at the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal,” Journal 
of International Institute 2 (2004), 11. 
	   147	  
The Tribunal judges, though writing a history spanning centuries on the 
basis of a single testimony (with the exception of a relatively narrow point about 
worker self-management offered by anthropologist Robert Hayden, called by the 
defense), describe as Serb propaganda the fact that periodicals from Belgrade 
“featured stories on the remote history of Serbs intended to inspire nationalistic 
feelings.”433 The “remote history” in question refers to the Second World War. 
That period, as the Tribunal mentions elsewhere in the decision, with the type of 
understatement that led to the British libel trial in Irving v. Penguin Books,434 
was a “tragic time, marked by harsh repression, great hardship and the brutal 
treatment of minorities. It was a time of prolonged armed conflict, in part the 
product of civil war, in part a struggle against foreign invasion and subsequent 
occupation.”435 One hoping to read even a superficial account of the fascist 
political structure of NDH Croatia, or the widespread atrocities committed by the 
Ustasha—those committed against the Jews comprehensively detailed in Volume 
II of Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews436—will be 
disappointed. Instead, the “credible history” presented by the ICTY judges states 
that “Three distinct Yugoslav forces each fought one another: the Ustasha forces 
of the strongly nationalist Croatian State, supported by the Axis powers, the 
Chetniks, who were Serb nationalist and monarchist forces, and the Partisans, a 
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largely communist and Serb group.”437 
Let us attempt to break down that sentence. First, the ICTY’s history 
qualifies the Ustasa as “forces of the strongly nationalist Croatian state,” and 
while this is true in the same way it is true that Nazis were forces of the strongly 
nationalist German state, the claim is significant for what it fails to state. In 
Hilberg’s words, “the underlying philosophy of the [Croatian] state was Fascist-
Catholic.”438 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is somewhat less 
reserved than Hilberg in its characterization of the Ustase as “fanatically 
nationalist, fascist, separatist, and terrorist.”439 The “tragic time, marked by 
harsh repression, great hardship and the brutal treatment of minorities,” (as the 
ICTY describes it) is less euphemistically described by Hilberg’s account of half 
the Jewish population of Croatia’s internment in one or the other of NDH 
Croatia’s seven labor or two extermination camps.440 Of the two extermination 
camps, Jasenovac is the most well known, and it is primarily there that Jews 
(along with Serbs, who comprised the majority of the victims, as well as Roma 
and political opponents) died of typhus, torture, drowning, knifings, and blows to 
the head with hammers.441 Walter Laqueur and Judith Tydor Baumel describe 
Ustasa killings as “madness”,442 a sentiment echoed by General Edmund Glaise 
von Horstenau, the Wehrmacht’s Plenipotentiary General in NDH, one of the 	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many Italian and German officials who complained about “the lawless and 
chaotic” methods of the Ustase.443  
The Tadic judgment mentions Jasenovac—memorialized by the USHMM— 
only three times, and only twice in the portion of the judgment devoted to 
history. First, it emerges in the context of Serb propaganda, and “stirring up Serb 
nationalistic feelings.” The ICTY judges write:  “Among much other suffering, 
many Serbs, including the accused’s mother, had been forcibly deported by the 
Ustasha to a concentration camp at Jasenovac where many died and all were ill-
treated.”444 The second mention of Jasenovac occurs in a paragraph directly 
addressing a “campaign of propaganda” orchestrated by the Serbs, and it is 
referred to in a quote, attributed only to “Serb-dominated media,”445 as a 
“symbol.” The final mention of Jasenovac in the “reliable” history written by the 
ICTY concerns the accused. “During the Second World War,” wrote the judges, 
“his mother had been confined to the Jasenovac prison camp which was operated 
by Croats.” 
The Tadic judgment nearly instructs the reader in greater detail about the 
Hapsburg occupation than it does about the death camp at Jasenovac. In fact, it 
is not possible to know what it was, other than a place of ill treatment—a prison 
or concentration camp—where many died. And thus, judicial history determines 
what counts as history, but also what history is entitled to leave out of its account. 
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The historiography of Yugoslavia continues to be contentious, and nothing 
arguably illustrates this better than Josip Glaurdic’s scathing review446 of the 
recently published result of Charles Ingrao’s “Scholar’s Initiative,” an eight-year 
project involving three hundred scholars from thirty-one countries to attempt to 
resolve the most enduring controversies in the historical scholarship on 
Yugoslavia.447 Glaurdic is unsparing in his criticisms of the volume, and some 
objections certainly seem legitimate, in particular the instances of plagiarism, if 
confirmed. However, the importance of Ingrao’s initiative in the context of the 
historiography of war crimes tribunals, and Glaurdic’s exasperation over 
inaccurate points of varying importance, is that attempts to write the one last 
definitive history of anything—let alone of recent and highly-charged conflictual 
events—is as incautious as it is unsuccessful. Richard Evans details a remarkably 
long list of complaints made in the press after the Irving trial at which he 
appeared as an expert on behalf of Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books, many 
expressing concern with a judicially enforced single narrative about the 
Holocaust which would result in an atrophy of important questions about the 
events.448 Evans takes pains to distinguish these objections—with which he would 
have agreed had the trial actually been about imposing a single version of 
history—with what the Irving trial did address, that is, the standards of historical 
scholarship. The standards, for Evans, are what distinguish ideologically-driven 
twisting of sources (and omissions) from legitimate debate about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Josip Glaurdic, "Review Essay: Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar's Initiative," 
2010, East European Politics and Societies (24) 294. 
447 Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, eds., Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A 
Scholars’ Initiative (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press). 
448 Richard Evans, Lying About Hitler (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 251-259. 
	   151	  
Holocaust.449  
In the Irving trial, a libel suit was initiated by David Irving in Great 
Britain, where libel law places the burden of proof on the defendant. The issue in 
question was whether Deborah Lipstadt was entitled to characterize Irving as a 
Holocaust denier. Irving’s position was that he was a serious scholar and 
historian and thus, that his reputation had been harmed by Lipstadt, and her 
publisher, Penguin Books. The defense proceeded to inundate Judge Charles 
Gray’s court with expertise detailing the ways in which, over the course of his 
career, Irving had oriented his work towards a denial of the Holocaust, and had 
not treated his sources and evidence in an objective, fair, or scholarly manner. To 
arrive at a verdict, Judge Gray formulated the standard of the “conscientious 
historian.”450 The misrepresentations and distortions of historical evidence, 
found in nineteen separate instances of Irving’s work were found to have fallen 
short of that standard, according to Judge Gray’s 350-page judgment.451 
One is entitled to wonder whether the ICTY’s historical treatment of the 
former Yugoslavia would meet the standard of the “conscientious historian.” 
What is certain is that the kind of history that it did generate is incomplete, and 
would cause some perplexity from the vantage point of scholarship undertaken 
on the Holocaust, in particular its treatment of NDH Croatia and the atrocities 
committed during the Nazi satellite’s existence. Thus, its own claims to having 
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established a historical record, “beyond reasonable doubt” to silence deniers is of 
historical and legal concern. In fact, silencing deniers, when seen as a judicial 
function, apparently involves silencing episodes of history—in this case the 
Holocaust—which paradoxically serves as the very model of denial (a moral and 
in some cases criminal offense) the ICTY has appropriated.  
Other difficulties are related to the historian’s role in war crimes 
prosecutions, in particular when historians are personally invested in the events 
about which they later testify as experts. The case of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’s first judgment, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, is instructive in 
this respect. Historian Alison Des Forges testified as an expert, both on the 
history of Rwanda—which Trial Chamber I saw fit to recite at length, from pre-
colonial times to 1994452—as well as to interpret broader events, well beyond the 
scope of Akayesu’s indictment, as constituting preparation and execution of 
genocide. These views had been endorsed by the Human Rights Watch and FIDH 
sponsored “International Commission of Inquiry” (ICI), in a 1993 report Des 
Forges co-authored.  
Des Forges was the only historian cited by the ICTR in its thirty-three 
paragraph history of Rwanda, as well as its eighteen paragraph finding that 
genocide had occurred as a historical fact in Rwanda in 1994. Des Forges’ 
testimony provided the court with its basis for findings on issues as diverse as 
political and territorial organization, Rwandan law, the military, weapons 
shipments, the economy, religion, as well as a unique—and arguably influential—	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manner of disqualifying the previous government’s claims of attacks or 
infiltration by the other party signatory to the Arusha Peace Accords of 1993, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, who had invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990.453 The 
Rwandan President’s entourage, the Trial Chamber noted, on the basis of Des 
Forges’ sole historical testimony, had disseminated propaganda and fabrication, 
characterized, according to the judgment, “as ‘mirror politics’, whereby a person 
accuses others of what he or she does or wants to do.”454 This constitutes a 
powerful explanatory claim; one that in the ICTR’s first ever judgment certainly 
set a tone and even suggested how evidence should be weighed and credibility 
assessed. It is so powerful a disqualifying device that its uncritical inclusion in a 
court-written history poses a double problem of evidence: that is, the nature of 
the evidence that supports the claim, and the fact that the device may later be 
used to assess the credibility of claims regarding historical events. 
Des Forges’ involvement in the International Commission of Inquiry led to 
her testimony in other trials regarding Rwandans suspected of involvement in the 
1994 events, but the reception she received in some domestic courts was not as 
uncritical as it appears to have been before the ICTR. The Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeals, for instance, was sharp in its assessment of her credibility as 
well as her objectivity as a historian. Testifying against Leon Mugesera, facing 
immigration charges in Canada, Des Forges (much as she did before the ICTR in 
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Arusha) defended the report of the ICI, as well as her activism. The Canadian 
court highlighted the following statement: 
She admitted, at the end of the cross-examination: “If you wish to argue 
that we chose our evidence to support our conclusions, you are entirely 
correct. We chose our evidence to support our conclusions. There were 
many facts concerning the historical period which did not appear to us 
relevant. We did not include them. We chose our evidence after we had 
weighed all of the facts and reached our conclusions. We made an orderly 
presentation as you do as a lawyer to support your contention” (a.b. vol. 
10, p. 3075 – emphasis added by the Federal Court of Appeals).455 
 
The prosecutorial flavor of her expert testimony—which went unnoticed in the 
context of a UN trial, where in fact she was afforded tremendous deference and 
her testimony great weight—was remarked upon in Canada in an unambiguously 
critical manner:  
Even making the debatable assumption that a member of a commission of 
inquiry, who is actually its co-chairperson and co-author of the report, can 
be described as an objective witness concerning the conclusions of that 
report, Ms. Des Forges testified much more as an activist than as a 
historian. Her attitude throughout her testimony disclosed a clear bias 
against Mr. Mugesera and an implacable determination to defend the 
conclusions arrived at by the ICI and to have Mr. Mugesera's head.456 
 
The difference in treatment of Des Forges as a witness by the UN and Canadian 
bodies emphasizes the striking difference in the acceptable scope of a historian’s 
testimony in domestic as opposed to war crimes courts. This phenomenon was 
even remarked upon by Robert Donia, who testified for the Prosecution in the 	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Blaskic case in The Hague, as “more an extended lecture on regional history than 
court testimony as it might take place in an American court, where a judge would 
neither need nor welcome such an extensive background portrayal”.457 
Aleksandar Jokic has referred to this moral and judicial differential as “the 
normative divide,” a concept that captures the fact that acts that would be 
blameworthy in Western democracies or Western courts, appear acceptable if 
performed abroad, in relation to an ostensible challenge against, or even a 
narrative about genocide.458 Beyond the moral question, however, lies the 
historical one, and it is intertwined with the notion of justice. As Judith Shklar 
has argued about the legalist disposition of lawyers and legal theorists—that is, 
that they insist rather dogmatically on a separation between politics and law, 
when in fact the notion that they can be so neatly distinguished is a conservative 
self-delusion459—so, too, we are challenged to look at the connection between 
history and the law.  
But while it is obviously misguided to insist that history and law never do 
and never ought to intersect, it is also arguably even more dangerous to suggest 
that judges can capably do the work of historians and that historians can safely 
perform the functions of the judge. Again, Carlo Ginzburg’s point appears 
apposite here: “if one attempts to reduce the historian to a judge, one simplifies 
and impoverishes historiographical knowledge; but if one attempts to reduce the 
judge to historian, one contaminates—and irreparably so—the administration of 	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justice.”460 Shklar’s view that legalism is an ideology ought not stand for the 
proposition that either history or law are well served by their respective 
instrumentalization. A court writing history—a single, definitive history, the 
denial of which is in some instances subject to criminal sanction—is also 
performing an ideological role.461 While Tzvetan Todorov formulates the classic 
legalist objection to the trial of Klaus Barbie, writing that “what is especially 
worth criticizing . . . is not that they wrote bad history, it’s that they wrote history 
at all, instead of being content to apply the law equitably and universally,”462 the 
problem is compounded when, even assuming that judges are qualified to 
reconstruct events for anything wider in scope than what is required for the ends 
of a discrete criminal prosecution, according to its rules of evidence and 
procedure, they determine a preferred historical interpretation of that 
reconstitution.  
Emanuela Fronza’s critique of the criminalization of negationism (or 
denial) emphasizes the ideological nature of the judicial protection of a single 
version of history. Rational and democratic systems of government treat people 
like citizens, but when they criminalize who people are or what they want, they 
treat them as enemies.463 Fronza isolates the historiographical problem of the 
court-sanctioned version of history: “The tribunal will inevitably find itself, in 	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this case, sanctioning one interpretation as official and discrediting the idea that 
more than one historical school exists. Yet, in truth, a multitude of historical 
schools exists.464”  
Criminal law seeks a single, definitive reconstruction of an event, but only 
as a means to determine whether the state has established the culpability of an 
individual according to rules of evidence and a standard and burden of proof. The 
historical approach selected by a tribunal will necessarily be subordinated to the 
needs of the judicial function.  
For example, David Chuter argues, following the analogy of the 
intentionalist-functionalist debate in Holocaust scholarship465 that it would have 
been impossible, had Hitler been tried, to settle on one approach to the detriment 
of another, as most proponents of a historical school will generally concede that 
there are valid objections to it.466 It may be, however, that in some cases a side in 
a historical debate is chosen. This will occur when or if one approach presents 
greater consistency with judicial, usually prosecutorial, objectives. Thus, in the 
case of Nuremberg, neither historiographical approach lent itself well to a smooth 
prosecution. It is noteworthy that then, functionalism had barely emerged, as 
Hilberg’s Destruction of the European Jews was yet unpublished.467 For the 
Nuremberg court, conspiracy, as participation in a common plan to commit 
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crimes against the peace, was the legal device most suitable to apply.468  
International war crimes tribunals may have difficulty performing their 
judicial function, moreover, when the historical nature inherent to these 
prosecutions imposes, if not a dominant interpretation, then at least a sense of a 
widely accepted version of history.469 David Paccioco argues that the events 
creating international tribunals impose an interpretation of history on judges 
that is practically irresistible, and which creates expectations from judges that 
they will find in the record what they think that they already know.  
This creates an irresistible temptation—however well intentioned—to 
prejudge issues, one that traps both the innocent and the guilty.470 There is little 
allowance made for the idea that the received history can be wrong, and thus that 
innocents can be convicted as a result, and while judges decide on evidence, their 
assessment of it will inevitably be based on their pre-existing beliefs about the 
events471 that led to the creation of the “law-like political institutions”472 in which 
they are called to judge. Paccioco points out that part of the reason for history’s 
influence on these proceedings lies in the very creation of international criminal 
courts,473 namely in the attempt to promote reconciliation, in addition to their 
prosecutorial and punitive functions. In turn, this preoccupation is transformed 	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into a “search for historical truth”474 which justifies recourse to what Almiro 
Rodrigues and Cécile Tournaye call a “free system of evidence,” one that admits 
hearsay, and indeed, whatever type of evidence judges consider relevant and 
which has probative value.475 Rodrigues and Tournaye consider that these rules 
of evidence were deemed necessary in anticipation of the difficulties that the 
ICTY would encounter in gathering evidence in the service of historical truth.476 
Thus, from its inception, the contemporary UN war crimes tribunal, as a judicial 
body, both invests itself in the search for historical truth, and—perhaps 
surprisingly from the vantage point of historians—loosens the rules of evidence to 
do so.  
Reconciliation is seen by proponents of the historical school of 
international law as establishing a “memory” that would, as Paccioco writes, 
“shame offending parties into distancing themselves from their past.”477 
Participants in the establishment of the United Nations ad hoc courts have 
explicitly acknowledged this intent. For instance, Michael Scharf, writing an op-
ed in the summer of 2004 arguing against Slobodan Milosevic’s continued self-
representation, stated that the ICTY had been established with three objectives:  
In creating the Yugoslavia tribunal statute, the U.N. Security Council set 
three objectives: first, to educate the Serbian people, who were long misled 
by Milosevic’s propaganda, about the acts of aggression, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed by his regime; second, to facilitate 	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national reconciliation by pinning prime responsibility on Milosevic and 
other top leaders and disclosing the ways in which the Milosevic regime 
had induced ordinary Serbs to commit atrocities; and third, to promote 
political catharsis while enabling Serbia’s newly elected leaders to distance 
themselves from the repressive policies of the past. May’s decision to allow 
Milosevic to represent himself has seriously undercut these aims.478   
 
These clearly appear to be political objectives, and while Shklar would be 
skeptical of the idea that the judicial function can ever be really separated from 
politics, it is one thing to admit the influence of politics on law or even to 
acknowledge its logical necessity, but quite another to establish a body with 
objectives that appear antithetical to the judicial function. Of concern is the effect 
that the political nature of this establishment can have on the kind of history it 
writes, as well as on the history that will be written by others about the events to 
which these tribunals devote their work. 
 
 
The Political Quality of History in International War Crimes Trials 
The media played an essential role in establishing a dominant narrative—
described by Diana Johnstone as a “collective fiction”479 with respect to 
Yugoslavia: it was, according to the standard narrative, a “prison of peoples” in 
which the Serbs oppressed all other ethnic groups480. When the oppressed of 
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Yugoslavia attempted to liberate themselves from the brutal dictatorship of 
Slobodan Milosevic, he—and the Serbs (a thoroughly evil group of people)—
embarked upon a policy of ethnic cleansing, about which the international 
community did nothing. Milosevic and the Serbs had a policy of systematic rape, 
concentration camps, and committed genocide in the locality of Srebrenica. U.S. 
bombing forced Milosevic to participate in peace talks in Dayton, and to make up 
for the international community’s inaction in the face of Nazi-like horror, the UN 
Security Council established a body just like Nuremberg.481 
Diana Johnstone argues that almost every material particular supporting 
this narrative is inaccurate; but that once the equation had been drawn between 
the Nazi Holocaust and the Yugoslav wars, created by “reporters under pressure 
to meet deadlines, editors further simplifying the story for readers assumed to be 
both ignorant and impatient, paid propagandists and public relations officers” it 
was too late.482 The political changes that invested a post cold war single 
superpower with the ability to declare itself the judge of the moral and legal 
questions it had itself framed proved irresistible. A virtually unimpeachable truth 
had been established by repeating a narrative that relied on the Holocaust often 
enough. The power of the historical analogy triggered action; in the interests of 
justice, something had to be done. 
The effects of the media’s contribution to the establishment of the ICTY 
through its reliance on Holocaust imagery cannot be understated. The most 	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influential scholars, authors, and pundits do not even attempt to conceal it. 
Samantha Power’s influential A Problem From Hell: America in an Age of 
Genocide makes it unambiguous: 
We will never know whether a different war in a different place at a 
different time would have eventually triggered a different process. But one 
factor behind the creation of the UN war crimes tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was the coincidence of imagery between the Bosnian war and 
the Holocaust.483 
 
The strategy yielded dividends that are still apparent today as even the Obama 
administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy demonstrates the strategic 
value of U.S.-dominated ad hoc courts, and U.S. involvement—where it can 
control processes in its interest—in the proceedings of the International Criminal 
Court. 
International Justice: From Nuremberg to Yugoslavia to Liberia, the 
United States has seen that the end of impunity and the promotion of 
justice are not just moral imperatives; they are stabilizing forces in 
international affairs. The United States is thus working to strengthen 
national justice systems and is maintaining our support for ad hoc 
international tribunals and hybrid courts. Those who intentionally target 
innocent civilians must be held accountable, and we will continue to 
support institutions and prosecutions that advance this important interest. 
Although the United States is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), and will always protect U.S. 	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personnel, we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on 
issues of concern and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases 
that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of 
U.S. law.484 
 
Thus, what preceded the establishment of these contemporary bodies was the 
power of history. Today, still, international justice, framed as national security, 
relies on the Nuremberg precedent, arguably less in its legal form than in its 
cultural and historical embodiment. It does not follow, however, that the 
institutions created in the nineteen-nineties write the history of the events they 
adjudge in the way historians, over the past decades, have refined their 
understanding of the workings of Nazi Germany and of the Holocaust. Yet that is 
perhaps precisely the history we imagine when we think of Nuremberg. To 
conflate the careful scholarship of Raul Hilberg and Christopher Browning, for 
instance, with the approach of those who established the narratives of this 
immediate history is to mistake the approach and training of the historians, on 
the one hand, with the unique constraints and objectives of journalism.  
“It is not a criticism of the media,” write David Chuter, “to say that its 
priorities are different from that of courts and investigators,”485 and how much 
more so do they differ from those of historians. The work of historians can pose a 
problem in its use in courts—amounting to what Chuter characterizes as a 
“category error.” This means that little if any of the scholarly production in 
history seeks to establish an individual’s guilt for an offense beyond a reasonable 
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doubt based on judicial standards.486 Journalism exacerbates the misfit 
considerably given the time and commercial constraints of the trade.  
Journalists have been more prompt to assert guilt—and with greater 
confidence and speed—than have historians in articles, and on some occasions, 
books. Many journalists have been called upon to testify before the contemporary 
war crimes tribunals.487 Yet demands of space and time inherent in the practice 
of journalism lead to preferring extravagant claims over more tentative ones, 
higher estimates of casualties over lower ones.488  
Raul Hilberg’s careful assessment of Jews killed in the Holocaust is 
inferior to the standard six million—and, as Chuter puts it, “because of the 
limitations that the media work under, shorthand comparisons are often used to 
convey what busy and often inexpert journalists want their busy and poorly 
informed audiences to understand.”489 Chuter cites Pulitzer award-winning 
journalist Roy Gutman490 as an example of amplification of claims: he had 
written, in 1992, that every woman aged fifteen to twenty-five had been raped in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.491  
Less commonly known is the little remarked upon fact that Roy Gutman 
was the source for the ICTY Prosecutor’s indictment of a certain “Gruban” for a 
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series of rapes.492 The indictment was subsequently withdrawn, as Gutman’s 
source—a fellow Yugoslav journalist—had, in response to Gutman’s queries about 
whether his colleague could identify the “biggest rapist” in the region, named 
Gruban, a fictional character created by a local novelist.493  
This incident—the actual indictment of a fictional character before a war 
crimes tribunal established by the United Nations on the basis of a journalist’s 
communication of evidently unreliable hearsay evidence—tends to demonstrate a 
clear difference in the manner in which journalists and historians treat the 
concept of a source. As for the judicial component of this embarrassing 
imbroglio, while it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure, it is worth 
inquiring into the potential influence of the journalistic approach—the rush to 
judgment on such a tenuous basis—on the carelessness with which this 
indictment was proffered by the Prosecutor then confirmed by United Nations 
judges. Journalists played a tremendous role in stoking outrage for reasons 
detailed above—lack of time to investigate claims, as well as a preference for more 
colorful narratives—and as a result, they resorted instead to very powerful 
discursive historical shorthand. “Moral certainty,” however, as Carlo Ginzburg 
put it, “does not have value of proof.”494 Yet, references to the Holocaust were 
consistent in the reporting on the Yugoslav wars,495 and more than serving 
merely as shorthand, these references created—then reinforced—the kind of 
climate of preconceived belief among judges that Paccioco rightly critiques. 	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A legalistic mind might find the narrative quality of some historical works 
on the events that courts are called to adjudicate objectionable—the emotional, 
and perhaps melodramatic quality of what fills in the gaps where footnotes are 
absent, can make criminal lawyers uncomfortable. This phenomenon could be 
called “narrativism,” and would be defined as a misuse of the narrative device in 
absence of evidence—and in particular in the presence of contrary evidence—to 
create an emotional response in the reader. Two examples from Samantha 
Power’s influential America in an Age of Genocide may illustrate the problem. 
Power begins her book, which is not the work of a historian, though its largely 
positive reception and Pulitzer Prize (for General Non-Fiction) make that 
irrelevant—with the following paragraph: 
On March 14, 1921, on a damp day in the Charlottenburg district of Berlin, 
a twenty-four-year-old Armenian crept up behind a man in a heavy gray 
overcoat swinging his cane. The Armenian, Soghomon Tehlirian, placed a 
revolver at the back of the man’s head and pulled the trigger, shouting, 
“This is to avenge the death of my family!” The burly target crumpled. If 
you had heard the shot and spotted the rage distorting the face of the 
young offender you might have suspected that you were witnessing a 
murder to avenge a very different kind of crime. But back then you would 
not have known to call the crime in question “genocide.” The word did not 
yet exist.496 
 
The legalist reader is perhaps the kind of reader that Carlo Ginzburg might have 
had in mind when he described as “naïve” the person who would search in vain 
for a footnote to support a clearly conjectural claim.497 Is there not conjecture in 
the very familiar wording observed above, “if you had heard the shot,” and does 	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this formulation not eerily resemble Eileen Power’s description of the life of Bodo 
in Medieval People? Ginzburg points out the implausibility of Bodo—who was 
from Île-de-France—singing an Anglo-Saxon incantation.498 The problem resides, 
here, in the filling of gaps in evidence with implausible or questionable 
conjecture. But in Samantha Power’s retelling of Tehlirian’s murder of Pasha, the 
reader is not invited to understand the young Armenian’s statement as 
conjecture; alternatively, if it is conjecture, it is not only implausible, but contrary 
to existing evidence regarding the event, in particular transcripts of Tehlirian’s 
trial for murder499—in which the accused himself, as well as a witness state that 
nothing was said before the assassination of Pasha. That “this is to avenge the 
death of my family”—now reproduced in other pop-historical accounts, 
footnoting Power—was the broad interpretation one could reasonably hold of 
Tehlirian’s defense, as well as the outcome of his trial (an acquittal by reason of 
insanity, as a result of trauma caused by witnessing the slaughter of his family) 
certainly seems sound, it is another thing altogether to gratuitously place that 
quote—as if it had been spoken, when evidence tends to show that it was not—at 
the very beginning of Power’s book. 
In another instance, Power quotes an account from a story published in 
the Washington Post on July 15th, 1995, which possesses a quality that can be 
described as “the anecdote that nobody could have possibly witnessed,” and 
which again, perhaps, weaves conjecture with evidence: a young woman, a 	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refugee from Srebrenica, hangs herself, but before that moment, she sobs alone. 
It is perhaps naïve to wonder how one goes about establishing that she was 
sobbing if she was alone. It is, one can suppose, an assumption that one sobs 
before suicide. 
The young woman died with no shoes on. Sometime Thursday night she 
climbed a high tree near the muddy ditch where she had camped for 36 
hours. Knotting a shabby floral shawl together with her belt, she secured it 
to a branch, ran her head of black hair through the makeshift noose and 
jumped… She had no relatives with her and sobbed by herself until the 
moment she scaled the tree.500 
 
Power employs the quote from John Pomfret’s emotional front page July 15th, 
1995, Washington Post article, about the young woman’s suicide, to set up a 
scene at a President Clinton cabinet meeting, in which Vice-President Gore, she 
writes, had referred to the photograph accompanying Pomfret’s article: 
Gore told the Clinton cabinet that in the photo that accompanied 
Pomfret’s story, the woman looked around the same age as his daughter. 
“My twenty-one-year-old daughter asked about that picture,” Gore said. 
“What am I supposed to tell her? Why is this happening and we’re not 
doing anything?” […] “My daughter is surprised that the world is allowing 
this to happen,” Gore said, pausing for effect. “I am too.” Clinton said the 
United States would take action and agreed, in Gore’s words, that 
“acquiescence is not an option.”501 
 
The sobbing conjecture could appear puzzling enough to prompt the 
skeptic to verify Pomfret’s article to examine his evidence: had somebody 
witnessed the woman sobbing alone? A Lexis-Nexis search of the Washington 	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Post’s front page on July 15th, 1995, reveals not only Pomfret’s story, but another, 
by Samantha Power, “special to the Washington Post” (from Sarajevo), with 
additional reporting by John Pomfret (in Tuzla). There was no sourcing, in the 
Pomfret piece, to indicate how he knew the woman had sobbed by herself. The 
prose seems uncharacteristically literary, and the article, according to Lexis-
Nexis, is accompanied by a Reuters photo of Muslim women crying. What to 
make of Power’s account of Gore’s reaction to the photo of a young woman 
hanging from a tree, a photo that according to her, “accompanied” Pomfret’s 
article? 
A microfilm search of the front page of the July 15th, 1995 issue of the 
Washington Post reveals that John’s Pomfret’s article appears in a box, beneath 
the fold, on the right hand side, without illustration. It is continued, on page A-17, 
and is accompanied by a Reuters photo of Muslim women and children crying. 
Above the fold that day, under the headline “Residents Sizzle,” the Washington 
Post published a photo of a young woman pouring water down her neck. No 
photo of a hanged young woman ran alongside John Pomfret’s article, as stated 
by Power, nor was it run on the following days.  
Power’s account of the cabinet meeting footnotes Bob Woodward’s The 
Choice, at pages 162-163. Woodward writes, regarding Vice-President Gore: 
He noted that the front page of the Washington Post over the weekend had 
described a young woman, just one of the 10,000 refugees from 
Srebrenica, who had committed suicide by tying a floral shawl and her belt 
together to hang herself from a tree. A picture of the woman had run all 
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over the world. Gore said she seemed to be the age of his own daughter. 
“My twenty-one-year-old asked about the picture.”502 
 
Power’s claim that this photo appeared accompanying John Pomfret’s July 15th, 
1995 article is inaccurate. The Washington Post does not support it, and neither 
does Woodward—who, carefully (for obvious reasons) references only the 
Washington Post’s description of the suicide, claiming rather that the picture had 
“run all over the world,” and that Gore’s daughter, perhaps an avid reader of 
foreign newspapers, had asked about the picture. Does is matter? It matters in 
that this account—like many others in Power’s book—is offered to illustrate a 
significant moment, an epiphany, in this case, a shift in U.S. foreign policy 
effected by Gore’s response to a photo that was published in the Washington 
Post, one that prompted his daughter to ask questions that were intolerable.  
The photograph was described in a Guardian piece by Lorna Martin, 
published April 17th, 2005, titled “Truth Behind the Picture That Shocked the 
World”. 
The photograph of Ferida Osmanovic was published on front pages across 
the world soon after the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July, 1995. It prompted a 
series of questions in the US Senate by those concerned about Bosnia’s 
war. What was her name, where was she from, what humiliations and 
depravations did she suffer, had she been raped, did she witness loved 
ones being killed? 
At a meeting with President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore referred to 
a front-page story in that day’s Washington Post. ‘My 21-year-old daughter 
asked about this picture,’ he told the President, showing him the 
newspaper. ‘What am I supposed to tell her? Why is this happening and 	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we’re not doing anything? My daughter is surprised the world is allowing 
this to happen. I am too.’”503 
 
Here, too, the point is that this is a significant photograph, described by Martin, 
ten years after its publication “on front pages across the world,” as having 
prompted questions in the Senate. Martin writes that Vice President Gore showed 
President Clinton “that day’s Washington Post,” stating that his 21 year-old 
daughter asked him about the picture, in precisely the same terms as those 
crafted by Power. Here, journalism reproduces the errors of a former journalist’s 
account of a conversation it is far from clear ever occurred, about a photograph 
that did not run in the Washington Post. The account appears in Gore’s Senate 
webpage, the myth now apparently carved into stone.504 
Also strange is Power’s contention that Clinton cabinet meeting occurred 
on July 15th, 1995, when page 161 of Woodward’s book (the following two pages 
are footnoted in support of her account) places that meeting on Monday, July 
17th, 1995.505 
Power’s anecdote is one where a poignant photo of a hanged woman 
accompanies a front-page article in the Washington Post, and the Vice President 
brings it to the President’s attention, the very same day. Does the account lose 	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narrative force if described in a manner consistent with the evidence? The 
accurate account is that Gore would have referred to a Washington Post article, 
“published over the weekend” (it was Saturday, July 15th) that described a 
hanging, a photo of which was apparently published elsewhere.506 That 
photograph both reminded him of his daughter, and caused his daughter to ask 
him why “the world” was doing nothing, a question he adopted as his own. The 
message in each account is the same: this photo changed foreign policy as a result 
of Gore’s emotional response. In Power’s account, however, the photo was 
published in the Washington Post, and Gore responded to it immediately. Both 
the press (specifically the Washington Post, to which Power herself contributed 
an article that day), and Gore appear more decisive in Power’s inaccurate 
account. The conclusion seems to be that the media—and in particular, images, 
have the power to affect politicians and cause them to act despite their 
hesitations. The obvious problem is of course—and this example shows it well—
journalists do not always treat evidence with care. 
The difficulty is compounded when a journalist crafts a work imbued with 
scholarly pretense. Power’s erroneous claims, in keeping with the trappings of 
scholarly methodology, are supported by footnotes, and yet it is those very 
footnotes that show them to be inaccurate. It is thus not an invitation to 
conjecture, to be weighed, then accepted or rejected: Power’s assertions are 
offered as facts, supported by footnotes. Power correctly added the reference to 	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Pomfret’s piece in Woodward’s account, and footnoted it accurately. No person 
having done that could honestly claim that the photograph of a woman hanging 
accompanied that article, and arguably less someone having herself published an 
article in the same paper that same day. Power misstates the date of the cabinet 
meeting, yet it stretches credulity that she would miss Woodward’s reference to 
the date at which the meeting occurred. That date appears one page before the 
pages she footnotes. How does the writing process unfold? One thing is certain; it 
is not a scholarly process, much less a historical one. It can rather be imagined as 
a series of anecdotes, all emotional and powerful, fraught with victims and 
heroes, brought together to send a powerful message. Narrative license, even on 
insignificant matters, supports a strange subtext: to Power, accuracy does not 
matter; the story does, as does the appearance of careful research and accurate 
reference to evidence. Yet a genre tackling genocide, and the history of its 
understanding by the United States, as well as the history of the establishment of 
legal bodies, about which Power also states that they would not have been created 
without the coincidence of imagery with the Holocaust, requires meticulous 
attention to evidence. A wealth of footnotes and a stout bibliography do not make 
up for errors of fact, nor does a better story, or a noble cause. In fact, the 
enterprise becomes suspect as the reader is left baffled and wondering for what 
purpose an easily uncovered myth is planted in this narrative; one which would 
have served the thrust of her work just as well had she reported the facts—about 
reporting, ironically—with accuracy. 
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History in International Relations and Academic International Criminal Law 
I have attempted thus far to explore the relationship between law and 
history, as well as the effect of journalism on a certain idea of history. The sub-
discipline of international relations, which can study international criminal law 
from the perspective of political science or the philosophy of international law, 
also employs history as evidence, data, as well as to provide examples to illustrate 
social scientific theoretical propositions. Academic international criminal law, 
too, employs history in a manner of interest to this essay: to account for, or more 
particularly to advocate for change in the substantive law. Such is the case of 
academic international criminal law’s development of an unusual concept: the 
“Grotian Moment.” 
Paul Schroeder has addressed the issue of the relation between history and 
international relations scholarship with great care, seeking first to address 
commonly held misconceptions regarding the differences between the two 
fields.507 First, the notion that history addresses only the particular in great 
detail, while international relations theory addresses patterns and law-like 
generalizations; second, and related, is the idea that the difference between the 
two disciplines is that international relations is nomothetic while history is 
idiographic, a merely descriptive pursuit, which thirdly, seeks understanding in 
the sense of Verstehen—intuitive identification.508 Schroeder argues that while 
there is some plausibility to each of these claims, they can nonetheless serve to 	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distort history to the point of caricature, thus granting license to political 
scientists (or scholars from other disciplines) to misuse and abuse elements of 
historical work to pursue what is mistakenly considered to be a strictly social 
scientific endeavor, that is explanation and prediction.509 This misconception 
holds that history is a merely descriptive undertaking, and while it is true that 
narration (and description) play a crucial role in the historical approach, this 
view fails to grasp that historical works, as Schroeder writes, “are clearly 
nomothetic in the sense that they develop hypotheses, assign particular causes 
for events and developments, and establish general patterns.”510 History seeks to 
account for social change, and its methodology, perhaps “distressingly vague” by 
social scientific standards,511 consists in identifying under-explored or incorrectly 
interpreted phenomena, and marshaling all available evidence, arriving at a 
synoptic judgment, that is “a broad interpretation of a development based on 
examining it from different angles to determine how it came to be, what it means, 
and what understanding of it best integrates the available evidence.”512 Misuse of 
history—in addition to the most obvious abuses resulting from incorrect factual 
claims, usually resulting from the reliance on other works in international 
relations—occurs primarily when historical findings are taken out of context and 
used as data without an adequate understanding of the key differences between 
history and political science: history seeks to account for change, it is concerned 
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with acts of purposive human agency, not mere behavior, and historians form 
judgments about the causes, meaning and significance of social change.513  
The use of historical materials to classify states according to their 
democratic or autocratic nature—known in international relations as the 
democratic peace theory, the proposition that democracies do not go to war 
against each other—provides an illustration of a misfit between history and the 
social sciences.514 Indeed, from the perspective of historians, the cases used as 
data to test the theory have been removed from all context;515 they lose the 
complexity and richness of explanation, the continued refinement, debates and 
questions that continue to interest the discipline of history; historical events, thus 
employed, are effectively dehistoricized. As Schroeder writes:  
The concept of what is to be discovered and explained (not change over 
historic time, but supposedly lawlike, structural correlations between fixed 
stylized phenomena); of the subject matter (not human conduct, acts of 
purposive agency, but behavior, phenomena to be stripped of their human, 
purposive element precisely in order to be manipulable and calculable for 
scientific purposes); and of the desired explanatory outcome (designed 
precisely to exclude synoptic judgment and to consist of proofs, preferably 
statistical-mathematical, of such correlations)—all these are so remote 
from and alien to what historical scholarship is about and always will be, 
that between it and this kind of endeavor no genuine conversation, much 
less fit and collaboration, is possible.516 
 
Edward Ingram draws a similar conclusion, adding that historians, when 
examining the world of the political scientist, are bewildered by its curious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 Ibid., 71. 
514 Edward Ingram, “The Wonderland of the Political Scientist,” International Security, 22 (1) 
(Summer, 1997), 53-63 , 56. 
515 Ibid., 56. 
516 Schroeder, “History and International Relations Theory,” 73. 
	   177	  
position on time, space, and causation, like Alice in Wonderland.517 Both Ingram 
and Schroeder argue in favor of something akin to a non-aggression pact between 
the two disciplines, but it could be argued that historians may have a 
responsibility greater than that of merely averting their gaze from political 
science’s different perception of the phenomena they study. There are instances 
in international relations scholarship as well as the related scholarship in 
academic international criminal law where the use of historical materials goes 
beyond mere oversimplification or instrumentalization: it is employed to argue 
that international law has changed—without legislative intervention and in an 
virtually instantaneous manner—resulting in real consequences for real people. 
In this genre, the concept of the “Grotian moment,” first developed by Richard 
Falk, but most recently expounded by Michael Scharf, is instructive. The Grotian 
moment refers to Hugo Grotius, widely considered the father of international 
law. Michael Scharf employs the expression as he marshals elements of history to 
assert a paradigmatic shift in law as a result of a dramatic historical event.518 In 
an article advocating that a controversial mode of criminal participation, joint 
criminal enterprise—or JCE, also known by some critics as “just convict 
everyone”519—which in one of its incarnations allows individuals to be held 
individually criminally responsible for crimes perpetrated by others that were 	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519 Shane Darcy, “Imputed Criminal Liability and the Goals of Criminal Justice,” Leiden Journal 
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outside of the scope of the original agreement, provided they were the 
foreseeable consequence of activities that were originally agreed upon or 
contemplated. Hence, the purpose of JCE is to facilitate convictions, as it 
significantly reduces the prosecutorial burden of proof, and permits the 
conviction of the morally—and objectively—innocent.520 I have argued 
elsewhere521 that JCE is both a very recent and unique legal concept. JCE is only 
deployed in cases where there is, in fact, no evidence—or insufficient evidence, 
from the standpoint of the criminal burden of proof—of genocidal intent. In other 
words, its purpose can be said to be to convict the innocent. 
JCE is recent, as the ICTY's Statute does not—and did not at the 
institution's creation—include this “prosecutorial tool” as a mode of participation 
in a criminal offence522; indeed, Article 7 of the Statute sets out traditional modes 
of participation, which require evidence of both a criminal act, either as a direct 
act, or as alternate, traditionally known modes of participation, such as aiding 
and abetting, or a common agreement, plan or design as well as criminal intent. 
Scharf’s position, in contrast, is that JCE forms part of customary 
international law since the Nuremberg trials, and an impressive array of 
arguments are offered in support of this argument. However, precedents (such as 
the Eichmann trial) or the debatable inclusion of all Nuremberg principles into 
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international criminal law do not appear to suffice; Scharf wants to make a 
different argument, and employ his concept of a Grotian moment to strengthen 
his legal case. This is done by arguing that the particular atrocities committed by 
the Nazi regime—described in a single paragraph that omits Germany’s invasion 
of the Soviet Union, surely not a detail of history, and which footnotes two pages 
from a previous book written by Scharf himself as sole historical support—having 
led to the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal, constituted a paradigmatic 
shift in law. Thus, (and this is Scharf’s specific goal) JCE should apply to the 
defendants before the Cambodia tribunal, and constitutes evidence that this 
mode of participation was included in international criminal law in the nineteen-
seventies when the Khmer Rouge regime was in power.  
The argument is troubling along legal and historical lines: the legal 
controversy has, in the case of Cambodia, been resolved by the Appeals Chamber, 
which has ruled that the most controversial form of JCE523 was not a mode of 
criminal participation in international criminal law during the years 1975 to 1979. 
In fact, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia, a hybrid 
international court, have rejected Scharf’s arguments as legally unfounded. The 
Chambers also served a stunning rebuke to the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision 
in Tadic: the decision incredibly included an egregious error: a quote from 
Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor’s argument, presented by the ICTY Appeals 
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Chamber as part of the Einsatzgruppen judgment. This is the ICTY’s final court of 
appeal, and Tadic was the ICTY’s first judgment. Errors and unsuccessful legal 
arguments are the stuff of everyday practice and scholarship, but what is unusual 
in Scharf’s approach is the blend of (poor) history and legal argument to create 
claims that would facilitate the conviction of the innocent. Misuse of history in 
legal scholarship ought to baffle the historian as much and arguably more than 
Ingram’s Alice in Wonderland feeling when confronted with international 
relations theory, as work such as that written by Scharf is normative in nature, 
and in this particular instance militates for the conviction of the innocent based 
on some sort of historical—as opposed to a legal—idea of sudden paradigmatic 
shifts in international law, minus states ratifying treaties, or their opinio juris. A 
historian might wonder, as Ingram does about the democratic peace theory, why 
only the case of Nuremberg? Why no international courts during the cold war? 
Can the sudden change solely be explained by atrocities that re-emerged only in 
the nineteen-nineties? If Nuremberg, for the sake of argument, modified 
customary international law in a “Grotian moment,” why is aggression—
described by the Nuremberg’s Trial of the Major War Criminals as “the supreme 
international crime”—not presently an actual crime? Historians of legal bodies 
can also question Scharf’s assertions that only the United States wished to try—
rather than to execute—the Nazi leadership, whether Nuremberg was an 
international body rather than the exercise of jurisdiction by the Allies following 
German terms of surrender, whether conspiracy charges were an exclusively 
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American idea, and whether following Nuremberg, international law could 
charge and prosecute individuals. 
 
The Dangers of Obiter Dicta 
In criminal law, what goes beyond the legal and factual findings required 
to find whether an individual is guilty or not guilty of an offense, before a court of 
law, is obiter dictum.524 Similarly, international court practice disallows a 
determination in favor of parties that go beyond the issues of a case; this rule is 
known as non ultra petita.525 History written by an international court thus falls 
somewhere between obiter dicta and ultra petita, but this history is less the 
responsibility of the judges as it is attributable to the nature of these bodies, 
described by Judith Shklar as “law-like political institutions.”  
Since these courts are the product of international politics, they can fall 
within the scope of international relations scholarship. What should be borne in 
mind is that international war crimes courts exist at the intersection of politics, 
law, and history; they are not impervious to the influence of the media. This has 
an effect on both the history these courts can be expected to write and the 
fairness of the process.  
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Historians, political scientists, and legal scholars all have a stake in the 
manner in which they examine the development of international criminal law: 
historians ought be wary of the history written by courts, and understand, along 
with legal scholars, that the process cannot be divorced from the political aspects 
and purposes of these bodies. Political scientists or philosophers, in turn, should 
not shy from the study of international criminal law as a political question and 
the establishment of war crimes tribunals as a result of power and of interests; 
indeed, they are well suited to address the limitations of international law, but 
they may have to approach the issues reflexively,526 rather than attempt empirical 
theory building and the generation of correlations focusing solely on behavior 
and ignoring purposive agency. The manner in which historians arrive at synoptic 
judgments about events, and the care with which evidence is treated should serve 
as a model for international relations scholarship.  
Finally, in examining international criminal courts, international relations 
scholarship, and conceptually minded thinkers like philosophers, ought to pay 
attention to the quality of the history generated by these institutions and take 
great care to verify those narratives with the more careful and deliberate work of 
historians. International relations and international legal scholars and those who 
have an interest in evaluating their argumentation, however well intentioned they 
may be in hoping that a Grotian moment has emerged and that new, unwritten 
norms now govern individuals, would be well-advised to approach their hopes 	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with caution: so-called Grotian moments today seem to operate to the detriment 
of individuals charged with grave crimes, and some innocent people may well pay 
the ultimate price of an unjust conviction.  
Miscarriages of justice can occur internationally, and are more likely to do 
so in the misguided search for historical truth. In The Judge and the Historian, 
Carlo Ginzburg writes that: “in comparison with the errors of historians, 
however, the errors of judges have more immediate and more serious 
consequences. They can lead to the conviction of innocent people.”527 And now, at 
least in France, where Inquisitor Jacques Fournier once tried people for their 
beliefs, it is a crime to contest the obiter dicta of “law-like political bodies,” a 
matter that ought to—and is—of great concern to historians. It should also be of 
concern to international legal theory and practice. 
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Essay 4: Shklar’s Legalism and the Liberal Paradox 
 
 “And it is with some dismay that I now find myself treated as the purveyor of 
standard ideas, known to and accepted by all, even by the most conservative 
academic lawyers. To recognize that professions have their self-sustaining 
ideologies is hardly news today, but it was in 1964. And so Legalism, which is my 
favorite of the books that I have written, went quickly from being a radical 
outrage to being a conventional commonplace.”528 
-Judith Shklar, “A Life of Learning,” 1989. 
 
 
Legalism’s Interdisciplinary Promise 
Judith Shklar’s 1964 book, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials529 
is an eclectic, sophisticated, erudite, critical, historical, but primarily political 
exploration of a phenomenon, legalism, that she defines immediately as “the 
ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following and 
moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.” This 
early definition is misleading: what Shklar wanted to really get at was that 
legalism, or perhaps more accurately legalisms, plural, as she details several 
kinds, constitute ideology, by which she meant simply a political preference of a 
certain type.530  
This again is too simple a qualification, as legalism also stands for an 
evolving concept that shifts from an ideological attitude held by lawyers as a 
social group, to a potential “creative policy,” then finally to a conservative and 	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stabilizing force compatible with a wide range of other political ideologies.531 
Most importantly, however, it is a historical phenomenon, which is why, writes 
Shklar, it cannot “be understood simply by defining it.”532 
The concept, so far, is at once sociological (concerning practicing and 
academic lawyers), ideological, political, and historical. Legalism—let us for now 
simply define it as a culture of rule-following—is of course a feature of most 
democratic societies; in addition, it illustrates the sort of formality that is 
required if judicial bodies established internationally are to be considered 
legitimate, a critical requirement in absence of supranational enforcement 
mechanisms. Of particular interest in the context of the post-cold war institutions 
of international criminal law, Shklar identifies legalism as a specific and 
paradoxical ideology that denies “both the political provenance and the [political] 
import of judicial decisions.”533 That intuition is at the heart of my research 
agenda: how do bodies that exist as a result of international politics deny their 
politics? What are those politics, and is there a political and historical cost in 
denying them? The concept of legalism, as a specific ideology inherent in legal 
practice and scholarship that considers itself apolitical, neutral and 
independent—which happens to be the very source of its legal and political 
legitimacy— but that cannot in fact be dissociated from politics presents a rich 
conundrum. And because it is at root a historical phenomenon, it can be 
historicized. Because it relates to multivarious fields, it can be historicized across 	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many disciplines. 
Legalism has a place of theoretical pride in Gary Jonathan Bass’ Stay the 
Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, a work that argues 
that liberal states are legalistic, and therefore are more likely to put war criminals 
on trial in rough accordance with their domestic norms than non-liberal states.534 
The liberal/non-liberal distinction should be familiar to both the historian of 
nineteenth century history law and its emphasis on the distinctions between 
civilized and uncivilized states, as well as to the international relations scholar 
acquainted with the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter. An actual reading of 
Legalism, beyond the ritual, initial definition provided by Bass, proved to be an 
engagement with a much different phenomenon, as well as a different argument 
altogether, made immediately evident from reading her acid critique of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, or her trenchant indictment of the Rosenberg and 
Dennis trials in the United States. That Legalism was written by a liberal political 
theorist is no doubt true; that it was a sanguine defense of legalism and of 
political trials as carried out in liberal states is, in contrast, patently false on even 
the most tortured reading. The gap between the actual content of Shklar’s 
argument and the purposes to which it was put by Bass is puzzling. Samuel Moyn 
has observed that Shklar’s book had little impact at the time of its publication, 
hypothesizing that her having “dripped scorn” on most if not all legal academia of 
the time might have something to do with the cool reception, and that in any 
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event legal realism may have superseded her arguments.535 He adds that despite 
the fairly recent reemergence of international criminal law, “no one in the legal 
academy […] has ever paid serious attention to it.”536 This, though the “serious” 
part is true, does not mean that Legalism has not been swept up as an almost 
obligatory reference by a remarkable number of scholars. In 1989, three years 
before dying from massive heart failure, Shklar presented a lecture about her 
intellectual trajectory in which she wrote of Legalism that it was her favorite 
book, and that it was “with some dismay” that she found herself, after the book’s 
initial reception as a “radical outrage,” “treated as the purveyor of standard ideas, 
known to and accepted by all.”537 While Shklar could be dismayed at the signal 
year of the cold war’s end that the initial controversy sparked by Legalism had 
fallen into the realm of conventional wisdom, its arguments fully understood and 
no longer subject to dispute by any serious academic lawyer or political 
philosopher, today, Shklar might be struck both by the renaissance as well as the 
uses to which Legalism has been put, precisely in theorizing the triumph of the 
very ideology she examined and critiqued. 
Ubiquitous superficial footnotes citing Shklar employ the concept of 
legalism in many curious ways: it is meant to refer to approaches to international 
criminal law that favor judicial institutions,538 or perhaps to be opposed to ad hoc 	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courts.539 Legalism is instead the mistaken view that international collective 
action problems can be solved through recourse to institutions that are 
unrealistic, ineffective, and ignore interests as well as their potential for rational 
attainment.540 Maybe arguments in Shklar’s Legalism should stand for the 
proposition that political trials are valuable to establish a historical record and 
prevent revisionist accounts, or the claim that to focus on due process and 
individual culpability is “too narrow” in the context of international criminal 
law.541 Some have even shown tremendous political creativity in purporting to 
continue and expand on her work, offering a full-throated defense of liberal show 
trials.542 It is difficult, if not impossible, to find the streamlined, or worse yet, 
disfigured “legalism” before Bass’ significant mention of Shklar’s work in 2000. 
Thus, the historical development of Shklar’s legalism—not to be confused 
with the idea of law generally—is revealing. It is apparent that the renewed 
reference to the work emerges after being cited by Bass as a general defense of 
the Western, liberal—and it is not going too far to say distinctly American—war 
crimes trial, but that the totemic footnotes do not imply serious engagement. 
Instead, what is observable is rather a historical coincidence of the emergence of 
ad hoc and hybrid international courts, as well as the development of the 
International Criminal Court, and the publication of an influential book by a 
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Princeton rising star (and former journalist) who had himself to some extent 
jumped on the bandwagon of the successful liberal international relations theory 
with what “sometimes appears as if a theoretical introduction and conclusion 
were heaped on what was a lot of—otherwise good—journalism.”543 
Shklar’s first charge against legalism is that it walls itself off from the rest 
of historical thought and experience. Law’s (or more properly legal theory) 
propensity to isolate itself from other social phenomena, to limit history to its 
own discrete jurisprudence, to seal itself off from politics and morality, is 
primarily what makes it an ideology. For legalists, law is “there” to be discovered 
and properly interpreted and exists, in its own conception, outside historical 
space and time.  It is a phenomenon, at least in the history of ideas, that can be 
historicized: contemporary lawyers, Shklar contends, resemble Coke in “their 
vocabulary, outlook and concerns,” something that cannot be said of medical 
doctors in relation to their respective pre-nineteenth century predecessors. De 
Tocqueville, she contends, describes perfectly well the modern lawyer’s 
conservatism, built on dedication to order and formality, which translates into 
support for the established social order. Thus, the radical village lawyer of the 
French Revolution “was an aberration that the aristocracy foolishly brought upon 
itself.”544 A hundred years later, she sees continuity in Max Weber’s assessment 
of the conservative bureaucratic lawyer, but points to the “liberalizing effects of 
involuntary politicization on the American higher bench, doomed to interpret 	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and adapt its own constitution” as historical evidence to support the theoretical 
claim that legalism should be seen as a matter of degree, rather than as either 
“there” or not “there” as lawyers think, Shklar states, of the law.545 
Shklar is not alone in historicizing legalism: where she sees de 
Tocqueville’s aristocratic habits of thought in the bench and bar as less accurate 
than Weber’s distinction between class and the specific sociological mores of 
lawyers as responsible for their propensity for order, noting, in addition, that the 
law, in America, then as now, was open to talent, “the poor boy’s road to middle 
class eminence,”546 Eric Posner speculates that American legalism may be a 
symptom, paradoxically, of a skeptical view towards democracy and a veiled 
preference towards the rule of judges.547 Posner further conjectures that legalism 
holds sway in polities where the population is more diverse, and political means 
of resolving disputes are less available or viewed as unable to successfully 
navigate bargaining between disparate groups. Many empires with diverse 
populations, he offers, citing the examples of the Roman, Austro-Hungarian and 
British Empires, have been legalistic.548 In more recent American history, Posner 
argues, courts with their inherited authority from the British system, presented a 
desirable alternative to a weak, remote national government, as well as state 
legislatures viewed with distrust. Finally, for Posner, de Tocqueville’s observation 
that in America the law functioned as a benign aristocracy ought to be sharpened: 
that elites prefer judges to democracy should be taken to stand for a stronger 	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anti-democratic preference, and a defense of class interests.549 
Mark Mazower’s study of international governance illustrates similar 
nineteenth century themes: as European groups, assorted entities, and even 
states joined efforts to attempt a legal global governance—even the term 
“international” is a pure product of the century, coined by Jeremy Bentham550—
time and again, legalism took a conservative turn. From the idealism that first 
motivated great initiatives for world peace, the shift to law created a first wave of 
disappointment in Kant—his bitter reference to the “miserable comforters” 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel “and the rest,” for their justifications in favor of war 
speaks volumes551 —but by the late nineteenth century advocates of international 
law, by Mazower’s account, seemed increasingly anti-democratic; they 
denounced socialism and anarchism, drafted extradition treaties for political 
crimes, and used the law as a rationalization for plunder abroad, while claiming 
that justice was on their side.552 Shklar firmly attached the cold war idea of a 
“Western political tradition” to the rule of law, but traced the felt need for 
ideological identity of the time to nineteenth-century claims of European 
“rationality.” Weber’s comparisons of the distinguishing features of European 
culture—its propensity to follow rules, responsible for the legal profession, 
capitalism, rational social ethics, and finally, Protestantism—to “Eastern 
despotism,” are historically problematic for Shklar. Beyond questioning the 	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adequacy of Weber’s account of Asian history, the problem was that there was no 
single Western tradition, but rather a history of traditions, a diversity of 
conditions that accounted for Europe’s turbulent history. To state, writes Shklar, 
that “freedom under law” characterizes the Western tradition “falsifies the past, 
and renders the present incomprehensible.”553 Legalism thus serves as a critical 
concept that invites historical investigation, or at least awareness, and stands 
against “the idol of origins,”554 specifically the temptation to view the very new 
post-cold war international criminal courts as a result of continuous progress, in 
the manner of a Whig history555 that international law has always advanced, and 
will continue its march of progress. 
Following Shklar, as well as Morgenthau, I contend that international law 
is a subset of international politics, and in the international relations aspect of my 
interdisciplinary work, I am interested in the normative implications of the 
denial of those politics. Courts such as the ICTY and ICTR, and now the ICC are 
historical agents, who also happen to write history556 but insist, for the sake of 
their legalistic legitimacy, on the denial of the historical conditions that granted 
them their limited autonomy557 in particular on the dimension of power. Shklar’s 
normative view of political trials is not that they are inherently anti-democratic, 
or even totalitarian; instead, she contends that the kind of politics they pursue—	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and not whether or not they are political—ought to be the object of the inquiry. It 
is the nature of the politics that are assessed, and political trials can be excused, 
tolerated, even encouraged if the politics they promote are “decent.” Conversely, 
and quite contrary to the use that Bass and others have made of this concept, 
legalism alone is not enough for decent politics, as a rule of law system can have 
repressive rules and fanatical judges, producing “neither freedom nor 
decency.”558 Decency, pursues Shklar, is “the spirit of humane skepticism.” While 
disconcertingly brief, Shklar’s idea of decency as humane skepticism can provide 
some guidance and is certainly both sufficiently expansive but fundamentally 
critical to assess the international politics of criminal trials. In this essay, I 
develop a working lawyer’s legalism that examines precisely the humane 
skepticism and the promotion of central tenets of classical liberalism, such as the 
values of human autonomy, freedom and equality, in the nature of the work of 
defense lawyers generally, and those practicing before international courts in 
particular.  
Legalism’s connection to the phenomenon of Memory Studies is a 
fascinating question on its own. Memory Studies or what I prefer to more broadly 
call Memory discourse—whatever it may actually be, so varied are the 
methodologies that sometimes simultaneously drive and study it559—emerged 
much at the same time as the renewed interest in Shklar’s legalism, interest in the 
Holocaust, which played an important analogical role in the establishment of a 	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first ad hoc criminal court as well as the re-emergence of international criminal 
law.  
Historian Peter Novick invoked Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of collective 
memory to provide part of the theoretical framework for The Holocaust in 
American Life,560 but only briefly summarized Halbwachs’ work as focusing on 
“the way in which present concerns determine what of the past we remember,” 
then pit this slight definition of collective memory against history: memory is 
then ahistorical, even anti-historical, sees events from a single committed 
perspective, is impatient with ambiguities, and reduces events to mythical 
archetypes, while history, in contrast, strives to grasp the complexity of past 
events with the kind of detachment that would permit an interpretation that 
allows various perspectives as well as their inherent ambiguity.561 
Such a functional definition of history and memory by contrast is 
reminiscent of Pierre Nora’s similar exercise in Les lieux de mémoire, though 
normative preferences differ in their respective accounts. “Memory is life,” writes 
Nora, while explicitly recognizing (and here the epistemic position differs little 
from that adopted by Novick) that memory, as a phenomenon borne by living 
societies, is vulnerable to manipulation, appropriation, censorship and 
projection. Nora’s account, in contrast to Novick’s, depicts history as a discipline 
whose mission is to “destroy and suppress memory” even to “annihilate what in 
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reality has taken place.”562 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether historicizing 
memory would end up, following Nora, cannibalizing it altogether, memory has 
in many ways become increasingly legalistic. “Legalism” here should not be 
understood as a rule-governed conduct exclusively, but rather as a framework of 
representation. A significant example of what I mean here is the explosion, in the 
past few decades of “the imperative of witnessing” “as a powerful secular 
norm.”563  
Legalism, a nuanced critical concept with normative implications, holds 
the tremendous interdisciplinary potential to help achieve what Martti 
Koskiennemi has called for in international legal history, that is “to contextualize 
the legal ideologies or concepts within the intellectual, social, and political 
environment in which they have operated.”564  
 
Shklar and the Nouveaux Legalists 
While the late political philosopher Judith Shklar could be dismayed in 
1989 that the initial controversy sparked by Legalism had fallen into the realm of 
conventional wisdom, its arguments fully understood and no longer subject to 	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dispute by any serious academic lawyer or political philosopher, today, Shklar 
might be struck both by the renaissance as well as the uses to which Legalism has 
been put, precisely in theorizing the triumph, following the end of the cold war, of 
the very ideology she examined and critiqued: legalism. Moreover, from the 
commonplace that it may or may not have been two decades ago, the concept of 
legalism—which far from being the simple notion that “professions have their 
self-sustaining ideologies,” though it is indeed an important and not 
unsubstantial insight, and in the case of lawyers, not without certain special 
difficulties, to which we shall return—has reemerged as something so streamlined 
and arguably trivial as to bear very little resemblance to the complex exploration 
undertaken by Shklar in 1964. The “new,” primarily post cold war legalism is an 
ubiquitous footnote in many ambitious articles and books, and is particularly 
favored by scholars concerned with international criminal law; however, few of 
these authors appear to have engaged Shklar’s work on the concept in earnest. 
For to engage with Legalism is to be confronted with an evolving concept that 
shifts from an ideological attitude held by lawyers to a potential “creative 
policy,”565 then finally to a conservative and stabilizing force compatible with a 
wide range of other political ideologies.566 There is, of course, much more to it, 
and in some cases there is not only more, but something different altogether; 
thus, rather than refer unthinkingly to an unexamined concept, or worse, 
perhaps, to embark upon a critical analysis of it without first having given 
thought and due respect to the manner in which Shklar develops and modifies it 	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herself, it is advisable to give Legalism a second look.  
Legalism is a feature of most democratic societies, but can in addition 
constitute an ideology that denies “both the political provenance and the 
[political] import of judicial decisions.”567 Legalism illustrates the sort of 
formality that is required if judicial bodies established internationally are to be 
considered legitimate, a critical requirement in absence of supranational 
enforcement mechanisms. 
It is worth noting that legalism is both a tool of critical political analysis 
and a concept that has been reinterpreted by subsequent scholars and publicists 
as representing formalism as well as a distinctively liberal virtue.568 Reviews 
published following the initial appearance of Legalism certainly did not mistake 
Shklar’s argument as its opposite, as seems to have occurred in recent years. The 
problem of legalism as a scholarly attitude unattuned to the political significance 
of law’s social role was then greeted with philosophical skepticism—a 
contribution to the Philosophical Review dismissed Shklar’s views as “not, even 
on the most latitudinarian construction, those of a philosopher,”569 and another, 
written by Tokyo prosecutor Joseph Keenan’s occasional co-author, Brendan 
Brown, accused Shklar of engaging in moral relativism, and failing to distinguish 
human dignity from that of a baboon.570 There was, as well, the occasional 
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expression of praise for having raised an important albeit difficult political and 
philosophical question.571 Shklar’s characteristic queasiness with absolutes572 was 
already apparent in her 1964 analysis of law, politics, and political trials. She was 
skeptical of the utopias she grappled with early on in her career,573 but beyond 
the more obvious kinds of political extremes typically derided in the cold war 
context, Shklar was also critical of the “Athens-worship” for which she faulted 
Hannah Arendt,574 and unimpressed with her friend Michael Walzer’s 
idealization of communities and informal interest groups,575 views she found to 
be perfectly consistent with intolerance, injustice, and indeed cruelty. It is 
precisely her dispositional skepticism, as well as her meticulous care to read and 
convey with unusual charity her sources that make Shklar’s work so complex and 
valuable, but at the same time challenging for the reader, who is inspired to 
consider her arguments with commensurate care. Though Legalism’s erudite 
inquiry into the manner in which the legal field attempts to insulate itself from 
politics and struggles with morals proved to be provocative, it did not stand for a 
crude triumphalism of Western, liberal justice.  
Shklar’s skepticism is key to understanding her approach to the problem 
of legalism. Self-described as a natural, painless skeptic, Shklar found that 
Rousseau, who she credited for providing her with both “political imagination 
and a second education,” expressed a revealing discomfort with doubt. She 	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preferred the skepticism and indeed the legalistic protection of individual 
autonomy defended by Montesquieu.576 What was seemingly a “continuing 
revelation” in Rousseau’s struggle with skepticism was the contrast presented by 
Montesquieu: classical liberalism, as Shklar conceived of it, required a decent 
dose of doubting, an “unconventional view,” as she defined skepticism in the late 
1980s, “of accepted social beliefs.”577 But skepticism, for Shklar, is more than 
that; it is an epistemic reaction to disastrous events in human history that leads 
to question what we know, and how we can know it, demanded by the failure of 
knowledge to avert the human catastrophes of war and extreme suffering. Not to 
be confused with the pyrrhonism against which she cautioned post-
Enlightenment historians,578 and with which she generally had little patience,579 
this skepticism is intimately related to Shklar’s inquiry into the legalistic ethos, as 
it is explicitly doubts, in the post war context, “the moral relevance of the normal 
system of justice.”580 
“The great skeptics,” observed Shklar in her discussion of the idea of 
injustice in the works of Plato, Cicero, St. Augustine and Montaigne, “doubted 
that law-governed judgments could achieve their aims, because we simply cannot 
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know enough about men or events to fulfill the demands of justice.”581 The 
burden of history thus leads to the necessary acknowledgement of the modesty 
with which skeptics must view the sources of law and practices of the judiciary. 
There is more, and worse. Alongside Montaigne, with whose Essays Shklar began 
engaging in earnest when examining the myths and illusions of American history 
and political thought,582 Shklar explored the contention that trusting rules could 
make us too sure, arrogant, even cruel and tyrannical; that beyond the failure of 
what she called “normal justice” to achieve justice, it could actually promote 
harshness and social sclerosis by being delusionally overconfident in its 
abilities.583 
The critical discussion of legalism did not begin with Shklar; Hans 
Morgenthau’s 1946 Scientific Man and Power Politics raises the liberal lawyer’s 
blind faith in the normative superiority of her profession, and the naïve extension 
of the success of domestic law, in particular American law, in providing order to 
the sphere of international relations, the result of an “orgy of idealism.”584 For 
Morgenthau, this view was inherently liberal, a reflection of the Enlightenment’s 
quest for the universal axiom, which among academic lawyers, was amplified by 
the belief that international litigation and legislation could serve—and better than 
any other means, as it indubitably had domestically—the cause of peace. That 
those other means meant primarily the messy business of politics—something to 
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be obviated entirely by the legalists’ attempts to render international conflict 
rational and calculable—was a fundamental, though unacknowledged insight in 
Shklar’s legalism. For her, as for Morgenthau, the idea that politics would 
somehow be inferior to law, rather than the area of human relations of which law 
is a subset, was not only delusional in that it was grossly inaccurate, but actually 
deleterious, in that wholesale reliance on something as fragile as international 
law, to be enforced by something as vague as the international community—the 
existence of which Shklar stoutly denied585—and on its “spurious analogies” of 
“dueness” and punishment, could not lead to peace. Morgenthau was far more 
direct in his critique of the influence of legalism on foreign relations. “For here,” 
he wrote, referring to states’ inability to learn the lessons of 1914, “our first appeal 
is always to the law and to the lawyer, and since the questions which the law and 
the lawyer can answer are largely irrelevant to the fundamental issues of which 
the peace and welfare of nations depend, our last appeal is always to the 
general.”586 The 2011 misguided military intervention in Libya, meant to enforce 
the novel international legal doctrine of “responsibility to protect,” hardly proves 
Morgenthau incorrect on that count.  
Shklar’s only acknowledgement of Morgenthau is to classify him among 
the realists who commit in her view the related ideological error of insisting that 
history, politics, morality and law be confined to separate and isolated spheres. 
Furthermore, Shklar, though finding the realists’ rejection of legalism “sensible 	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enough,”587 considers nonetheless that their project is ideological, first for their 
reliance on the “national interest” as something that can be discerned, calculated, 
and obeyed; and second as a result of the realist dislike for liberalism, “largely 
because the latter failed.”588 Shklar’s insight regarding the conceit of calculability 
strikingly presents a mirror image of Morgenthau’s critique of liberal legalism. 
Shklar details how realism’s hostility to hypocrisy led to the search for a pure 
politics, and cites in particular Carl Schmitt’s conception of power as a unique 
and separate phenomenon. This political pedigree could hardly be further from 
the work of the classical realists Shklar was discussing, among whom was George 
Kennan, also not particularly known for any interest in the work of the Nazis’ 
“crown jurist.” And much like Shklar, Morgenthau expressed a clear objection to 
Schmitt’s unmooring of politics from the moral order, which in its logical extreme 
invited the pure politics that could discard the totality of Western thought and 
lead to German fascist brutality.589 Not all realists, then, should be understood as 
Schmittian separationists.  
Shklar nonetheless drew a prescient connection, as critical legal 
scholarship far to the left on the political spectrum of Schmitt’s fascist leanings 
has reengaged Schmitt’s work of late.590 So, too has E.H. Carr’s very similar 
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critique of international law found its way into critical legal scholarship.591 Shklar 
acknowledges that the classical realists of her period are anything but fascists. 
They are, rather, she writes, “despairing liberals all.”592 In the case of 
Morgenthau, she might have added that they were despairing—or at least 
justifiably disappointed—legalists, as well.  
The problem of legalism is not merely, however, a problem of the all or 
nothing thinking of the type Shklar attributes to lawyers. While it is fair to point 
out that legal theory has devoted what may seem for the political theorist to be an 
inordinate amount of intellectual resources to establishing the criteria that would 
determine whether a true system of justice exists—perhaps best illustrated by the 
passion and acrimony generated by the storied positivist/natural law debate 
between H.L. Hart and Lon Fuller, skillfully analyzed by Shklar593 though her 
analysis was deemed “caricatural” by at least one contemporaneous reviewer594—
the existence or not of law, a debate that Shklar rightly pointed out was 
unnecessarily artificial and did not serve in any meaningful way the social 
concerns that such theories purport to deal with,595 is really not the main 
problem occupying working lawyers or informed legal observers today. Legalism 
does indeed unnecessarily narrow the study of legal theory and empty it of its 
political content, but contemporary legalism is best understood when distinctions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Nikolas M. Rajkovic, “‘Global law’ and Governmentality: Reconceptualizing the ‘Rule of Law’ as 
Rule ‘Through’ Law,” European Journal of International Relations, 20 (10),(2010) 1-24. 
592 Legalism, 125. 
593 Legalism, 107-110. 
594 H. A. Bedau, “Review,” The Philosophical Review, 76,  (1) (Jan., 1967), 129-130, 130. 
595 The point is also made approvingly by Francis Aumann, in one of the rare positive reviews of 
Legalism immediately following its publication: Francis R. Aumann, “Review,” The Journal of 
Politics, 27 (3) (Aug., 1965),  703-705, 705. 
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are drawn between domestic law and its international counterpart. Law’s power 
over the American imagination and political identity hardly requires belaboring; 
noticed early on by Tocqueville596 and today provocatively framed by some as a 
form of religious observance for the foundational document that is the United 
States’ constitution, the idea of law looms large in the American liberal 
imagination.  
 
Legalism in the Trenches 
Whether the idea of law in America is theological rather than institutional 
or political, or merely a matter of habit is beside the point when the focus is 
shifted to international law. To debate the “thereness” of law in a domestic liberal 
jurisdiction can indeed be seen as a politically absurd pastime: it is very much 
there, inasmuch as “there” assumes an institutional framework, enforcement, 
and above all, the political legitimacy that ensures precisely the type of equal 
treatment and universal application, or at least its legitimate expectation, that 
liberals consider the law to embody, at minimum. In domestic law, despite the 
system’s failure to always live up to this ideal—and it is readily identified as an 
ideal inasmuch as a society is scandalized in those relatively rare instances that it 
demonstrates its shortcomings—democratic institutions and law seek 
nonetheless to attain it. The situation in international law stands in stark 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 "The spirit of the law, born within schools and courts, spreads little by little beyond them; it 
infiltrates through society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally the whole people have 
contracted some of the ways and tastes of a magistrate." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Laurence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1840).  
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contrast. There the liberal view, already complex and not always subject to 
perfect consensus over meaning or exact commitments, is not reflected in judicial 
institutions that, as the liberal view of justice requires, would hold all states 
equally to the same standards and obligations, under some kind of penalty meted 
out in proportion to an offence, and nothing else. This very basic, indeed crude 
idea of law, as demanding equal subjection, application, and enforcement, is a 
political one, and its politics are undeniably liberal. Viewed in this manner, to say 
that an international “law-like body” is illegal, that its legality is dubious, or as 
Shklar would have it, “not there,” is in fact a political claim: it states that an 
institution is not legal in the sense that it does not possess the minimal attributes 
of justice on a liberal account. This is most evident in criminal law, where the 
political commitment to freedom, to be subordinated only to a rational, 
predetermined procedure, and only following the commission of an offence 
ostensibly to some principle critical to the maintenance of civil society, takes on 
the harder and more formal attributes of legalism. Yet the value of freedom—
from which flows the principle of legality and the presumption of innocence—is at 
root a political concept. Shklar makes much of lawyers’ purported obliviousness 
to politics, but she ignores the fact that working lawyers—no doubt to be 
distinguished from legal theorists—are the artisans of applied political theory, 
whether they are aware of it or not.597 When the basic principles that permit 
working lawyers to carry out their function such as the presumption of innocence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 For the opposite view of the distinction between the manner in which lawyers, on the one 
hand, and theorists, on the other, approach the idea of law, see Terry Nardin, “Theorising the 
International Rule of Law,” Review of International Studies (2008), 34, 385–401, 386. In 
Nardin’s view, lawyers employ the law in a merely instrumental manner, while theorists seek to 
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or the other safeguards to freedom that flow from it are not there, lawyers will 
point to illegality, and not to the absence of “decent politics.” That is a result of 
their training, or their ideological legalism perhaps, but it is worth mentioning 
that in such a case what is being complained of is less a deficiency in the 
“thereness” of the law than the fact that some kind of body has the power to 
deprive individuals of freedom: if it can do that, then for the lawyer it is “there” 
enough to worry about. If it can do so without observing those formalized rules 
that emerged from political norms concerning individual freedom, the working 
lawyer’s objection is in itself a defense of decent politics, as Shklar understood 
them. The very barebones liberalism of fear developed by Shklar has the rule of 
law as its first principle, and she observes that one half of the Bill of Rights is 
about fair trials and the protection of the defendant in a political trial, adding that 
without these protections “no one has a chance.”598  
Thus, it seems legitimate for Morgenthau and Shklar to caution against the 
enthusiastic precipitation to adopt international legal institutions, as if their 
legality (or legalist trappings) could ipso facto succeed in guaranteeing order and 
peace all the while protecting liberty, as understood by the liberal forms of 
justice, as in domestic law. The critique of lawyers’ objections to the illegality of 
international bodies or the irregularity of their proceedings, however, undercuts 
something very crucial in the liberal commitment to freedom. When Shklar 
formulates the creative potential of legalism as one that can promote decent 
politics, it is surely worth trying to distinguish between a politically decent 	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political system, and whether an individual’s freedom can be, in a wholly sui 
generis manner, subordinated to decent politics, whatever, in passing, those 
might actually consist of. If it is somehow conservative and a defense of the status 
quo for lawyers to understand  “decent politics” to mean some recognized legal 
procedure that does not sacrifice an individual’s liberty for whatever pedagogical 
purpose, no matter how grand, so be it. However, in practice, and certainly in 
criminal law, it is the hue and cry of the mob for the blood the designated 
transgressor that has always represented conservatism, and reflected precisely 
the kind of action fuelled by fear that Shklar found elsewhere the most 
deleterious to the tolerance demanded of liberalism.599 And it is the defense 
lawyers’ principled refusal to permit mob rule—whether within or without 
legalistic support—at times invoking an established rule, and therefore arguably 
relying on the status quo—but more often seeking more humane interpretations 
of rules, on the basis of supralegal, be they constitutional or jurisprudential 
principles that any student of politics would recognize as political and 
philosophers as moral in nature. Working lawyers are thus very much alert to 
politics and to morality; that they invoke these principles in legal terms may have 
less to do with their ideological paralysis than the nature of the institutions in 
which they participate. The problem of “thereness,” for working lawyers, then, is 
radically different from that which occupies academics: “thereness” for a defense 
attorney is established by the legitimate use of handcuffs and a potential sentence 
of imprisonment for a client. For this actor of international justice, hearing that a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Ibid., see, too, Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 145-147. 
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law-like body is perfectly legal and not at all political will either create 
expectations of commensurate due process, or will generate opposition and 
outrage if in fact the body demonstrates a primary commitment to international 
politics promoting the interests of powerful states. Does this show a kind of 
rigidity in lawyers, and does it prove that legalism is indeed a narrow-minded, 
conservative ideology, bent at all costs on preserving the status quo? What of the 
“decent politics” that political trials can accommodate? As for the lawyers, 
untrained as political actors, in particular when they are expected to play the role 
of the jurist in a legal trial when what it really at stake is an exercise in political 
pedagogy or an experiment in international relations, decent politics generally 
ought not employ them as pawns in another exercise altogether. Once the body, 
the charter, or the covenant is promulgated and established, it is unfair to the 
lawyer to blame her for assuming that it is indeed “there.” And once it is there, for 
a lawyer, it means—and this, too, is a manifestation of legalism—that a norm is 
inevitably created that guarantees equality and supersedes power.600 Hence, the 
traditional distinction between, for instance, recourse to the Security Council, 
and an appeal to the International Court of Justice, where no great power veto 
exists.601 The expectation is precisely that politics will not intrude upon the 
settlement of a legal question, and that if it must, as any lawyer with any 
experience knows that it inevitably will on occasion, it will not be dispositive of 
the issue at hand. That type of result will be deemed illegal—contrary to law—but 	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also politically defective.  
Working international criminal lawyers may demonstrate some naïve 
nostalgia for the pristine, apolitical justice of their domestic jurisdictions, 
understandably forgetting in the midst of trials meant to pursue liberal ideals 
that often end up doing so in illiberal ways, that their own municipal law often 
strains liberal principles. What seems different, as observed in Darryl Robinson’s 
excellent analysis of international criminal law’s struggle with its Jeckyll and 
Hyde relationship to liberalism, is that when what we can loosely call liberal 
states legislate in ways that do violence to those liberal principles that Shklar 
includes in the most minimal conception of legalism, as they have in the post 
September 11th world, these changes do not occur without objection, debate, and 
the sense that something has been sacrificed.602 In other words, at home, it is 
clear that something has been lost. In international trials, that sense of loss is 
harder to come by. The attempt to deny and obviate politics is so actively pursued 
by international courts that the political understanding of sacrifice, however 
intuitive in a domestic jurisdiction, is often foreclosed, or denied. 
This is what might be deemed a form of organic legalism, one that posits 
that inherent in the nature of any liberal understanding of law is the fundamental 
understanding that issues between parties will not be resolved by politics, but 
solely upon evaluation of the evidence and in accordance with rules of evidence, 
procedure, and pursuant to the law. For working lawyers it is simply impossible 	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to perform any professional duty outside this type of understanding; indeed, 
unless a trial is explicitly acknowledged as being political, a lawyer attempting to 
engage in “political,” or extra-legal advocacy will cause a disservice to her client’s 
interests, risk being shunned by her peers for having violated professional norms, 
and no longer enjoy the reputation of being a “normal” lawyer. Political advocacy 
in effect removes the lawyer from the realm of what is understood to be his 
function.  
Shklar’s legalism, when viewed as a conservative inability to think of law 
as a subset of politics within a nuanced continuum of political value, puts lawyers 
in a bind. Of course lawyers conceive of politics, whether in the legislative process 
or in the political leanings of prosecutors and judges. But it is a concern, and not 
an embrace, and in this respect Shklar is correct to pinpoint legalism as, if not an 
ideology, at least a mindset that does in the context of the law itself, privilege rule 
following to what is indeed the messy business of politics.  
That kind of legalism is simply that of legitimate expectations. Lawyers 
deploy their trade in courts, and courts, in turn, are meant to eschew the political. 
That is what makes them courts. But another form of legalism, that which 
internationally, in particular, insists on its pure, unmitigated legal provenance, 
procedure, objectives and form, when in fact its creation and objectives cannot be 
considered purely judicial—for example because it is created by the Security 
Council of the United Nations, like the ad hoc courts for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, or because not all states accept to hold their nationals subject to the 
body, such as in the case of the International Criminal Court—deserve scrutiny 
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here. Shklar may not have envisaged these types of bodies in her examination of 
legalism as a creative force in the service of decent politics and the elimination of 
bellicose expansionism and fascism through law. What seems to be the object of 
some consensus, however, is that bodies such as these do insist on their legality; 
advocates and opponents alike of the international criminal legal agenda point to 
the ICC’s “legalism” and sometimes to its quintessential legalism. That insistence 
on perfect legality in cases where politics are evident (and often not denied by 
anyone except individuals acting within the tribunal setting and some engagé 
academics) is the legalism that today deserves examination. Why, indeed, is it 
essential to claim that international tribunals maintain an absolute absence of 
politics when these are evident, both from the very nature of international 
relations and by the purposes of the bodies themselves? And why, if the 
promulgation of decent politics is nothing to be ashamed of, should those 
ostensibly valid political objectives be shielded from view by those most actively 
participating in their enforcement? It may be that judges, tribunal 
administrators, and international prosecutors are as blind to politics as those 
academic lawyers Shklar chided in Legalism. This, however, though perhaps 
correct in some cases, seems unlikely as a general claim. What appears as a more 
plausible alternative is that Shklar’s attempt to provoke the legal community into 
acknowledging the limits of the law and the reality of politics in the judicial realm 
failed in a spectacular manner; that law remains, as is the epitome of certainly the 
American character, as fetichized and glorified as it has ever been, in particular 
since the end of the cold war. Politics, and what is seen, more than ever, as its 
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ugly and developmentally disabled cousin, power, are today too tasteless to even 
mention; what is described as the international community instead considers that 
it acts solely on principle, as expressed through legitimate legal institutions. That 
politics indeed operate here, even if they are occasionally explicitly mentioned 
and lauded for the positive aims of, say, establishing definitive political 
accounts,603 putting an end to impunity, or effecting political catharsis604 is in the 
current context unmentionable. This is legalism and a real legalism of ideology 
writ large: law in effect redeems then entirely obviates politics, as the idea that 
politics is a messy business remains unabated. Internationally, the idea of politics 
as reflecting a form of popular sovereignty, or a liberal view of democracy, 
cannot, despite great efforts genuinely yet hold. Not all states share these 
commitments, but all seek—or at least wish to be seen as seeking—resolution of 
international, and in some instances arguably strictly national, when the nation is 
a foreign one, disputes and punishment of international crimes through non-
political means and specifically legal fora. Thus, international legalism relies on 
the idea that law, as a vehicle for international relations, is unimpeachable, as 
only it rises above politics and generates results that secure consensus. This is not 
the legalism of lawyers seeking to separate the legal order from the moral or the 
political, this is a political legalism that denies its political provenance and 
objectives, in the interests of credibility and international support. International 
legalism demonstrates the current fear of international politics, and the current 	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distaste for bargaining, debate and disagreement. Not much has changed, in that 
respect—though arguably the situation has deteriorated—since Shklar observed 
that same attitude towards political arrangements in international relations after 
the Second World War.605 
Lawyers working before international law-like bodies are enlisted with 
tremendous ease in the pursuit of today’s international legalism. As the deterrent 
effect of Socrates’ trial and execution calmed the ardors of political theorists ever 
since, so, too, have the outraged reactions to political defenses, in particular that 
of Slobodan Milosevic,606 incited lawyers to stick very closely to their strictly 
legalist training. And if self-policing did not suffice, the ICTY’s Directive on the 
Assignment of Counsel only deems lawyers eligible to act as defense counsel if 
they have not engaged in conduct, professionally or ‘‘otherwise’’ that is ‘‘likely to 
diminish public confidence in the International Tribunal (...) or otherwise bring 
the International Tribunal into disrepute.”607 Lawyers at the ICTR have been 
sanctioned for complaining that the body was a political court, and that is 
precisely what it means to “diminish public confidence in a tribunal,” or to bring 
it “into disrepute.” This does not prevent tribunal employees or diplomatic 
representatives of all stripes from making political statements about the 	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tribunals’ successes: it only prohibits characterizing those statements, and that 
particular approach to law, as political. 
Academic efforts have also been invested into demonstrating that defense 
lawyers do not view the ad hoc bodies as “political.”608 Jenia Iontcheva Turner’s 
empirical study of international criminal defense lawyers’ attitudes somewhat 
idiosyncratically construes Shklar’s Legalism as defending the proposition that 
political trials establish definitive historical accounts of events (an idea that 
horrifies decent historians everywhere),609 and prevent revisionism, as well as the 
idea that due process would also prove too narrow in international criminal 
law.610 While each of these claims reveals a poor grasp of Shklar’s global 
argument, the last is by far the worst offender, for nowhere does Shklar make 
such a claim: the narrowness she complains of in Turner’s reference is explicitly 
conceptual and refers, in the context of the argument, to the manner in which 
legalism, as an ideology, is too inflexible to grasp its own creative potential.611 The 
problems for Shklar are not the constraints of fair procedures and individual 
culpability, as she was an ardent supporter of those very safeguards, but arise in 
the context of the legalists’ self-serving belief that law’s validity, and indeed 
superiority, is attributable to its hermetic separation from politics.612 How to 
express the irony of Turner’s misapprehension in light of Gary Jonathan Bass’s 
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book, Stay the Hand of Vengeance,613 that develops a theory of due process 
liberalism on the polar opposite interpretation of Shklar’s Legalism? However 
unconvincing Bass’s treatment of liberal states’ propensity to establish war 
crimes tribunals, how “faddish”614 his attempt to loosely attach his argument to 
democratic peace theory, or how questionable it is to enlist Shklar, the notorious 
skeptic, in hegemonic-sounding claims of liberal virtue, at least to his credit, he 
does not portray Shklar as an opponent of due process.  
 The greater irony is perhaps that Turner’s project ends up doing precisely 
what Shklar was deriding when she wrote about “legalism’s traditional pieties,” as 
the study reports that a robust majority of defense lawyers before both the ICTY 
and ICTR do not see the tribunals or their proceedings as political. The world can 
heave a sigh of relief; the emperor is fully clothed. It may not be clear to academic 
lawyers or to most political scientists deprived of the joys and pains of legal 
practice that it is fairly impossible for a defense lawyer actively involved in a 
criminal case (as those polled in Turner’s study were)—much less when the 
accused is charged with offences as grave as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and violations of the Geneva Conventions—not to convince herself that the 
evidence, her legal arguments, and the quality of her court performance 
(objections, cross-examinations, and the defense presented) does not have a 
decent chance of leading to an acquittal. No serious attorney presents a defense 
doomed to fail. More importantly, the idea that success can be secured, precisely 	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because the procedure is legal, rather than political, is essential to a defense 
lawyer, and without it she should not, and generally cannot, participate as an 
advocate in a criminal trial. Thus Turner’s results can hardly be deemed 
surprising or reassure anyone that if those hardest nuts to crack—the defense 
lawyers—believe the proceedings to be legal rather than political, then they must 
be exclusively legal. Attorneys in the midst of a high-pressure case are in general 
the least qualified to pronounce on the political nature of a court. Indeed, they 
have the most to gain from its strict adherence to the principles of legality. As 
Shklar wrote much later, adherents to legalism generally believe that with a 
normal system of law, injustices will be rare.615 Conversely, in order to believe 
that injustice will not be committed in a particular case, it is easy to convince 
oneself that in fact a normal system of justice is in place. 
Legalism is a critique of a closed moral and professional system that in 
denying its political provenance and power, in particular when faced with 
genuinely political questions, offers nothing beyond its own internal norms of 
conduct. But it is also a potential creative force. Its iteration as a formalist 
defense of an accused is not inconsistent with Shklar’s liberalism of fear,616 and 
argues in favor of those very fundamental safeguards, say an independent 
judiciary, without which no system of Rule of Law can be said to exist.617  
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Both kinds of legalism are ideological, in a very weak sense, simply 
referring, as Shklar intended, to political preferences.618 The first legalism denies 
that it prefers anything but the law, which is by definition sealed off from politics, 
and cannot ever therefore amount to a political preference. Any and all conflicts 
can be solved by recourse to the existing law, and adjudication provides clear, 
unambiguous, and legitimate answers to difficult problems. The second legalism, 
the potential creative force, illustrates itself not only, as argued here, in those 
quintessentially classical liberal defenses of individual freedom against the state 
or international criminal apparatus, but in the value of the trials themselves.  
 
Legalism and the Emergence of International Criminal Law 
It is by now well established that despite previous well-meaning attempts, 
international criminal trials tasked with the prosecution of individuals only 
emerged with the Nuremberg Tribunal following the Nazi defeat after the Second 
World War.619 Historical attempts to try Napoleon or Kaiser Wilhelm had 
failed,620 confronted by international law’s most enduring (and possibly 
intractable) problem, that is its continued existence in a virtual state of nature, 
without a supervening authority capable of pronouncing judicially and enforcing 
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its authority against individual states exercising sovereignty.621 Though this state 
of affairs did not genuinely change after the Second World War, and the formal 
arrangement of states remained one of anarchy, political will emerged strongly 
among the victorious Allied states to establish “law-like political institutions”622 
to prosecute the Nazi leadership (as well as the Japanese) for the waging of 
aggressive war and for a newly promulgated offense called “Crimes against 
Humanity.” Shklar recognized—much to the dismay of those most committed to 
the legalist nature of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials—that the policy to try 
individuals was not a purely legal endeavor, emerging fully-formed from 
nowhere: it was a result of politics, meant to promote decent political aims. 
Shklar’s 1964 Legalism examines the unexplored tensions (and indeed the 
paradoxes and conflicts) that were apparent in these trials. Seen in a purely 
legalist light, they could be said to enjoy great international legitimacy, but that 
very same legalism paradoxically contributed to the erosion of the credibility of 
courts trying offenses that were not (at least technically) crimes at the time of 
their commission. And indeed, despite the establishment of the United Nations, 
not a single international criminal prosecution was carried out until after the cold 
war was over, with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia in 1993.623 Thus, it cannot be said that Nuremberg left a 
truly legalist legacy in its wake: the cold war, witness to many large-scale 
atrocities and undeniably prosecutable war crimes, appeared to promote the 
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interests of the two superpowers more than it did the pursuit of an international 
criminal policy agenda. As Geoffrey Best put it, as late as in 1984, Nuremberg was 
“but a beacon behind us, growing ever fainter.”624  
This is not only because there was still no supranational authority that 
could compel states (but most crucially the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) to submit to a 
judicial authority, but on broader philosophical grounds. Shklar contended that 
Nuremberg should be seen as the political conclusion of a kind of politics 
(Nazism and fascism) and of a kind of war (World War II). Viewed in that light, 
Nuremberg could never stand as a precedent (legal or otherwise) but as a sui 
generis resolution of an ideological war of elimination—on both sides—which 
demanded the corresponding elimination, albeit by legal, or at least legalistic 
means, of its defeated leadership.625 The trial was thus a political act, “a powerful 
inspiration to the legalistic ethos,”626 as opposed to a truly legal endeavor that 
could be referred to as having somehow modified the substance and much less 
the nature of international law. The value of Nuremberg was not, argues Shklar, 
that it recognized the legal force of the Hague Conventions or anything else; it 
was that Nazi political behavior—and specifically what it consisted of—as well as 
the fact that the allies, however disproportionate were the military means they 
employed, say in the fire-bombing of Dresden, were not comparable to the 
atrocities committed by the Nazis. These actions could thus be the object of 
international political pedagogy, rather than constituting any kind of legal 	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precedent. Furthermore, despite the important symbolic contribution of 
Nuremberg to the collective conscience, its sister tribunal, Tokyo, did not benefit 
from such symbolic clarity. One need simply write the name of the German city 
that housed the International Military Trial to evoke the triumph of Western-
style law over vengeance, then barbarity and indeed evil. In Tokyo, the political 
lessons made out with such eloquence against the Nazi leadership hardly could 
have convinced the Japanese. They did not even persuade all the judges, and the 
dissent of Indian judge Radhabinod Pal in particular illustrates how different 
Tokyo was.627 First, the “clean hands” of the Allies were much less apparent than 
in Nuremberg. As Bruno Simma noted: “Auschwitz was singularly German, and 
none of the offences committed by the Japanese political and military leaders 
came even close.”628 Judge Pal was revolted that the Americans would try Japan 
for war crimes and crimes against Humanity after Hiroshima and Nagasaki: and 
indeed, such outrageous hypocrisy629 not only distinguished the lesson of 
Nuremberg from Tokyo’s “political catastrophe,” but it served to diminish the 
legal credibility of both bodies, when taken together. Second, argues Shklar, but 
far less compellingly, Japan lacked the culture of legalism630 that was a feature of 
German institutions—and, one might add, fairly evident in German intellectual 
production from Immanuel Kant to Hans Kelsen, and Max Weber in between—
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and which Nuremberg reignited.631 Furthermore, Joseph Keenan’s insistence on 
arguing on the basis of just war theory, and his claim that it, as well as the natural 
law he deemed appropriate to frame as the basis of the prosecution, were 
universal as they flowed from Judeo-Christian civilization, were ultimately an 
embarrassment, the polar opposite of Nuremberg’s much vaunted legacy. The 
lack of legitimacy of at least one of the two institutions diminished chances of 
compliance following the end of the post-war proceedings.  
Shklar’s approach answers Richard Falk’s query as to “why sovereign 
states should have been ever willing to validate such a subversive idea as that of 
international criminal accountability of leaders for war crimes.” This validation, 
pursued Falk, only made sense “if the imposition of accountability is understood 
to be a particularly advantageous response to a given geopolitical challenge 
whose wider implications can be avoided.”632  And for America, the wider 
implications continue to be avoided, indeed. 
Legalism was meant as a conceptual device serving precisely to illustrate 
the necessity of political will in the emergence of international criminal law. With 
the establishment of two ad hoc institutions trying individuals by the United 
Nations Security Council, as well as the nascent International Criminal Court (of 
which the U.S. is not a member state, and whose jurisdiction it continues to 
oppose, on the exceptionalist basis that the United States, does not commit 
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aggression),633 legalism continues to provide a challenge both to the view that 
legal bodies can (or should) solve everything internationally, and that it could be 
politically decent not to try.  
 
Legalism, International Politics, and the Politics of Memory 
It is possible to doubt the transformative effects of international norms. 
Particularly in international politics, when legalism clashes with the demands of 
politics, prudence may guide national leaders toward the latter. As Stephen 
Krastner has observed, in an international environment in which “there are many 
demands, multiple norms, power asymmetries, and no authoritative decision-
making structures,” states are socialized to international norms imperfectly.634  
Besides the variance in state norms, and the absence of authoritative 
decision-making structures, there is the more important fact of the absence of 
international enforcement power; this, argues Eric Posner, makes international 
law “unavoidably weak.”635 Posner considers international law not as what Shklar 
would characterize as something that is “there,” but rather as a collective action 
problem, to be conceived of and grasped with the tools of rational choice theory. 
Posner’s “legalism,” like that of many contemporary thinkers, suffers from 	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serving merely as a straw man—or at best an extra—in support of what is the 
author’s actual theory. Posner’s association of rational choice theory to a classical 
realist framework to analyze international law is not without a great deal of 
appeal. State interests and the (still) anarchical distribution of power 
internationally constitute a lucid, and therefore helpful way of looking at 
international law. However, what is missing in Posner’s otherwise excellent 
critique is perhaps the nuance in thinking, that continuum developed by Shklar 
between the legal and the political extremes, incorporating morality, and the 
understanding that—as legal theorists like Martti Koskenniemi have done—the 
new “ethical turn” in international legalism, that recourse to morality (or rather 
moralization) at the expense of law, best exemplified by the self-consciously 
“illegal but legitimate” NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, while presenting an 
alternative to formalized legalism, may serve hegemonic politics, and is 
profoundly conservative in nature. In turn, the obsession to formalize political 
problems (what I have called “international legalism”), while, as writes 
Koskenniemi, “understandable in historical perspective, enlists political energies 
to support causes dictated by the hegemonic powers and is unresponsive to the 
violence and injustice that sustain the global everyday.”636 
Another way to examine the post cold war international landscape would 
be to analyze degrees of legalism, while attempting to respect democratic 
(political) choices made by different societies along a continuum ranging from 
international regimes demanding formal accountability and retribution, to 	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collective political responsibility and reconciliation.637 The realization of social 
peace in post-conflict states is often owed to the decision to defer immediate 
justice to political negotiations.638 Moreover, the deterrent effect of justice can be 
significantly limited when a society is trapped in a perverse-equilibrium—a 
situation in which individuals are unwilling to stop abusive practices unless 
everyone credibly commits to ending them.639 Overcoming these challenges often 
requires providing amnesties, and bargaining with key leaders of the previous 
regime who otherwise may be inclined to derail the process of post-conflict 
institution building. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
and the amnesties granted by Spain in order to confront its fascist past—of 
interest in light of Spain’s attempts to prosecute Augusto Pinochet despite newly 
democratic Chile’s political decision to grant him immunity as a senator640—
constitute recent examples of non-legalistic approaches to addressing problems 
of political transition.  
It is precisely in cases of political transition—known somewhat hopefully 
as “democratic transitions”—that Shklar’s arguments in Legalism have been 
deployed the most disconcertingly. Mark Osiel, for instance, argues that an 
expansion of Shklar’s work demands a defense of the liberal show trial, 	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“monumental spectacles,” he writes, with no apparent sign of irony; “yarns,” 
“narratives,” and “stories” that would require prosecutors to familiarize 
themselves with the local conventions of narrative genres641 (it is assumed, 
apparently, that prosecutors will be English-language readers of Osiel’s work sent 
to far-away locales where the indigenous storytelling will be unfamiliar to them). 
Osiel means this for the sake of establishing—or rekindling—liberalism’s great 
virtues in societies recovering from what he calls “administrative massacres,” and 
discouraging the vices that that threaten liberalism most of all. The worst of these 
vices, Osiel offers, is cruelty, curiously failing to acknowledge Shklar, whose best 
known work, Ordinary Vices, loosely inspired by Montaigne’s Essays, is precisely 
devoted to an erudite examination of vices in liberal societies, and concludes that 
cruelty is the one that liberalism must foremost eschew to preserve its nature.642 
But Osiel seeks something else entirely. In contrast to the kind of tolerance that 
Shklar defended throughout her career, Osiel seeks a wholesale modification of 
collective memory in communities affected by massacres, and argues that this be 
done—in the pursuit of liberal virtues—through the use of gripping narratives and 
“vivid yarns,” spun not around campfires, but in courtrooms, in real criminal 
cases where individuals’ freedom—Osiel seems to momentarily forget just how 
crucial this is to liberalism—is a stake. Acknowledging—as surely he must—that 
some lawyers might cringe (the term seems weak) at the idea, Osiel nonetheless 
offers that interesting narratives, despite the risk, by promoting appeal to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641 Mark J. Osiel, “In Defense of Liberal Show Trials-Nuremberg and Beyond,” in Perspectives on 
the Nuremberg Trial, Guénaël Mettraux, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 704, 704-
709. 
642 Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
	   226	  
sentiments of the general public, that they could compromise the historical 
record, are useful in creating the decent politics of the sort Shklar thought 
justified at Nuremberg. Osiel’s goal is pedagogical, but one is hard-pressed to find 
a compelling reason why schools could not teach these heroic stories to inculcate 
the virtues of liberalism and the condemnation of its vices, rather than 
instrumentalizing courts and judicial procedures, and thus perverting those very 
liberal values in so doing. What is liberalism if it requires state-sponsored history 
to create a consensus of sentiment? Something surely much unlike liberalism, 
indeed. In Osiel’s liberalism of consensus, history fares not much better. He 
defends his use of socially salubrious court-made myths on the basis that the 
legal system is accustomed tolerating competing narratives. He concludes that 
“courts may legitimately tailor the stories they tell in order to persuade skeptical 
publics of the merits of liberal morality. But they may not exclude incompatible 
stories from public hearing.”643  Osiel’s idea is that historians can eventually—
because in a liberal society they are entitled to differ—offer narratives that 
diverge from the official legal version of history. One is challenged whether to be 
first struck by his grandiose naiveté or by the Orwellian flavor of this social 
proposal. 
Legalism, when cast as a potentially creative force promoting decent 
politics can acknowledge that some politics inevitably promote specific interests, 
and in many cases, those are the interests of the powerful to the detriment of the 
weak. Moral arguments are only as solid as the facts that support them, and 	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where legality—if not legalism— provide protection against idiosyncratic actions 
of a potentially unjust and politically tragic nature, committed often by the most 
powerful, is in evaluating evidence, in what legalists of the organic type hope at 
least will be a dispassionate manner. As Koskennemi puts it, “against the 
particularity of the ethical decision, formalism constitutes a horizon of 
universality, embedded in a culture of restraint, a commitment to listening to 
others' claims and seeking to take them into account.”644 Saying it does not make 
it so, and for all the weaknesses of legalism, at least it cherishes the idea of 
considering all sides of an argument, as stated in the legal maxim audi alteram 
partem. Legalism’s formality may be impossible to effect as a result of the nature 
of international relations,645 or its time may simply be past;646 if this is true it 
ought not, however, discourage the self-reflexivity required of all those who 
deploy their efforts in the trenches or on the margins of international law, in 
particular those involved in international criminal trials. The all-or-nothing 
thinking, may, as Shklar argued, be characteristic of lawyers, but it presents itself 
nonetheless, in matters of such gravity, as a prudent alternative to not thinking at 
all. 
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Epilogue: A Salutary Demise 
 
 
“We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the 
record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a 
poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.” 
 
Justice Robert Jackson, Opening Address to the International Military Trial,  
November 10th, 1945 
 
 
The varied enthusiasms in favor of the establishment of international 
criminal “lawlike”647 bodies that characterized 1990s scholarship and activism—
rekindling the legacy of Nuremberg, exporting Western legalism and human 
rights to the needy, writing history and effecting reconciliation— stand in stark 
contrast to what I have found to exist and motivate actual international criminal 
law. At the outset, I made clear that this work reflected the disposition of a 
skeptic. This epilogue is meant to test the limits of that skepticism.  
The question can be posed quite clearly: can the enterprise of international 
criminal law, once its myriad shortcomings and perversions identified and 
analyzed, be reformed and thus retain its promise to create an international 
regime of norms reflecting the rule of law to be applied equally to all? 
Those who would champion the cause of reform look forgivingly at 
international criminal law’s shortcomings; instead they choose to see “a fledgling 
cause that needs to be sheltered from the ordinary conditions of inquiry,”648 and 
crucially, a cause that deserves time to self-correct whatever lacunae might 
blemish the great cause of ending impunity. In the meantime, individuals are 	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prosecuted, and in some cases, the decisions of sovereign states’ highest courts 
are blithely disregarded, while the conspicuous and unavoidable reality of power 
in international relations works to create a de facto situation where the three 
most powerful states in the world—and permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council: The United States, China, and the Russian 
Federation—are not, and show no signs of wanting to become members of the 
International Criminal Court. Many states in the African continent have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the court’s sole prosecution of Africans, and 
the African Union has voted in favor of—but has yet to ratify—the establishment 
of a regional body with jurisdiction over the main international criminal offenses, 
as well as other proposed crimes, arguably more suited to specific legal 
preoccupations of the continent.649 Of special note are environmental offenses, 
trafficking offenses, as well as the ability to prosecute corporations. Contrary to 
the ICC, the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights does not 
contain an opt out clause for the crime of aggression, held by the Nuremburg 
tribunal to be the “supreme international crime.” The offenses envisaged in the 
African Union body are the following: 
• genocide; 
• crimes against humanity; 
• war crimes; 
• the crime of unconstitutional change of government; 
• piracy; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 Beth Van Schaak, “Immunity Before the African Court of Justice & Human & Peoples Rights—
the Potential Outlier,” Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/12732/immunity-african-
court-justice-human-peoples-rights-the-potential-outlier/ 
	   230	  
• terrorism; 
• mercenarism; 
• corruption; 
• money laundering; 
• trafficking in persons; 
• trafficking in drugs; 
• trafficking in hazardous wastes; 
• illicit exploitation of natural resources; and 
• the crime of aggression. 
 
As the original two ad hoc tribunals created by the UN Security Council in 
the 1990s come to a close, the question of the preservation of international 
criminal law depends largely on the legitimacy to be afforded to the ICC, and at 
present, that is challenged both by non-participation by powerful states, as well 
as by the African Union’s bold legal rejoinder. Even once reservedly supportive 
veteran Western observers of the court have come to critique its “prudent 
cowardice, that looks only at the crimes of failed, routed peoples, and forgets 
those of nations that impose their domination.”650 
If the ICC could realistically be reformed, it would be possible to conceive 
of something like a checklist of deficiencies in order to then go about applying 
appropriate corrective measures. It might cease disregarding decisions of 
domestic supreme courts; it might refuse to follow Security Council referrals as in 
the catastrophic case of Libya—but no, it actually could not. And it seems fairly 
clear that there will not be Russian and Chinese participation in such initiatives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
650 My translation of Stéphanie Maupas, Le Joker des puissants : le grand roman de la Cour 
pénale internationale, (Paris : Editions Don Quichotte, 2016). 
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for at least the next two decades. There stops the checklist. It could not in any 
likelihood, as Palestine so ardently wishes, investigate Israelis; it will not 
prosecute American actions in Afghanistan (as some legalistically dream), and 
after all, as the late British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook put it, the ICC “was not 
set up to bring to book Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom or Presidents of 
the United States.”651  
Inequality before international criminal courts, and within the powerful 
states that promote the soon to be bankrupt project demands a return to Anne-
Marie Slaughter’s caution about international normative institutions: the time is 
ripe to assert that indeed they have evolved in manner disconcertingly 
reminiscent of 19th century distinctions between civilized and uncivilized. Even 
Radhabinod Pal’s seething dissent in the Tokyo trials seems appropriate in 
examining the ICC today,652 and though it cannot be said that contemporary 
international relations reflects the kind of colonialism—though it may well 
constitute another653— against which he justifiably railed, it is nonetheless 
apparent that the ICC can do nothing to afflict the comfortable, and has done far 
too little to comfort the afflicted. 
Against the idealism of the proponents of the international criminal justice 
project is raised a materialist diagnosis: the costs of the endeavor are simply too 
high, both at home and abroad. Another idealism is required: that which would 	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652 Ibid.  
653 Ibid. Varadarajan notes that the ICC has only prosecuted individuals from Africa. The 
continent’s wealth in raw materials, overt foreign military operations there, and the ICC’s 
prosecutorial strategy are not, she contends,  “mere coincidence.” 
	   232	  
shift the focus of rights and law discourse—and eventually practice—from a 
collective summum malum to a broader project of summum bonum. A genuine 
reclamation of American virtue surely requires attention to the shocking reality of 
income inequality, its impact on education, health, life expectancy, and indeed 
democracy, rather than a miserly focus on atrocities abroad, while US foreign 
policy itself has in too many ways failed to “stay the hand of vengeance.” 
Skepticism can easily be confused with pessimism, even cynicism, but it is 
truly pessimistic not to mourn the coming demise of a failed, costly and 
distracting project? History appears to be proving that the early optimism in the 
international criminal law project was at the very least misplaced. And as Isaac 
Deutscher put it, “Awareness of historical perspective seems to me to provide the 
best antidote to extravagant pessimism as well as extravagant optimism over the 
great problems of our time.”654 
Seen this way, the emergence of post cold-war international criminal law 
looks less like Nuremberg, and much more like Tokyo: a tribunal the world would 
have been better off without. It is time to abandon international prosecutorial 
zeal and turn instead to “the great problems of our time” at home, without 
extravagance, but with clear-minded determination for the greater good. 
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